South Asia and Central Asia: Geopolitical Dynamics

Ambrish Dhaka

MANGAL DEEP PUBLICATIONS
JAIPUR

To
Father

Preface

South Asia and Central Asia are the two proximate regions that have governed much crucial aspects of world geopolitics in the 19th and 20th century. The overarching influence of Cold War and Communist Movement overshadowed much of their past in Afghan rivalry. The regions were set back to back as if there was no historical acknowledgment of each other's presence with variety of links serving the two regions. The post-90s changed the world dramatically where the political hold of the Russians declined comparatively. Interestingly, the Central Asian Republics (CARs) were fiercely opposed to the disintegration of USSR. No doubt their socialist credentials have been the contact of the first order whilst the making of Indian nationalism.

South and Central Asia are basically contrasting regions, with some crucial commonalities. The socio-economic evolution of South Asian peoples has been essentially based upon settled agrarian practice. On the other hand, the Central Asian peoples have been pastoral societies. Thus, historically they have been the near perfect reciprocities, considering their

political economy. Another important aspect is their geographical location. Central Asia is the entrepot between the Orient and the Occidental worlds. The famous Silk Route multiplied into numerous strands reaching South Asia, Central Europe and Russia, the Mediterranean and the far East Asia.

The book is an attempt to see all this compage as a backdrop to future possibilities of the two regions setting afresh an agenda for cooperation under the current regime of globalization and WTO. The vast energy reserves are natural inclination for never satiating demand for South Asian market. But, howsoever, such opportune overtures are engineered, the real agenda for cooperation is set only with backward and forward linkages between the crucial sectors of the economies of the countries in both the regions. This exercise can transform the full space into another hub of economic opulence.

Based on these novel assumptions, the book is a harbinger to further explorations of opportunities that lie ahead.

I acknowledge constant encouragement of Late Sh. B.K. Mangal of Mangal Deep Publications who made vital efforts to bring out this book.

Ambrish Dhaka

Contents

	Preface	vii
1.	Introduction	1
2.	The Geopolitical Theory	31
3.	Development of Geoeconomic Thought	63
4.	South Asia and Central Asia: The Regional Semblance	95
5.	South Asia and Central Asia Geopolitics and Geoeconomics	142
6.	Conclusion	197
	Bibliography	209
	Index	215

1

Introduction

The post-Soviet era has seen the emergence of new patterns of geopolitical relations world over. Old powering blocks have been stumbling. Developing countries have been reshuffling their political and economic allegiance and the US, the sole superpower, is now assured of its unchallengeable supremacy. Simultaneously, there has been a general recognition of failures on the front of the Third World economic development and the growth of ethno-political issues, and the role of the UN and its agencies in resolving them. The failure of the North-South dialogue for economic cooperation, rising disparity of status between the developed and the developing countries at WTO, the continued oppression of Palestine people and the strenuous relations between Russia and the NATO are the residuary Cold War interpolations for the present century. These assertions shall have long-term implications for relations between the communities and the nations in the present century under what is popularly known as the New International Economic Order (NIEO). Emergence of global structures and institutional paradigms are finding their role in reordering smaller units such as regions and nation-states in an evanescent global hierarchy. Among these universal features, there has been inception of several unique regional formations that have time-bound relevance.

Central Asia is one such newly emergent region that has the potential for development of geopolitical linkages with neighboring regions, such as South Asia, which itself is the largest conundrum of civilization and acclaimed as one of the hotspots for 'clash of civilizations'. Notwithstanding the high mountains of Himalayas and the Hindukush between the two Asias, the historical–political linkages in the form of cultural and commercial contacts have been since times anon. The sinuous pathways through hilly terrain and narrow passes have seen thousand years of movement of peoples from both the regions.

This book is an interdisciplinary (systemic-regional)[1] study in political geography. It sets with the framework of analysing the core geographical concern, i.e., the region, here as a geopolitical unit that can identify the role of state influencing the sense of territoriality and political organization of spaces and peoples.[2] The aim is also to analyse the hitherto major trends of geopolitical modelling and its present extension up to geoeconomics. And test its applicability in the context of South Asia vis-à-vis Central Asia.

The role of political process in transforming the regional characteristics has been recognised, so do the economic processes. However, the major object of investigation for a geographer is not the process, but the scales at which they are operating and thereby delimit the region on this account. Primary identifiable indicators of a geopolitical region are its territorial boundary, area under military operations, extent of international grouping, war, degree of control over vital resources and lines of communications, and the strategic deployment and covert operations. The regional formulation of political consciousness ranging from proto- to ultra-nationalism is the primary propagator of communal organization of society (internal and external) in a region. The spatial manifestations of ethnic, caste and racial considerations enter into political process and they also define the spatial patterns of occupational structure, mode of production and

social organization based on surplus value and division of labour. This tends to generate class like patterns in society and its space, riding on ethnic, religious or cast lines, seeking to assert regional-political differentiation, thereby posing serious challenge to existent nation-state formations. Both South Asia and Central Asia in the beginning of 20th century came across this issue and dealt in a unique manner. The South Asian thrust mainly relied upon countering such tendency through more and more politicization and democratization of society. On the other hand, Central Asian efforts mainly concentrated upon planned economic development and socialist mode of production.

The independence of Central Asian Republics (CARs) has provided a unique opportunity to study the role these factors in cultivation of their independent policy posture. This shall also help study the modified South Asian milieu that has generated debate on India as an agency of globalization in the region. There have been energized efforts to involve these states in economic, political and cultural spheres. Though, there had been significant interaction during the days of Soviet Union, but it was much under Moscow-Delhi umbrella. Former Prime Minister of India A.B. Vajpai had aptly remarked that the security of India is the security of South Asia.[3] Besides, there are equally newer economic opportunities to find trading partners under the energized efforts to globalize economy.

Basic Delineations

The context of studying geopolitical dynamics for both the regions can be laid as follows:

1. Central Asia States and South Asia States are influentially linked with deep-rooted historical, cultural and socialist ties.

2. Regional Cooperation based on South-South dialogue is a necessary link between economic regions and the globalization of trade.
3. South Asia and Central Asia have a host of opportunities to interact in geopolitical and geoeconomic framework.
4. Globalization and trade liberalization can be taken advantage only of strengthening Moscow-Delhi ties between India and Central Asia.
5. Central Asian Republics affect to a certain degree South Asian balance of power.
6. Geopolitical influence across the two sub-continents run intertwined with ethnic, religious and cultural identities.
7. The major concern on both sides is the export of ethno-sectarian terrorism, fundamentalism, and drug and arms trafficking.
8. Afghanistan perpetuates a critically important geopolitical situation that is constrictive of any geoeconomic imperatives.
9. Oil and natural gas potential of Central Asia along with Indian market provides geoeconomic motives to find a way out to these problems.
10. India's geostrategic interest lies in maintaining the monocline gradient of strategic power relations in South Asia vis-à-vis Central Asia.

The existing geopolitical concerns and the complementary relationship arises from the present status of Central Asia and its economic, cultural and political growth sending impulses all around in vicinity. This certainly has potential to influence South Asian milieu. It is believed that certain initiatives shall emerge that will stabilize their contacts for more peace and growth.

Regional Cooperation and the 'Third World': A Geostrategic Outlook to the New World Order

According to Leslie Wolf Phillips and Joseph L. Love, the term 'Third World' originated with the French scholar Alfred Sauvy, who coined the term 'Tiers Monde' in 1952 in one of his articles, 'Tiers Mondes, Une Planete'. His analogy was to the 'Tiers Etat' of the French Revolution. He wrote, "...this Third World (is) unknown, exploited, despised like the Third Estate, it too wants to be something"[4]. Although there has been no ideological unity between Third World countries, they share common trauma of underdevelopment and poverty. The Bandung Conference in 1955 more clearly defined the term amidst growing struggle for supremacy between Soviet Russia and the Western Capitalist world.

They share a common characteristics:

1. *Colonial history*: All the countries of the Third World had colonial past in some form or the other. The European powers exploited and used them as 'raw material appendage' in order to build their economy. Thereby, making poverty and underdevelopment characteristic to them.
2. *Poverty*: The massive exploitation and destruction of native economy rendered whole of Africa, Asia and Latin America into large-scale famine, hunger and poverty.
3. *National Security*: Emergence of Third World nations accompanied with ethno-cultural reassertions, resurgent feudal conflicts, class-culture contradictions rendering their territorial integrity vulnerable to partition, separatism and reactionary nationalistic movements.
4. *Plural Contradictions*: Third World largely consisted of tribal and feudal institutions. There had been strong cultural value systems, which came into severe challenge under colonialism. The post-colonial phase

> saw acute sharpening of these conflicts giving shades of regionalism, communalism, casteism, religious nationalism, and other ethno-cultural leanings.[5]

Globalization has taken the developing countries on a roller coaster ride. The autonomy of State has come under evasive nuances under its operation. The developing nations have the right to choose the path of development in accordance with their national priorities and objectives. There is need to reverse the growing disparity between the rich and the poor, both among and within countries through promotion of growth with equity, eradication of poverty, the expansion of productive employment and the promotion of gender equality and social integration. There is an urge in its wake for a North-South dialogue based on a spirit of partnership, mutual benefit and genuine interdependence in order to expedite the removal of these constraints. The international economic governance institutions must promote broad based decision-making, which is essential if we are to have a more equitable global political economy.

The persistent endemic poverty and the deprivation in the South constitute a potential threat to the security and prosperity of the world. There is a need to restore the confidence in multilateral trading system. The South-South cooperation is an effective instrument for optimizing the developing world potential to promote development through mobilizing and sharing of existing of resources and expertise in these countries, as well as complementing cooperation programme with donor countries. Such cooperation is all the more important, in the context of globalization and that should be pursued with determination and political will. As assertively put by Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohammed:

> "All the unclaimed wealth of this earth" is "common heritage of mankind, and therefore subject to the political control of the Third World."[6]

There is also another dimension to this approach. South-South cooperation is an essential mechanism for promoting sustained economic growth and sustainable development in a sense that it constitutes a vital element in promoting constructive South-South relations and achieving self-reliance. The recent initiative to promote cooperation between Africa and Latin America and the Caribbean, as well as between Africa and Asia, for example, the issue of desertification, drought and land degradation in joint efforts to implement the UNC to Combat Desertification in Africa, is highly commendable.

The UN declared the Year 2001 as the *Year of Dialogue among Civilizations.* This shall lend an additive help in understanding of diverse cultures and promoting North-South and South-South cooperation. There is a growing importance of information technology in social and economic development programmes. The developed nations should facilitate the transfer of technology, easing the costs and collateral conditions that presently obstruct its smooth transfer. The 21st century shall find the world concerns over primarily on two themes: Peace, Security and Disarmament and Development and Poverty Eradication; and the bottom line is, "*Development is the best contribution to Peace, and that both are built together*".

South Asia and Central Asia: A Case for Geostrategic Regional Cooperation

The studied region (Central Asian Republics, popularly known as CARs) has been chosen for currently being in focus for international community due to a variety of geostrategic and geoeconomic concerns. The post-Soviet order offers business, defence, strategy and plethora of interest hovering around these newly independent states. The most important of them being a classical paradox: a landlocked cultural region but geographically an entrépot of socio-political, cultural influences from all the four directions and with the potential

to transmit the influences from one region to another, even by maintaining a strong identity.

Oil Geopolitics of Central Asia

Central Asia is the promising region for oil and natural gas supply to ever hydrocarbon hungry South Asia. Its enormous natural gas reserves can help generate electricity much needed for industrial development in South Asia. But there are strong hurdles to its materialization. The Afghanistan situation and the stymied state of Indo-Pak relations have bellowed down an early hope. India is pursuing its efforts to develop regional contact despite these constraints embarking upon traditional ties with Iran, the gateway to these republics.

Resources are not the only aspect of regional cooperation between South Asia, especially India, and the CARs. There is a host of legacy of Indo-Soviet relations, which have dominated every sphere of Indian national interests. The basic approach to eliminate poverty from sub-continent shall remain dependent on redistribution capabilities of the Indian State. This links up Indian masses with the more democratic and socialist tools of governance so deeply entrenched into the ways and means of these newly independent republics. The way these states have brought about social and cultural change in their society is an example to Indian planners for development.

Central Asia was planned to extract the maximum out of agglomeration economies of scale between resource-rich neighbouring regions. The region-to-region linking up chain like structure strongly contributed to Soviet growth under Gosplan. This cooperation in decentralized manner is an important feature that has gone unrecognized in the glaze of globalization.

Level of specialization at micro-region level has been significant unit in creating larger higher units. Initially, the idea was found with Soviet Geographers, who had vast land area dispensed with unevenly dispersed resources providing

enormous challenge to bring socialist equity.[7] The magnanimous efforts to integrate the regions are no doubt the precursor to present global edifice of inter-regional cooperation. This approach is finding its place under the global treatment of nation-states. The materialistic base of globalization cannot afford to ignore such forces of decentralization while consolidating the leadership of few nations.

Contemporary Relevance

The relationship between South Asia and Central Asia dates back to the dawn of history. There were trade and commerce, cultural and religious contacts, and some recent archaeological work now suggest that Indus Valley Civilization had links with the ancient civilizations as far as Turkmenistan. Central Asia had been the meeting point for the great religions of Hinduism, Buddhism and Islam. Over the centuries, the interaction between these three great civilizations, their Saints, Bhiksus, Sufis, literature, travellers, their traders enriched the Asian scene to a very great extent, but it had been the Islam that played the lasting role in the development of historical and cultural linkages between the two regions.[8]

The subsequent period of colonization of this region, attended by economic exploitation and cultural disruption, led to progressive suspension of contacts between the two regions. The whole area became entangled into what was known as the *Great Game,* in which the Soviet and the British vied the mainland bridge—Afghanistan for supremacy.

This struggle reverberates in the present-day complex scenario of non-governance in Afghanistan as well the struggle between India and Pakistan for supremacy over Karakoram region. The post-Cold War period has seen the reassertion of ethnic, linguistic and religious identities alongside the powerful movement towards globalization. However, the quest remains for the regional-cultural linkages that can only sustain any other political or economic edifice. Only coming events can

show whether both Central and South Asia are ready for the aforesaid task? Some affinities have been projected by interested nations as resurgence of a clash with modern jargon painting it as civilizational. South Asia, especially under the leadership of India is keen to put away these aberrations from the newer opportunities that cooperative world presents more than ever before.

Central Asian States are under process of institutionalizing democracy and socio-cultural edifice that they feel essential to safeguard their national identity. One of the important areas has been post-Soviet social order. Looking back, the formation of Central Asian States has been a unique process in the history of nation-state formation. Under the Marxist-Leninist approach, it had been the pioneering effort of normative geoeconomic modelling. On October 24, 1924, the Central Executive Committee of the USSR adopted the resolution of formulation of these states. The immediate task was to eliminate the socio-economic as well as cultural backwardness of Central Asia. There were landmark changes in agriculture, and industrialization began with emphasis on textile industry. The advent of socialist mode of production was an important social transformation in Central Asian history. After 1991, there has been serious adjustment between the socialist life and new intrusions of cultural-radical Islamic traditions.

Speaking at the symposium of 'Friends of Central Asia Forum', Dr. Bhisma Narain Singh stressed that the instability in the region or the problems of ethnic conflict, terrorism and drug-trafficking had serious implications for both the regions, just as development and stability were in the common interest of both. Central Asia has been often viewed with concerns such as:

1. what future holds for the region,
2. will the new nations find stability and a firm identity as sovereign states free of external influences,

3. would these states break up further into their smaller ethnic constituent parts and cease to be viable individually,
4. what is the status of these states in the wake of nuclear and conventional arms proliferation and control, and
5. how all these affect South Asia, the most vulnerable vicinity?

Geo-strategically, Central Asia is a potential influencing factor to the power equation in South Asia. There is an overall influencing of 'resurgent' Islam, and both revivalism and containment process seem to accentuate. The region possessed large nuclear arsenal in Asia, and quite dangerously, the region has tendency to slide into retrogression. Most of these states are in agreement with NATO forces for security and stability in the region.

Afghanistan situation conveys a significant leverage upon Central Asian stability. This has led to extraordinary manoeuvres in this region. The *suo moto* governance by Taliban had no policy structures and ethics while conducting relations with its neighbours, save Pakistan. This was fraught with repercussions for Central Asia, such as, cross-border terrorism, narco-terrorism and political violence. They currently do not seem to acquire serious concerns directly for South Asian balance of power and geostrategy, esp. for India. However, they had been a rallying point for sectarian forces in Pakistan who are staunch adversaries to any dialogue on Kashmir dispute. The Kandhar episode revealed the generality of instability running across South Asia and Central Asia with the Kashmir dispute at one side and the Afghan imbroglio on the other. Any deterioration on this account is bound to affect India's security, threat perception and strategic preparations.

Central Asia too, is a region that is currently witnessing disputes of multiple orders. Big powers like, Russia, the US and China are engaged in geoeconomic and geostrategic tussle

over it[9]. At the regional level, Iran, Turkey, Pakistan and Russia are engaged in geopolitical and geo-cultural dominance. Russia at this juncture needs India to share some of its burden, exhausting energies at both global and regional level, by involving in Afghanistan. This complex situation has created a geopolitical matrix significantly important for India, where India-Russia[10]/India-Russia-China[11]/India-US(Schurman.htm)[12] /US-China / Russia- Pakistan / Russia-China, are the emergent sets of relationship. This has involved in lot of change in attitudes as well as discouraging old mindsets.

South Asia and Central Asia: An Introduction

It will be pertinent to take a brief look at the nature of land mass that has great importance in shaping the destinies of its peoples'. The two regions are great contrasting land masses. Central Asia is a continental block with no maritime climate. South Asia is a mix of both continental and maritime climate.



Figure 1 South Asia, Central Asia and Afghanistan

Perhaps the most pertinent geographical unit, yet the most ignored unit till September 11 attacks has been the case of Afghanistan. It links more than separate the two regions. However, the fate of this country continues to be under the impact of post-Cold War ramifications. This is the conduit of all geopolitical and geoeconomic influences that can tread across the regions. Afghanistan might have been acclaimed a 'failed state', but certainly not a failed geopolitics.

Regional Geography

Geographically, Central Asia and South Asia are proximate regions. The present-day Central Asia consists of the five former Soviet republics of Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, Khyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan. Although the Chinese Turkestan is also a geographical affinity to the region, but belonging to a different geopolitical sphere, it is not included. Table 1.1 shows the general dimensions of CARs. Kazakhstan is the largest country occupying around 2.7 million square kilometers, whereas Tajikistan, the smallest one with only 143,100 km sq. These states are generally arid and irrigation is the only major source of agricultural growth, however being rich in mineral wealth it has strong potential for a new Middle East. Petroleum, Natural Gas and abundant hydroelectric potential (Table 1.1) make them vital energy storehouse in an energy stricken twenty-first century.

Table. 1.1

Geographic Profile of Central Asian Republics

	Kazakhstan	*Kyrgyzstan*	*Tajikistan*	*Turkmenistan*	*Uzbekistan*
Total area km²	2,717,300	198,500	143,100	488,100	447,400
Climate	Continental, cold winters and hot summers, arid and semi-arid	Dry continental to polar in high Tien Shan, subtropical in southwest Ferghana valley, temperate in northern foothill zone	Midl-atitude continental, hot summers; mild winters, semi-arid to polar in Pamir Mountains	Subtropical desert	Mostly midl-atitude desert, long hot summers, mild winters, semi-arid grassland in east
Highest point (metres)	Khan Tangiri Shyngy- 6,995	Jengish Choksu- 7,439	Qullai Ismoili Somoni 7,495	Arybaba- 3,139	Adelunga Toghi 4,301
Natural resources	Petroleum, natural gas, coal, iron ore, manganese, chrome ore, nickel, cobalt, molybdenum, lead. zinc, bauxite, gold, uranium	Abundant hydropower, significant deposits of gold and rare earth metals, locally exploitable coal, oil and natural gas, other deposits of nepheline, mercury, bismuth, lead and zinc.	Significant hydropower potential, some petroleum, uranium, mercury, brown coal, lead, zinc, antimony, tungsten	Petroleum, natural gas, coal	Natural gas, petroleum, coal, gold, uranium, silver, copper, lead and zinc, tungsten
Irrigated land km² (1998)	23,320	10,740	7,200	18,000	42,810
Population	16,741,519	4,822,166	6,719,567	4,688,963	25,563,441

Pop. Density km²	6.2	24.3	47	9.6	57.1
Growth rate (%)	0.1	1.45	2.12	1.84	1.62
Birth rate	17.83	26.11	32.99	28.27	26.09
Death rate	10.69	9.1	8.51	8.92	7.98
Sex ratio (m/f)	0.92	0.96	0.99	0.98	0.98
Life expectancy	63.38	63.56	61.24	61.1	63.9
Total fertility rate	2.12	3.16	4.23	3.54	3.03
Literacy (%)	98.4	97	98	98	98
Urbanization[a] (%)	55.8	34.4	27.6	44.8	36.7

Source: CIA- The World Factbook-2002

a- Year 2000.

South Asia is synonymous to Indian sub-continent. India occupying most of the geographical space is adjoined by Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Bhutan and Maldives.

Physiography[13]

Geographically, they both are of similar size. South Asia is 28.23% larger than Central Asia. The major features of Central Asia are vast expanses of steppe grasslands in the extreme north, deserts and semi-deserts on flat, wide plains in the west and central areas and some of the highest mountain peaks in the world to the east and south. The South Asian land mass has lofty Himalayas to its north followed by Indo-Gangetic plains and the Deccan plateau in the south followed by the Sri Lankan island. Geologically speaking, the Himalayas are a product of two ancient land mass on either sides—the Peninsular South Asia in south and Paleozoic platforms of Tien Shan, Turan and other Mesozoic structures.[14]

The main mountain ranges of Central Asia run through as the Kopet-Dag (Koppeh Dagh) of northern Iran, the Hindu Kush of Afghanistan, the Pamirs, occupying most of Tajikistan to the south, and the Tien Shan, extending eastward into western China. The South Asian mountain ranges are the continuum of the Central Asian ranges emanating from Karakoram ranges and spreading into great Himalayas to the east and Sulaiman and Kirthar ranges in the south-west.

The two principal deserts are the Karakum (Turkic: 'Black Sand'), which occupies most of the territory of Turkmenistan, and the Kyzylkum (Turkic: 'Red Sand'), which covers much of western Uzbekistan. Their South Asian counterpart is Thar Desert, which is one big continuous unit spread between India and Pakistan. Its summer temperatures reach a maximum of 54 degree centigrade making it one of the extremely hot places in the world.

South Asia and Indian sub-continent are synonymous.[15] South Asia is broadly sub-divided into four major physiographic regions as: (1) the Peninsular (Deccan) plateau, (2) the Indo-Gangetic plains, (3) the Himalayas and (4) the Islands. Aravalli running northsouth in the mid-northwest of the sub-continent is one of the world's oldest mountain ranges dating back to pre-Cambrian period. Other peninsular ranges are the Vindhyas, Satpuras, Western Ghats (Sahyadri), Eastern Ghats and the Deccan plateau. The Indo-Gangetic plains running all along the foothills of the Sivaliks up to western ranges in Pakistan has had been the cradle to the civilization in South Asia. The agrarian system reached apotheosis here that caught Marx's attention as the Asiatic mode of production.

Himalayas are one of the youngest mountain ranges in geological times. They are still rising and longitudinally classified southwards as the Great Himalayas, Middle Himalayas and the Sivaliks. They run into Pamir knot in the northwest, where the Central Asian ranges progress northwards. This Alpino-Himalayan Cordillera primarily divides the south and the central parts of the two Asias. But, between them lay interspersed several passes that drew seemingly never-ending trails of the Great Game players.

Drainage

The two main river systems, the Amu Darya and Syr Darya and their tributaries, provide most of the water used in the countries of Central Asia with the exception of Kazakhstan. The Amu Darya (ancient Oxus River) is Central Asia's largest river. Fed by its tributaries, the Panj (Pyandzh), which constitutes the border between Central Asia and Afghanistan, and the Vakhsh, the Amu Darya flows northwestward for 1,578 miles before draining into the southern Aral Sea. Its major tributaries within Central Asia include the Zeravshan River and the Kashka River. Toward the end of their courses, the Zeravshan and Kashka flow westward into the sands of the Kyzylkum and, mainly because of evaporation and irrigation, seldom reach the Amu Darya.

The Syr Darya (ancient Jaxartes River) flows westward out of the Tien Shan, which forms Central Asia's eastern

border with China, onto an inter-montane basin called the Fergana Valley, a relatively flat plain that is almost entirely encircled by mountains. After flowing out of the Fergana Valley, it takes a sudden, almost 90° turn north through the extreme southern portion of Kazakstan and empties into the northeastern section of the Aral Sea. Like the Amu Darya, the Syr Darya is fed by snow and glaciers melting in the spring and summer; its volume of water flow is about half that of the Amu Darya. Together with its tributary, the Naryn, the Syr Darya is approximately 1,811 miles long.

South Asian river system is divided into two—the Himalayan mountain system and the Peninsular system. Indo-Gangetic river basin has been the cradle of civilization for South Asia. Rivers from Himalayas are further classified under Indus system, Ganga system and Brahmaputra system. The tributaries of Indus, Satluj, Ganga, Gomti, Ghaghra, Gandak, Kosi, Tista and Brahmaputra provide enormous water resources for an opulent year round agriculture. However, there is steep decline in water availability as one moves towards western part of the sub-continent. The vast expanses of Thar Desert have witnessed years of drought bringing much loss of life ..nd cattle. Irrigation in these regions draws an analogy with Central Asian irrigation system.

Climate

Central Asia experiences arid climatic conditions, and inadequate precipitation has led to a dependence on irrigation from limited regional resources. In comparison with the rest of the Eurasian land mass, Central Asia is particularly deficient in precipitation and has high rates of evaporation.

Sparse precipitation, wide range in annual temperatures, and very low humidity characterize most of Central Asia. Average annual precipitation gradually rises eastward from the dry western desert margins to the foothills of the Altai Mountains and Tien Shan. Average precipitation just to the south of the Aral Sea is only about 3 inches (75 millimetres)

per year. At Bukhara in central Uzbekistan the amount rises to about 5 inches per year; the area is thus still a desert. But at Tashkent, near the base of the mountains in the east, precipitation averages about 14 inches per year, enough to make the area semiarid in winter but desert in the hot, dry summer. In the Fergana Valley in the east, surrounded by high mountains that cut off rain-bearing winds, precipitation is low.

Wide average annual temperature ranges reflect the extreme continentality of the climate. In the Aral Sea basin the difference between typical winter temperatures in January and hot summer temperatures in July approaches 60° F (33° C). Temperatures also rise and fall very rapidly. The high temperatures, bright sunshine, low precipitation, and low relative humidity levels during the growing season (April to October) throughout Central Asia underlie the necessity of irrigation for agricultural production.

South Asia is a monsoon land with stark contrasts. The advent of monsoon is a harbinger to all agricultural activities in the region. The precipitation in the northeastern part of the sub-continent is one of the highest in world. On the other hand the central Indian plateau and western desert are low rain-fed areas. The 100 centimetre isohyets run through the heart of the sub-continent. It serves as a divide in several nuances, viz., the rice and wheat regions, tropical and semi-arid regions, and other.

The upper air atmospheric circulation plays important role in augmenting southwest monsoon winds towards Indian sub-continent. Central Asian land mass plays significant role in conditioning of monsoons in South Asia. The high-pressure air streams overarch the Gangetic plains during winter. It is primarily responsible for the westerly disturbances intermittently arriving over Indo-Gangetic plains. Its retreat sets the northward movement of Inter Tropical Convergence Zone (ITCZ), the harbinger of summer monsoons.

Rainfall decreases from east to west and south to north. The variability is stark in terms of regional variations. Lower

Ganga basin of Bangladesh, eastern Himalayas in Bhutan and northeastern India receive one of the highest amount of precipitation world over.

Social and Economic Indicators

South Asia and Central Asia are a good contrast in this regard. The total population of Central Asia is 58.5 millions, which is less than 5% of the whole South Asian peoples (1.4 billion). Table 1.2 helps to draw a stark demographic contrast between the two regions. Central Asia because of its vast land area is sparsely populated region. The average population density ranges from 6 for Kazakhstan, 10 Turkmenistan, 25 Kyrgyzstan, 49 Tajikistan, to 59 for Uzbekistan (Table 1.1). On the other hand, South Asia is a heavily populated part of world ranging from average density of 982 persons per square kilometer for Bangladesh, 324 India, 303 Sri Lanka, 192 Nepal, 198 Pakistan and 47 for Bhutan (Table 1.2). Population growth of Central Asian Republics has witnessed low growth due to mass exodus of Russians after their independence. South Asia has only in the last decade succeeded to bring its population growth rate lesser than 2. Central Asian Republics show sex ratio in favour to female population, whereas only Sri Lanka does match the case in South Asia.

Table 1.2

Demographic Profile of South Asia.

Demographic Profile[A]	*Bangladesh*	*Bhutan*	*India*[A]	*Nepal*	*Pakistan*	*Sri lanka*	*Afghanistan*
Total Population	141,340,476	2,185,569	1,065,070,607	27,070,666	159,196,336	19,905,165	28,513,677
Population Density (sq. km)	982	47	324	192	198	303	44.04
Annual Growth Rate (%):	2.08	2.12	1.44	2.23	1.98	0.81	4.92
Urban Population[B] (%):	23.9	8.2	28.1	14.6	33.7	21.1	--
Birth rate	30.03	34.41	22.8	31.96	31.22	15.88	47.27
Total Fertility Rate	3.15	4.87	2.85	4.29	4.29	1.88	6.78
Death Rate	8.52	13.2	8.38	9.66	9.66	6.47	21.12
Life Expectancy (yrs)	61.71	53.99	63.99	59.4	59.4	72.89	42.46
Infant Mortality Rate	64.32	102.56	57.92	68.77	68.77	14.78	165.96
Sex Ratio (m/f)	1.05	1.07	1.07	1.06	1.06	1.05	1.05
Literacy Rate	43.1	42.2	59.5	45.2	45.2	92.3	36

Source: A. CIA–The World Factbook-2002.
B. HDR-2002.

The influence of Soviet planning is clearly discernible by the heavy urbanization in Central Asian Republics. Kazakhstan, despite its low population density has the highest urban population ratio among CARs, with 55.8% of the total population (Table 1.1). Turkmenistan (45.4) and Uzbekistan (36.8) are moderately urbanized, whereas Kyrgyzstan (34) and Tajikistan (25) have low urbanization primarily because of predominant pastoral economy and hilly terrain. South Asia is largely a rural sub-continent, but its urban population is the single largest consumer market vied by TNCs. No doubt South Asia is one of the largest economic consortium with the total GDP of $565.4 billion dollars (current US, 1998). Central Asia stands hardly to that comparison with $44.9 billion dollars (current US, 1998). Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan account for more than 86% of the total regional product. Another important aspect is their economic structure. This shows their comparability with the developed nations in some form. Services sector contribute in significant terms to these economies averaging 43.43% of the total contribution, which is quite comparable to South Asia averaging 46.7%. But the real difference is marked out by industrial sector contributing to only 25.6% for South Asia, whereas Central Asia has 30.26% of contribution from this sector revealing the Soviet base of their economy.

The Central Asian economies are awaiting a significant international economic integration. These economies were traditionally integrated to Soviet economy hence they command a high ratio of exports and imports of goods and services vis-à-vis GDP. South Asia averages 12.7% for exports and 16% for imports, whereas Central Asia averages 46.45% (excluding Turkmenistan) and 52.7% (excluding Turkmenistan). This brings into focus the high dependability of CARs on international economic environment.

Historical Cultural Ties

Central Asia and South Asia have witnessed close links since second millennium BC. Central Asia played a significant role in the cultural intermingling of the Harappans and the Aryans in the earlier phase. And later, during the medieval period, once again the great traditions introduced by major ruling elites significantly reformulated the South Asian society.

Cultural contact started showing reciprocity, first during the times of Buddha. The Bactrian kings were the first to provide protégé to ancient Hindu sects of Shiva, Krishna and then Buddhist teachings. Buddhist inscriptions in Kharoshti, and Buddhist stupas and monasteries are found not only in Gandhara but also in Kapisa and as far north as Tirmiz, the City of Crossing on the Oxus. Both Balkh and Tirmiz remained strong centres right up to the time when Islam replaced it. By the time when the great Kushanas had built their empire in Central Asia and South Asia, the Silk Road had extended its trade connections from China and India through Central Asia to the Western world. Along with the spread of Gandhara form of art, the Mahayana sect emerged along with it and subsequently spread along the Silk Road through Afghanistan to all the Republics in Central Asia, from Swat to Tibet, and along Karakoram Highway to China, Korea and Japan.

It is worth noting that a temple dedicated to Shiva and Uma has been found at Panchkent in Tajikistan.[16] The Arabs came to Central Asia in 751 AD after the battle of Talash (modern Zambul in Kazakhstan). Islam first spread in the Sogdians, the Tajiks and the Turks. As Buddhism receded, Central Asia became new home of Islam and absorbed the local traditions. All the old Buddhist places—Merv, Tirmiz, Balkh, Bukhara, Smarkand, Khojand, Farghana, Osh and Kashgar became the new Islamic centres. Although the Arabs first introduced Islam in South Asia, its large-scale influence took place only after the conquest of the Gaznavid Sultans

when the Sufi saints began to pour in South Asia. The Buddhist monks earlier took Buddhism from South Asia to Central Asia but now the Sufis brought Muslim culture from Central Asia to South Asia. Buddhist literature, religion and art carved a tremendous impact on the socio-religious life of Central Asia. Later the Persian language and literature from Central Asia got a new fervour in South Asian environs. Such cultural and trade links continued between the two regions until the imperial age dawned in the late eighteenth century.

The economic concessions were acquired by Czarist Russia from the Amirates and Khannates in Central Asia and from South Asia the British prevented the trade pattern, channelling it to the Sea Route. According to eminent archaeologist Ahmad H. Dani, time has come that the people of Asia should mobilize themselves to a renewed understanding of cooperation where so much of legacy stands for a justice.

Kashmir: The Geo-cultural Entrépot

The geo-cultural importance of Kashmir cannot be ignored under the present heuristics for the commonalities between the two regions. Kashmir acted as a land bridge since ancient times, and later during the subsequent inter-regional cultural osmosis. Prior to Kushans, the region is referred in Nilamata Purana, as occupied by the Nagas, the Pishachas, the Gandharvas, the Shakas, the Sungas, the Tunganas and the Yavanas. Nagas are considered to be of Turanian stock. The Persians designated Central Asia as Turan.[17]

There is ample proof that some of the migrant tribes of Central Asia occupied Kashmir, and majority of whom migrated to Chinese Central Asia, especially the Tarim basin. These Indians engaged in commercial activities in the oasis towns along the Silk Road. The 2nd century BC saw extension of Kushana Empire towards northwestern regions of Indian sub-continent. Kalhana's *Rajtarangini* provides historical evidence of three kings who ruled Kashmir for about

100 years. Kanishka was a great patron of Gandhara art and architecture. He built a colossal stupa near Peshawar. The fourth Buddhist council was held at Kashmir. This council was a milestone as it marked a new epoch for the Sarvastinvadin school of Buddhism. Its doctrines penetrated into Kabul, Bactria, Central Asia and Tibet. The first missionary that brought Buddhism to Central Asia was Vairochana. He was a Kashmiri Buddhist scholar who built a monastery near Khotan. The Chinese annexed Khotan around 382 AD. Buddhism was introduced to China from Central Asia. In 631 AD, famous Chinese pilgrim Huen Tsang came to Kashmir through Uri route. The 6th century AD saw powerful Huns swaying over Central Asia and Afghanistan. Large numbers of copper coins of Toraman Hun have been recovered from Kashmir.

After the decline of Huns, it was only during the Timurid reign that Central Asia regained its lost glory. Islam came to Kashmir through saints, scholars and traders from Iran and Central Asia. Gyalpo Rinchina, the Buddhist king of Kashmir embraced Islam in about 1323 AD. Several handicrafts and cultural traditions were introduced in the region. The Mughal period introduced Kashmir into Indian geo-cultural feature, and the subsequent period saw it in the Indian sub-continent framework.

Kashmir once again became crucial focus between Central Asia and South Asia during the Great Game between Russia and Great Britain. The Maharaja of Kashmir, Ranbir Singh attempted to extend frontiers up to Central Asia.[18] Several spy missions continued, both from the Russian and the British side. The Forsyth Mission gained popularity during Great Game, when he was deputed to conduct a mission to Yarkand and secure a commerce treaty with the rulers of Yarkand and Kashgar.[19]

Brief Review

The following chapters shall discuss geopolitical theory and its approach to set of equations involving regional economic, strategic cooperation in the backdrop of international terrorism and religious extremism witnessed by South Asia and Central Asia in the post-Soviet geopolitical framework.

First chapter introduces the backdrop of the study proposed. The researcher believes that the Post-Soviet world has brought a host of concerns on varying plane. The regional approach though subdued under the glaze of globalization is all the more important for recognizing the true essence of globalization in optimizing full cooperation between neighbouring nations and regions, thereby generating the economies of agglomeration. This also harps upon the need to relocate the proprieties of strategic partnership in tandem with the economic goals pursued.

The second and the third chapters deal with the theoretical framework of regional existence of a nation and the organic perception of its ecumene. Geopolitical thinking has been part of ruling elite consciousness since the times of Aristotle. *Lebensraum*, one of the key concepts of geopolitics has been used to distinguish the communitarian interests of a nation. Geopolitics is essentially an existentialist form of reasoning. Herodotus was the first to notice the integration of socio-cultural factors in political structuring of the region. The propositions of geopolitics can be classified into **three** thematic understanding: the concept of organic characteristics of a nation provided by Ratzel, the nodal strength of a state over global space provided by Mahan, and the spatial dynamics of state agency propounded by Rudolf Kjellen.

Geopolitics became more akin to understanding the imperial integration of world. Its foremost learning centres emerged in UK, Germany and the USA. Mackinder was the first to conceive the spatial differentiation of world into hierarchy of regions. In later schools, geopolitics got enmeshed

into military science. Cold War served as a cradle to geopolitics. The socio-political structure of nations hardly gained ground into this hermeneutic mode. Scholars such as Saul B. Cohen provided the amalgamation of both these approaches. Later in 80s, John O. Loughlin attempted to provide a quantitative model for geopolitical location of conflict. Cold War brought serious implications for the world politics. The world was firmly divided into the Imperialists, the Socialists and the Third World. Henry Kissinger noticed that geopolitics is essentially a game of shifting of the latter in respect of the former two.

The monopoly of world capitalism has succeeded in steering geoeconomic arrangement of international relations. Conceptual beginnings of geoeconomics can be traced in the works of famous French geographer Vidal de la Balche. His concept of *Pays* is an important component in visualizing economic behaviour of nations. In his article, 'Geographical Conditions of Social Facts', he pointed that man with his occupation creates distinctive countries, be they states or minor unit areas. Man's economic activities shape the regional characteristics and vice versa. According to Richard Hartshorne, people are engaged in the major activity of keeping their organic solidarity intact, i.e., economic pursuits. Likewise, the greater part of the landscape can be distinguished according to economic activities. These economic activities show marked differentiation over the *Landuse*. Differences in economic forms are closely connected, both directly and indirectly with large number of other cultural differences.

The largest numbers of people are engaged in landuse for plant and animal produce, primary agriculture. Landuse becomes complex with the growing complexity of labour, hence any region that may be previously identifiable under primary economic activity now can only be appropriated by secondary and tertiary activity rationalization. However, nations are slow to alter their boundaries than their spatial organization of economy. The economic approach to

landscape embedded an important understanding of the concept of region. Landuse appeared as the most important category of understanding of human and nature interaction.

World economic system has also been the system of regions. The nature of economic activity pursued within regions affects the economic, political and cultural interaction between nation-states. At the same time, an important aspect of economic relations is the process of alienation of economic systems from regions. The emergence of Transnational Corporations (TNCs) had been an important stage in the historical development of capitalism.

Geoeconomics, understandably, is the partial derivative of the spatial organization of political economy. Mackinder's Midland basin and Heartland were increasing in tussle to draw the Third World economic relations in their format. But the capitalist organization had one advantage, its changing location, dispersed bourgeoisie and larger control over resources.

Third World, emerging after a long period of colonial oppression, found them to be in a deeper struggle. There were not only two opposite growth models of development, but equally the need for capital and technology to overcome their basic handicaps. The presence of gross inequalities within these regions with unlimited supplies of labour drew most of them to capitalist path of development. The socialist bloc played an important mediating role between the First and the Third World.

Mackinder's Outer Crescent could last for only one socialist revolution. The rivalry between the Midland Capitalists and Heartland Socialists got into an ideological tug-o-war with Outer Crescent of Third World being stretched at either side. The end of Cold War created somewhat challenging situation for these countries. In the decade of 60s, special efforts were made to consolidate the unity of post-colonial developing nations. The *South-South Cooperation* gained ground to help poor countries rebuild their ruined

economies of colonial legacy. Organizations such as NAM, G-77 and UNCTAD provided an important forum to present an equitable case for these countries. The post-Cold War has altered these equations. How regional cooperation can be an adage to globalization is also one of the conveying themes of this research.

An important aspect in this scenario that has gone unnoticed is the concept of regional development. Whether it is done by state agency or TNCs, there is need to re-look into this for understanding the global problems linked to community aspirations. There have been growing tendencies to split out from regional compages in order to find a way out to socio-political issues. Prevention of international crimes, drug trafficking, terrorism and protection of communal harmony are at stake of these destabilizing forces.

Notes

1. The growth of discipline has always been subject to this debate, see Adhikari 1992; Dixit 1994.
2. In a naïve but veritably defined, "Political Geography is involved in studying human claims and conflicts concerning the use, partitioning and ownership of the land and its resources"; in Muir R (1997), *Political Geography*: An Introduction, Macmillan Press, London, pp.5.
3. 'India, Russia Embark on Historic Strategic Partnership' PTI, *Indian Express*, October 4, 2000.
4. Agarwal, S. (1985), *Third World and New International Order*, Alekh Publishers, Jaipur, pp.65-70.
5. *Ibid.*
6. Bello, Walden, 'UNCTAD: Time to Lead, Time to Challenge the WTO', http://www.zmag.org/CrisesCurEvts/Globalism/unctadbello.htm.
7. Lavrov, S. and Sdasyuk, G. (1988), *Concepts of Regional Development*, Mir Publishers, Moscow, pp.21-23.

8. Uberoi, J.P.S. (1970), 'Between Oxus and Indus: A Local History of the Frontier 500 BC- 1925 AD'; in *Central Asia—Movement of Peoples and Ideas from Times Prehistoric to Modern*, by Amalendu Guha (ed.), Vikas Publications, New Delhi, pp.82-199.
9. Jiali, M. (1999), 'Central Asia: Geo-strategic Situation and Big Powers' Policies'; in *Contemporary Central Asia*, Vol. III, No. 1, pp.39-46.
10. n3.
11. Thaleur, R. and Yunling, Z.,'China, India, Russia: Eyeing New Alignments', Z, *International Herald Tribune*, Nov. 30, 1999.
12. Schurmann, F., 'A New Strategic Quadrangle between Russia, India, China and the U.S.?' http://www.pacificnews.org/.
13. Based on Encyclopaedia Britannica, http://www.britannica.com.
14. Ershov, V.V., Novikov, A.A. and Popova, G.B. (1988), *Fundamentals of Geology*, Mir Publishers, Moscow, pp.280-84.
15. Dutt, A.K. and Geib, M.M. (1998), *Atlas of South Asia: A Geographic Analysis by Countries*, Oxford & IBH Publishing Co., Calcutta, p.1.
16. Dani, A.H. (1999), 'Buddhism to Islam: Cultural Links between Central Asia & South Asia'; in *Culture, Society and Politics in Central Asia and India* by N.N. Vohra (ed.), pp.6-16.
17. *Ibid.*
18. Khan, A.H. (1999), 'Political Contacts between Central Asia and the Indian Sub-continent'; in *Culture, Society and Politics in Central Asia and India* by N.N. Vohra (ed.), pp.128-142.
19. Hopkirk, P. (1990), *The Great Game on Secret Service in High Asia*, OUP Oxford, pp.337-38.

2

The Geopolitical Theory

Geopolitical thinking has the state and its spatial attributes as the basic objects for study. Its nascent beginnings are traceable to the pursuits of Aristotle[1] and that continues to be pertinent aspect in the present post-Cold War period. It has all the other coordinates of human activities at its variance, be they political, economic or strategic. Political geographer and strategist Nicholas J. Spykman believed that Geography is one of the key factors in shaping foreign policy priorities. The primary attributes of a geographic region (the terrestrial state) are: its location, topography, climate and natural (energy) resources. They all have impact on its socio-cultural and political milieu. This creeps into the state apparatus and its action system. The primary identity of a state is organismic (behavioural) under the geopolitical mode of reasoning. The distinct lifestyle of its people and the ecumene, all help into formulation of a regional political economy. The state and its *living space* (*dlebensraum*) determine the long-term national interests. Geo-strategy is its short-term offspring. The discipline grew well with the rising militarisation of industry in America and Europe. However, geopolitics got into unusual action system in the hands of Germans under Nazis.

The growth and nature of discipline itself has been subject to the locational aspect. Its institutionalization helped establish

several schools of thought, such as, the German School led by Karl Haushofer, British School led by Halford J Mackinder and later on, the American School under airman Alexander de Seversky. The prognostics form an important part of this discipline. Geopolitics made it a habit with Mackinder as its chief proponent, and a conflict zone as one of its favourite location. Cold War had been great cradle to geopolitics that accorded a great patronage to political geographers, especially the geopoliticians. The dichotomy of continental and maritime interests of state were although evident in Anglo-French rivalry; it acquired global dimensions only with the ideological portal being framed under the US-USSR rivalry. But the picture grew more complex with increasing recognition of the role of scientific and technological revolution, as well as their interpretative control. At no point geo-strategy missed the question of scales, as there was a consistent search for alliances in Mackinder's Inner Crescent, verifying the permanence of geopolitical factors.

These trends are an important cue to understand the basic dynamics of a state or a region (its functional space). There are factors that can be assembled on this basis. International behaviour is the essence of geopolitics. Security is a persistent concern for any state making it organismic. Geopolitics is not only a theoretical backdrop to conflicting interests, but also a source to conflict management and further shaping the proactive diplomacy of peace making efforts. There is also an economic part of geopolitics, a vital one for understanding, which has been discussed in the next chapter.

Development of Geopolitical Thought

The pursuit of geographic knowledge is unified around three spatial concepts: location, regionalization and spatial interaction. Beginning with the basic definition: the three dimensions of a geographical phenomena are—its areal differentiation, its distribution and the spatiality of its homogeneous and heterogeneous interaction. It is important

to know how locations are distributed. This involves identification of a location set, a spatial frame of reference, and the distance and positional relationships among the selected set of locations.

There are many subdivisions of geography, but those of greatest interest to the statesmen and strategists are the sub-disciplines of human geography, which study the ways in which physical factors interact with population, political institutions, culture, communications, industry and technology. The resulting branches of human geography include political geography, economic geography, cultural geography, military geography and strategic geography.

Geopolitics, among them, is essentially an existentialist form of geographic reasoning[2] that necessarily encompasses all these branches across the board—the relation of international political power to the geographical setting. Geopolitics is the study of the political and strategic relevance of geography to the pursuit of international power. As such, it is most closely related to strategic geography, which is concerned with the control of, or access to, spatial areas that have an impact on the security and economic interest of nations. Geo-strategic thinking imprints one's mind delineating distinct constraints and springboards for a nation's foreign policy apparatus and strategic thinking while at the same time providing distinctive opportunities. Colin Gray finds it an allocator of roles in international relations, demarcating several interest areas for which the players contend, and the terms by which they measure their security in relation to others.[3] The basic object of heuristics- the region or a political region- has an array of influence emanating out of its shape, size, location and content. The structure of a nation comprises a territory with space as its formal attribute, the state as its functional attribute, and the human and natural resources as basis for edifice. The foreign policy is a concrete action system revealing both domestic (formal) attributes and alter-territory (functional) attributes. The major handy tool to keep in track with both

the observations is consistently gauging the political factors for noticing the change of scales. The forthcoming analysis shall reveal the trends, but before that one must go in for a brief introduction to the development of Geopolitical Thought.

Geopolitical reasoning has a long pedigree. The understanding itself has been a part of Geographical Thought. It is visible in the works of Greeks such as Herodotus, Eratosthenes, Aristotle and in the pursuits of his disciple Alexander. Indeed, Herodotus, the title of whose History is better translated as '*inquiries*', provides a strong geographic underpinning to the examination of the '*clash of civilizations*' of his times. He was the first scholar to put the whole world into continental blocks by identifying Europe, Asia and Libya (Africa). For Herodotus, the physical geographical setting heavily influenced the 'ways' of Egyptians, Persians, Scythians, and Greeks. The advent of Roman culture saw vibrant growth during Augustan age. Ancient Roman Geographer Strabo's Geography can be considered as a pioneering work in historical-cultural geography, *The Precepts of Geopolitical Thought*. He was also the first to conceive the specialization of geography into mathematical, physical, political and historical geography.[4] Beyond this there is a big interregnum in geographical thought until the age of discovery, where discoveries and novel interaction between cultures under the resurgent force of mercantile capitalism let loose hitherto missing international order.

Furtherance of Geopolitical Thought came by integration of Nation, State and Territory as the object of Geographical understanding. The French Geographer, Vidal de la Blache's 'Nationalistic Geography' was an important understanding in this direction. French society was already witnessing the nationalist and bourgeoisie upsurgence against feudal state order and it gave fillip to formulating consciousness about living space, the work and the folk in semblance to the geographicity of their ecumene.[5] The concept of *Pays* emerged while understanding the diversity and unique characters of

French life. In his book, *Tableau de la France*, he has dealt with the demarcation of recognizable units of France and found that far from reducing the individuality of each pay, modern trade has accentuated it by making them agriculture distinctive. According to Vidal, each community adjusts itself to prevailing natural conditions in its own way, and the result of adjustment may affect centuries of development. In course of time, man and nature adapt to each other like a snail in its shell. In fact, the area over which an intimate relationship between man and nature has developed through centuries constitutes a region. The war, epidemics, and civil strife can interrupt the development of a region and bring chaos for a while, but when the crisis is over the fundamental developments reassert themselves. This approach is later reflected in the concept of dual economy—the pastoral versus agrarian economy, later as agrarian versus industrial economy—and the coming century for industrial versus information-technology (Cyber) economy. This conceptual gradient has likewise affected geopolitical perceptions that grew over the centuries on nationalism.

The advent of scientific age brought another major paradigmatic development under the influence of Darwinism. According to Stoddart, there are four major themes that came particularly handy for the scientific development of geographical thought: the idea of change with time, the idea of organization and ecology, the idea of selection and struggle, and the chance character of variations in nature. The Darwinian evolution seemed to provide fresh initiative to the processual aspect of geographical phenomena. This dynamism provided spurt to the growth of several more branches of modern geography. Political Geography and Sociology were among the pioneer disciplines to develop over this methodology. The term 'Geopolitics' came into existence with the advancement of politico-geographical ideas of Ratzel on the study of world politics and the nature of government. Prof. Rudolf Kjellen coined the term, 'geopolitics' and defined

it as the theory of the state—as a geographic organism or the phenomenon in space, i.e., as a land, territory, area, or most especially, as a country.[6]

The Founding Fathers

Modern geopolitics is a triad of ideological portals provided by geographers in late 19th century. To conceive a state as a behavioural entity beyond itself was the first concrete step to locate a nation-state in its ecumene (something that emerged rapidly during mercantile capitalism). Its greatest instrument was naval communication. Spatial attributes of communication became an important component to geopolitical instrumentation with the growing militarization of industry. The efficacy to implement the operational power in time is a key factor to any geo-strategic assessment today. And lastly, hitherto unseen role of state ideology beyond its territory with discerning patterns paved way for a perennial geopolitical dynamics.

Friedrich Ratzel

Friedrich Ratzel is regarded as the father of modern political geography. According to him, there are three essential characters of the state—the territory, the people and *lebensraum* (the living space, ecumene) that contribute to the dynamics of state geopolitics. He developed this discipline in his works *The Laws of the Spatial Growth of States: A Contribution to Scientific Political Geography*, and later the book, *Politische Geographie* (1897). He formulated an organic theory of state whose hypothesis was that the state being a sovereign political entity are like living organisms with a space and as other organisms in nature are involved in a constant struggle for a larger living space. The Darwinian impact is clearly discernible in his book *Politsche Geographie* (1897), which was based on Darwinian concept of plant community as an organism and the life cycle of birth, growth, expansion and decline.[7] The Organic State Theory was continental in outlook

and heavily influenced by Social Darwinism. Friedrich Ratzel employed biological metaphors, describing the state as an organism. He was always careful to employ biology only as an analogy while treating the development of the state as an evolutionary process and political geography as a part of the natural sciences. According to Ratzel, international politics was a constant struggle for survival in which the state was required to adapt to its environmental conditions: the state must grow or die. In his words, "the growth of the state over the surface of the earth can be compared to the downward growth [of plants] which leads to an attachment to the soil. The nation is an organic entity, which in the course of history becomes increasingly attached to the land on which it exists." He further elucidates in his work *Anthropogeographie*:

> "The state is not an organism merely because it forms a connection between a living population and the fixed earth, but rather because this connection is so strengthened by reciprocity that the two become one and can no longer be thought of as a separate."

This appreciation led him to the concept of *lebensraum* or the living space. Semantically, it is geographical area within which organisms develop. It is important to note two other geographical terms in this context, namely, the 'ecumene' and the 'noosphere'. For Ratzel, the states derived their power and adaptability from *raum*—the space, more specifically *lebensraum*, that is, a wide ecological and spatial attributes of a living space.

Alfred Thayer Mahan

Geopolitics in it application gathered immediate concern of defence analysts and the discipline Geo-strategy primarily emerged out of such studies. It is the geopolitics over a frozen period of time in terms of comparative military advantage. Alfred Thayer Mahan is credited for its insipient beginnings. Born in 1840, Mahan graduated from the US Naval Academy

in 1859, and retired from the US Navy in 1906 with the rank of Rear Admiral. His major contributions have been *The Influence of Sea Power upon History (1890), The Influence of Sea Power upon the French Revolution and Empire (1892) and The Life of Nelson (1897).* He identified spatio-political attributes of a Naval Power in world politics. According to him, there is a continuous and unbroken system of oceanic communication, around the vast transcontinental and almost landlocked Russian Empire. The insular states of Great Britain, Japan and the US would seek domination over this great 'sea highway' in the world of global trade commerce. It's the production, and the shipping lines and the colonies that make these maritime nations surpass the continental compactness of Great Russian Empire.[8] Alfred Thayer Mahan sought to demonstrate that sea power was the key to world power. He analyzed the impact of British sea power with reference to naval history of world and was able to identify six factors for calibrating a maritime state, it's development and maintenance as a sea power: geographical position, including coastlines, interconnected waters, exposed land boundaries, overseas bases, and the ability to command critical trade routes, and also the physical conformation of the state, that is, the nature of the coastline, extent of territory, size of population, national character and the nature of the regime. Mahan's views revealed the geopolitical dynamics in a utilitarian fashion, although much of the history of Europe suggested that epochal rise of imperialism was by no means a mere geographic coincidence. His ideas if not historic were very much similar in methodology with the Greek philosophers, who speculated about the shape of the earth after its ecumene, and quite easily found it to be of saucer type often displayed in their T-O maps.

Rudolf Kjellen

The Swedish Germanophile Rudolf Kjellen advanced the ideas of Ratzel in the sense that he "envisioned the state not only as a living organism" but also defined its objective "to acquire

good natural frontiers externally and harmonious unity internally". Kjellen was particularly in the processual aspect through which territories were transformed from simple geographic areas into cultural political regions. Kjellen's most important work on geopolitics was *Staaten som Lifsform.* Carrying his ideas further, German scholars made important contributions to the field of geopolitics and political geography. As already mentioned, the term Geopolitics came from the Swedish political scientist R Kjellen. According to him, the principal attributes of a great power were spaciousness, internal cohesion and the ease of external communication. He tried to delineate the process through which geographical regions can be interpreted into cultural regions. The process of human occupation of a region gave it, in causal sequence, continuity, solidarity, interaction, loyalty, and nationality, i.e., the creation of a nation with what Kjellen called a 'geographic instinct'. By the second half of the nineteenth century, the man-land theme in geography received a new impetus. He advocated the following steps to study a state: *Geopolitik*, or the geography of the state; *Demopolitik*, the population composition of the state; *Oekopolitik*, the economic background of the state; *Socio-politik*, social structure of the state and *Kratopolitk*, or the government of the state.[9] German intelligentsia got a timely clique to get on with their war-euphoria.

Major Schools and Later Developments

It is interesting to note that Britain, France, Germany and America in late 19th century, commanded significant territorial dominance over rest of the world. Geopolitics with the advent of First World War got deeper into ideology of each of their ruling elites, with the increasing militarization of industry, except France. Why? Perhaps geopolitics itself is the answer.

These geopolitical schools emerged with an acute sense of location, somewhat more closely linked to the growing crises of capitalism.

The German Geopolitik

Ratzel implanted the seeds of organismic approach to state and its future course of international relations. This came out at a time when the colonial aspirations of Germany were cornered by Great Britain and France. German geographers under a logical artifice dexterously concealed their proclivity towards German imperialism.

Karl Haushofer

Karl Haushofer (1869-1946) was the chief proponent of Nazi geopolitics. After a successful military career he became Professor (1921) of Geography at Munich. His writings include *Geopolitik des Pazifischen Ozeans* (1925), *Bausteine zur Geopolitik* (1928) and *Weltpolitik von heute* (1934). Haushofer also edited the periodical *Zeitschrift fur Geopolitik*. Haushofer felt that densely populated countries like Germany should be allowed and entitled to expand and acquire the territory of less populated countries (such as Czechoslovakia and Poland) Geopolitik became a highly popular subject of study in Germany in the period following the First World War.

Haushofer and his colleagues defined geopolitics as "the science of earth relationships to political developments". The Institute of Geopolitik was established in Munich in 1924 and General Haushofer, a soldier turned academician was appointed its chairman. The institute became the mouthpiece of Hitler's imperial aims. According to Otto Maull, "geopolitik concerns itself with the state, not as a state concept, but as a living being. It is concerned with the spatial requirements of a state while political geography examines only its space conditions".[16] Hitler put the expansionism preached by Karl Haushofer, Evald Banse and Hans Grimm into practice in his annexation of Austria and the German-speaking area of Czechoslovakia and in the demands he made on Poland that led to the outbreak of World War II. Defeat in 1945 not only brought an end to the Third Reich and German hegemony, but the discipline of Geopolitics received serious setback with its near total abandonment in future German Political Thought.

American Geopolitics

Geopolitik and organic state theory vanquished with the Third Reich but it did stimulate the development of a geo-strategic American geopolitics that had a profound influence on US policy and strategy during and after World War II.

Alexander de Seversky

Alexander de Seversky was one of the few who argued that the air constituted an altogether different order of power leading him to propose 'geopolitics of air power'. Employing an azimuthal equidistant projection centred on the North Pole, de Seversky divided the world into two great circles of airpower centred on the industrial hearts respectively of the United States and the Soviet Union. These circles overlapped in North America and northern Eurasia, which de Seversky called the "area of decision". Here, the United States and the Soviet Union possessed approximately equal power and their respective industrial centres were within striking distance of each other by means of strategic bombers.

De Seversky contended that the United States should conduct its defence from the Western Hemisphere; that with the exception of those in Great Britain, it should abandon its overseas bases, and that it should avoid small wars that sapped the strength of the nation. Although de Seversky's approach influenced the Eisenhower administration's New Look Strategy, policy makers for the most part rejected '*air isolationism*' maintaining that the Western Hemisphere would become increasingly vulnerable to attack unless the United States defended critical parts of the Rimland. Thus, in practice, containment represented the triumph of Mackinder and Spykman over de Seversky. As Ownes remarks, "De Seversky's airpower framework is just one example of the

seductive and plausible idea that technology can abolish geopolitics by annihilating the significance of space and distance".[11]

During the Cold War, Mackinder's notion that the future would be shaped by the opposition between sea power and land power has looked better and better as time separated one from the Second World War. The Cold War, Gray argues, was a "contest between the Heartland of the Soviet Union and the maritime alliance led by the United States for control, or the denial of control of the Rimlands of Eurasia-Africa and their adjacent or marginal seas".[12] Due to the resulting mutual vulnerability, the development of the means for intercontinental nuclear bombardment did not negate this fundamental geopolitical framework.

Many American geopoliticians, for instance, Robert Strausz-Hupé, Derwent Whittlesey and Andrew Gyorgy wrote interpretive books on Geopolitik. Among the American geopoliticians were both 'realists' and 'idealists'. The most influential of them all was the realist geo-strategist Nicholas Spykman. Much of the Cold War bipolar competition between the Heartland Soviet Union and the maritime alliance led by the United States occurred in shatterbelts of the Eurasian Rimland.[13]

The British School

The early 20th century saw rapid rise in imperialism under the leadership of Great Britain. Great Britain was increasingly making strides in scientific inventions and discoveries. It also saw a phenomena and political ideology, namely, socialism. This combination of scientific and technological revolution timed with radical socio-political changes in state polity gave a unique opportunity to foresee a dialectics between regional disparities and nationalism on one hand, and on the other, unipolar world development and egalitarian internationalism.

Mackinder's Contribution

Sir Halford Mackinder (1861-1947) is the writer most usually associated with geopolitics, although he hated the term. He attempted to organize the worldview based upon stratified diffusive structure along with this argument. Mackinder believed that changes in technology, especially the revolution in land transportation associated with the railroad had altered the balance of power between sea power and land power, bringing the Columbian age of dominant sea power to a close.[14]

He visualized a 3-tier division of the world in his paper '*The Geographical Pivot of History*' (1904), presented before the Royal Geographical Society of London. In the first tier, there is a huge land mass consisting of the interior Asiatic drainage located in Eurasia. This, he termed as the Heartland, the pivot of the World Region surrounded by mountain barriers from three sides and from ice bound sea in the north. He found it strategically a secure region like a castle. However, it had one access through its southwest, from Eastern Europe. This area in the second tier was shown to be surrounded by the Inner or Marginal Crescent. It included Europe west of the Urals, southwest Asia outside the Iranian upland, India, Southeast Asia, and most of China. The inner crescent or the 'marginal region' contained the vast majority of the world's population and was the origin of most of the world's great civilizations, religions, and empires. Mackinder believed, because of its location, the inner crescent would forever be a zone of conflict. Outside this crescent lied the Outer or Insular Crescent, which included the continents of North and South America, Australia, and Africa—south of Sahara. Besides, the island regions of Great Britain and Japan were also designated as the 'outer' because of their complete insularity from the mainland Eurasia.

The regionalization of world land based on spatial relationship among national communities and resource

location was a unique formulation of the concept later to be confirmed as geopolitics. Later in 1919, he published a book *Democratic Ideals and Reality* in which he expounded his theory and modified according to emerging new transformations in the world economic relations. He redefined Heartland as "the region to which under modern conditions, sea power can be refused access even if the western part of it lies without the region of Arctic and continental drainage". In the new closed international order, the 'continental' shall hold sway over the Eurasian core area as the principal one. Mackinder first called it as the 'geographical pivot of history' and later the Heartland. This core area was inaccessible to sea power and therefore capable of sheltering a land power able to dominate the Eurasian 'World-Island' from its central continental fortress: "The oversetting of the balance of power in favour of the pivot state, resulting in its expansion over the marginal lands of Euro-Asia would permit the vast continental resources for fleet-building, and the empire of the world would then be in sight".[15] For Mackinder, Eastern Europe was the gateway to the Heartland. Mackinder's geopolitical thesis influenced the victors at Versailles after World War I. While initially he played up the Chinese threat, the Yellow Peril gesticulating the occupance from the east. Later, he removed the Chinese possibility of recapitulating the region and felt that now it was up to the ambitious Germany to takeover, and he gave an airy cherub as follows:

> Who rules East Europe commends the Heartland;
> Who rules the Heartland commands the World Island;
> Who rules the World-island commands the World. (1919).[16]

Mackinder was uncertain about the true capability of inner crescent, although he sighted the importance of it being partially continental and maritime. But in the absence of Cold War rivalry in those days, its possibility of serving as a fulcrum could not be seen. He visualized the indomitable Heartland can only pose a linear opposition to both the crescents

allowing them to form a common sphere of influence. In 1924, he raised the possibility that the Heartland could be balanced by the powers of the 'Midland Basin', the countries that surrounded the North Atlantic or 'Midland Ocean' encompassing North America and Western Europe. In 1943, he posted another contention that the Heartland and the Midland Basin could combine to control Germany in the future. Although we would call Mackinder a 'realist', he did raise the possibility that statesmen could, to a certain extent at least, rise above the geopolitical process of world history and create effective international structures as an alternative to force as the arbiter of international politics.

Mackinder's *The Geographical Pivot of History* (1904) reveals three structural features that characterize modern geopolitics. The first is that geopolitics is an early twentieth century form of Cartesian perspective born in imperial capitals, cultivated by a caste of imperial men (who saw themselves as materialist-minded public intellectuals of empire) and engrossed upon how modern transportation networks, like railways and steamships, were transforming territoriality as they knew it.[17] In his 1904 presentation to the Royal Geographical Society, Mackinder described a geopolitical gaze that is made possible by the maturing of geography beyond a mere documentation of exploration and discovery. He was able to establish that in an era of closed space, there is a correlation between the larger geographical and the larger historical generalizations. For the first time we can perceive something of the real proportion of features and events on the stage of the whole world and may seek a formula which shall express certain aspects, at any rate, of geographical causation in universal history.

Mackinder was not to rest here, the fast changing world of imperial politics brought each day a newer equation of land relations between nations and their rise and fall came to be signified in terms of locational attributes. The Second World War became another occasion to add new dimension to his

theory. He proposed the concept of 'Midland Basin' in 1943 in his article 'The Round World and the Winning of Peace'. Germany virtually in decimation, he found Heartland, a region of obdurate character and that the west Europe and northeast America are the natural complements to this geo-strategic region. The North Atlantic Ocean, the eastern US and the western Europe were seen as the Midland Basin. He considered this area an effective counter-balance to the emerging political-power potential of the Eurasian Heartland. With the Soviet Union now firmly on map, he visualized a permanent geo-strategic contention of supremacy between the Heartland and the Midland.

The Geopolitics of Containment

Several contributions of similar nature were made. Major of them are, James Fairgreive's 'Crush Zone Concept' in his book *Geography and World Power* (1915), Nicholas Spykman gave his Rimland Theory, where he interpreted Mackinder's Marginal Crescent as a *Locus of Inflexion* naming it Rimland. Alliances among the Rimland powers or between the Heartland and the Rimland and hostile to the United States constituted for Spykman the real geopolitical threat to America. Spykman contended that Mackinder had overemphasized the power potential of the Heartland having overestimated the impact of the revolution in land transportation and underestimated the power of the inner and outer crescents. Spykman argued that the critical geopolitical area of the globe was Mackinder's inner crescent, which he renamed the 'Rimland'. The Rimland could operate in both the continental and maritime modes but it was accordingly vulnerable to both land and sea power. According to him, "The Mackinder dictum . . . is false. The relationship may easily be changed if a point on the circumference becomes in turn the centre of another circle of communication. Thus, the strategic implications of the position of Heartland in relation to British Empire have meaning only if the military strength is

applied at the Indian frontier originates in Great Britain. The moment the defence of that frontier or the Persian or the Chinese frontier rests on a locally developed war potential, the whole concept of interior and exterior lines is changed".[18]

He remodelled Mackinder's verse as follows:

Who controls the Rimland rules Eurasia;

Who controls Eurasia controls the destinies of the World.[19]

The strategic imperative for the United States arising from Spykman's thesis was to prevent consolidation of the Rimland by a hostile power: "Our constant concern in peace time must be to see that no nation or alliance of nations is allowed to emerge as a dominating power" within the Rimland. Spykman's approach greatly influenced the US. Cold War policy of containment. Indeed, if George Kennan is the *father of containment*, Spykman is its *godfather*.[20] Kennan wrote that vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, the United States should follow a "policy of containment designed to confront the Russians with unalterable counterforce at every point where they show signs of encroaching upon the interests of a peaceful and stable world". Containment is a particular manifestation of Spykman's dictum that the United States had a universal interest in "the prevention of hegemony, a power position which would permit the domination of all within [a hegemon's] reach".[21] He said, "it is the sea power which has made it possible to conceive the Eurasian continent as a unit and it is the sea power which governs the relationship between the Old and the New Worlds". Contradicting the strategic advantage accrued to Heartland by Mackinder, he found out that the problems of a state (army) working along the diameters of a circle or territory will be less difficult than those of forces, which have to function along the circumference of the same region.

Cohen's Locational Analysis of Conflict

According to Saul B. Cohen (1964), contemporary world politics has been working at two levels of fragmentation- one, the geo-strategic, trade-dependent maritime nations led by the US and the other is the Socialist block led by the USSR (at that time). Owens finds Cohen's geopolitical structure as hierarchical.

At the highest level are two geo-strategic realms, which are "arenas of strategic place and movement". Reflecting the classical origins of geopolitics, he identifies these geo-strategic realms as the maritime and the Eurasian continental. They are characterized not only by the physical characteristics of place and movement but also by cultural and strategic outlook. Realms are vast spatial areas affecting everything within their strategic-military reach. Below the realms are geopolitical regions, which are shaped by "contiguity and political, cultural, military and economic interaction". Cohen identifies nine geopolitical regions. The four are contained within the maritime geo-strategic realm: Anglo-America and the Caribbean, Maritime Europe and the Maghreb, Offshore Asia, and South America and sub-Saharan Africa, most of which constitutes what he calls the *quartersphere of strategic marginality*. Two are part of the Eurasian continental realm: the Russian heartland and East Asia.[22].

Of the remaining regions, Cohen argues that one, South Asia, is independent. Another, the Middle East remains a shatter-belt. Yet another, Central and Eastern Europe, Cohen describes as a 'gateway region', a transitional zone that can facilitate contact and interchange between the two realms. Below the regions are states, hierarchically ordered according to their power, geographical location and function within the world system. Certain states dominate or contend for domination of the various regions. The United States is the 'controlling state' within the maritime geostrategic realm.

Geopolitical analysis suggests that China and Russia will vie for that position within the Eurasian continental realm.[23]

Such an analytical framework allows one to discern broad spatial patterns, make predictions about the future shape of the international political system and develop strategic options for ensuring the nation's place in this system. Within this framework, a number of variables interact with geography to shape the world. As already seen, one is technology, another is the infusion of capital and economic development. The infusion of capital can modify the relative importance of a given geographic space, for example, by shifting power centres. In the early twentieth century the core of the maritime geo-strategic realm shifted from Europe to North America. On the other hand, lack of capital can consign geographical regions to the world's periphery. For instance, Cohen's 'quartersphere of marginality' is peripheral largely because with the exception of such pockets of modernity as South Africa, Argentina, Chile and Brazil, these regions are relatively untouched by "the capital flows, technology transfer, and specialization of industry that characterize the developed market economies . . . continental Eurasia . . . and South Asia".[24]

But geopolitical reasoning suggests limits to the impact of economic development. Location still matters. Consider the relative importance to the security of the United States, Brazil and China. Some consider Brazil to be a pivotal state, but its location in South America makes Brazil relatively less strategically important than China. Brazil, even supposing rapid economic growth does not possess the weight and position of China. It has a long coastline but it does not command the sea lines of communications of great maritime, manufacturing, and trading powers; China does. Indeed, in all respects, China possesses the geographic location, extent of territory and number of population to affect the international order for good or ill. Between these two regions, he visualized a 'Shatter-belt' consisting of Southeast Asia and the Middle East. Cohen defines shatter-belt as "a large, strategically located

region that is occupied by a number of conflicting states and is caught between the conflicting interests of adjoining Great Powers". Their fragmented political and economic character distinguishes shatter-belts. Owing to physical, environmental, historical, cultural and political differences, the shatter-belt appears to be incapable of attaining political and/or economic unity of action. Parts of the shatter-belts tend to seek neutrality and lead the entire region into this path but other portions are committed to external ties either because of their self-interest or because of military and economic pressures from the external power centres.[25] Cohen identified the Middle East and Southeast Asia as the shatter-belts of the Cold War. It was within these areas that the 'domino theory' was thought by US policy makers to operate. Ironically, the domino theory has been roundly criticized by many of the very analysts who believe the concept of the shatter-belt still has utility.[26]

The post-Cold War period brought a new assessment. While noting the demise of Soviet Union, he also saw increasing influence of China in the region. According to him, "it is the mountain that holds a spiritual, mystical attraction for the Chinese, and not the sea". Cohen described the two types of outlooks the 'continentality' and the 'maritime' in the nations. "The Eurasian continental World is more isolated, more inwardly oriented, and more heavily enveloped with raw materials than its maritime counterparts. Its people have deep love to the land. Whatever happens to the Soviet Union, there will be a Russia and some allied or subordinate republics to occupy the Eurasian heartland." He further argued that the present world is currently in disequilibria owing to the great differences in entropy levels between the two geo-strategic realms. This can be balanced only by geopolitical mechanism of 'Gateway Regions' and 'Gateway States'. Gateway Region, one such as Central and Eastern Europe could facilitate the transfer of new energies into the faltering Soviet core. Politically and culturally, Gateway States represent distinct historic cultural hearths. Cohen thinks that the emergence of

such states can facilitate the creation of boundaries of accommodation between the two geo-strategic realms since now the conflict between them has abated.

Modelling the Conflict

John O'Loughlin provided conflict model of geopolitics in 1984. He based his approach on five other theories given by different scholars. According to him, the sphere of influence as enunciated by Morganthau, consists of identification and examination of zones in a state may be dominated or is dominating. Second, Rumble's Social Field Theory postulates that nations as social units have social, political, and economic and military attributes and behave in terms of cooperation and conflict. Third, Sprout's ecological perspective sees shifting of balances in international environment through domestic situation, foreign policy linkages and individual perceptions. Fourth, Cohen's Theory of Shatter-belts, which maintains certain regions on the globe because of their complex ethnic, religious, political, ideological, economic, and physical composition, intrinsically stand out as areas of tension. And the fifth, Clines State's Power Index computed as $(Pp=(c+e+m) \times (s+w))$ where Pp is power potential, c= critical mass, (i.e., the size of the nation-state), e= economic capability, m= military capability, s= national strategy and w= national will. These five aspects of geopolitical world can be coaxed into a single space-time model of international conflict. O'Loughlin pleaded in favour of explicating the above five theories of international relations in context to space-time models in geography.

Models of International Conflicts.

On methodology side, the model should contain variables that derive from the four perspectives identified above, such as power and distance measures, economic data and political views. In a sense, the analysis would test the ability of each perspective. Second, the model should view the world as

system with feedback loops, externality effects, stimuli and responses and dynamic change as key elements. Third, the model should be multivariate, a clear requirement as a result of the shortcomings of QIR univariate test. Fourth, consequently the domestic attributes and international behaviour are measured as a Model of field theory. Fifth, the model would be a reflection of a 'maximalist' approach to international conflicts reflected not only in non-military concerns but which uses the triangular requirements of peace research acceptance of empirical data analysis, a value commitment to peace research and a concern for the relationship of structures to violence with a view to changing structure so as to reduce violence. Sixth, borrowing from econometrics, the model must have both exogenous (structural) and endogenous (time-space) predictors. Additional domestic attributes are included for each nation. The third dimension is time. Structural explanations refer to field theory analysis while endogenous explanations adopt the view that international relations are ordered in both their temporal and spatial elements that significant positive space-time autocorrelation is present. These regularities can be modelled using STARIMA methods and such topics as the impact of legislation, periodicity, higher-order spatial tags and trends can be readily examined.[27]

This tentative spatial diffusion model sees individual states as possible sites of conflict and focuses on both their individual characteristics, links with other states, the role of conflict-generating agencies and events, and spatial proximity to calibrate models based on past events and forecast future conflicts. The procedure is meant to conceptualize the diffusion, develop techniques for operationalizing the concept and identify the empirical regularities in diffusion.

This diffusion framework has 6 elements that demonstrate clear parallels with the study of international conflicts. The event being analyzed has the following properties:

(1) spatial elements;
(2) temporal elements;

(3) a specific character (e.g., war);
(4) places where the event is located at the start;
(5) places where the event is located at the end of time interval;
(6) path of movement, influence or interaction between states.

The five conflict theories can be viewed as having casual influences on international conflicts under the rubrics of distance, attributes, attitudes/beliefs, hierarchy and location, respectively. Diffusion processes are stochastic rather than deterministic so that the influence of distance is modelled through distance-decay functions—the equilibrium of spheres of influence in international relations. Attributes (domestic conditions) of the receiving and sending states will influence their view of conflict—a consistent finding of the social field theory approach. Perceptions refers to the national capability and values which allocate national resources and determine technology, just as certain farmers, by virtue of their attributes, perceptions and beliefs accept agricultural innovations while other are unable to do so. It's frequently suggested that states can be classified according to power as the 1st order (US., USSR), 2nd order (China, South Africa, Japan, etc.), 3rd order (Malaysia, Tanzania, Zaire), and 4th order (Mali, Bangladesh, Ireland, etc.).

Post-Cold War Geopolitics

The game of geopolitics, most famously for Henry Kissinger was to survey international politics with an imperial eye to the changing weight of these fixed monads.[28] The object of the game being to try to establish and maintain conditions of equilibrium between competing monads and so secure an international peace and order favourable to the United States. Geopolitics, as Kissinger conceptualized it is an approach that pays attention to the requirements of equilibrium one that is as neutral and rational concentrating all of its power to

determine 'the requirements of equilibrium' in the figure of the geopolitician as master overseer in international politics. A central assumption of this type of reasoning was that global space was unambiguously mastered by the politics of sovereign territorial states. Global space was held to be a fully in-stated space. So specified, modern geopolitics can be thought of as a regime of power, which produced international politics as an objective global spatial drama, a ceaseless global struggle between pre-determined geographical entities and as a vision of territorial states dominating global space.

The end of the Cold War has generated a number of competing candidate descriptions of the international environment, some of which essentially proclaim the 'end of geopolitics'. Optimistic non-geopolitical descriptions of the post-Cold War international environment include Francis Fukuyama's 'End of History' thesis, which argues that the end of the Cold War represents the final triumph of liberal democracy over its twentieth-century ideological competitors, fascism and communism. Other optimistic non-geopolitical visions of the future world include 'global interdependence', the idea that the pursuit of power in its geographic setting has been supplanted by liberal economic cooperation. According to such analysts as Richard Rosecrance and Jessica Mathews, the near future will feature borderless economic interdependence and the end of the nation-state. Pessimistic non-geopolitical images of the future include Samuel Huntington's 'clash of civilizations' and Robert Kaplan's 'coming anarchy'. Huntington claims "fault lines between civilizations are replacing the political and ideological boundaries of the Cold War as the flash points for crisis and bloodshed". Kaplan contends that in the future much of the globe will be consumed by ethnic, racial and religious strife unleashed by the failure of territorial states to protect the lives and property of those who live within their borders. Some have proposed semi-geographic but non-geopolitical views of

the future. Prominent among these are concepts of 'core' and 'periphery', 'pivotal states', and 'geoeconomics'.

Immanuel Wallerstein proposed the core and periphery as part of his neo-Marxist model of world politico-economic development. According to Wallerstein, the capitalist world economy created a single global unit, generating two fundamental inequalities: the traditional class inequality identified by Marx between bourgeoisie and proletariat and the spatial inequality between the states of the developed capitalist core and those of the non-developed periphery. What Wallerstein identified as the capitalist core is tantamount to what the great geographer Sir Halford Mackinder called the "Midland Basin: North America and Western Europe". Most of the rest of the world is the periphery. Wallerstein's model is in essence a spatial representation of Lenin's theory of uneven capitalist development. Although the dynamics are reversed, it also bears a striking resemblance to Lin Piao's conceptualization of the world as the capitalist 'city' surrounded by agrarian, revolutionary 'countryside'. System Theorist Barry Buzan has adapted the core and periphery concept to 'structural realism'. It notes that multipolarity is emerging among the capitalist great powers, though in the oligarchic ideological harmony within the core has consolidated their military power globally beyond the core. But the pivotal-state concept is geographical (locational) in that it argues that certain states are important to the stability of entire regions. It is, however, non-geopolitical in that it does not explicitly describe a hierarchy among those regions.

'Geo-economics' purports to place international politics on an economic basis. In the words of Edward Luttwak, "Everyone, it appears, now agrees that the methods of commerce are displacing military methods—with disposable capital in lieu of fire-power, civilian innovation in lieu of military-technical advancement, and market penetration in lieu of garrisons and bases. States, as spatial entities structured to jealously delimit their own territories, will not disappear but

reorient themselves toward geoeconomics in order to compensate for their decaying geopolitical roles." In the geo-economic world the 'logic of conflict' will be expressed in the 'grammar of commerce'. Adherents of geopolitics argue that to be of any use to the statesman and strategist, these various descriptions of the future must be placed within a geopolitical context. Real international relations occur in real geographical space. The relative importance of a given geographical space may be modified by technology or the infusion of capital, but geographical space cannot be ignored, as several of these approaches do.[29]

Geopolitics, Con and Pro[30]

Despite widespread use of the term, the concept of geopolitics has history of controversial epistemological evolution. It is argued with anti-determinist percept ignoring its representation of significant change that has come in the history of imperialism ranging from international aggression to the rising new world order. Another crucial aspect is the ethical value of the term that has derived from the German geopolitik, which during the interwar period became synonymous with 'the German science of statecraft', embraced by the Nazis. Its American form underlay the strategy of containment and in the eyes of many critics it led to the rigid divisions of the Cold War. Marxists and adherents of 'critical geopolitics' dismiss classical geopolitics as a rationalization for American imperialism.

Some students of international relations have criticized the discipline with a reductionist philosophy. They contend that geopolitics is banal that it is a pretentious word adding nothing to the important debates regarding international relations, foreign policy and strategy. Such scholars fail to notice that the identification of the spatiality of all the sought for conclusions is the exact teleological purpose served by the arrangement of scales of phenomena accruing from this approach. How much of its use can be made is up to political

scientists and other professionals. Others hold that since geopolitics is wedded to the concepts of military power and the territorial state, the importance of geopolitical reasoning is in decline as non-state actors in the international political system increase in importance. A corollary of this perspective is that since the pursuit of prosperity is supplanting the quest for power in international affairs, geopolitics has been superseded by the aforementioned geoeconomics, or even 'geopolinomics'.[31] Still others contend that although a geopolitical perspective may have been useful in the past, advances in technology, particularly airpower, nuclear weapons and information technology now render it moot. It has been used to mean everything from geographic determinism to the spatial dimension of political inquiry to merely an analytical way of thinking. It is used here to mean a normative-strategic doctrine: geopolitics is descriptive in that it helps us understand the world as a whole, and prescriptive in that it suggests strategic courses of action.

The adherents of geopolitics contend that the study of the international scene from a spatial viewpoint by which one better understands the whole has strategic implications. The main directions of proper strategy may be deduced from an understanding of the overarching spatial relationships among political actors by discerning broad geographical patterns thereby developing better strategic options by which a state can assert its place in the world.

The geopolitical perspective in international relations has given rise to spatial 'pivotal binaries', categories that shape how we look at the world and suggest strategic steps to enhance state power. The most enduring of them include East and West, 'sea power' and 'land power', 'maritime' and 'continental', 'heartland' and 'rimland', and 'core areas' and peripheral 'shatter-belts'. These are, of course, mental constructs but strategy is directly connected to perceptions about the geographic attributes that configure the global space in which conflict occurs. We might call these 'mental maps'.

Mental maps reflect another important aspect of geopolitics: the strategic culture. It is undeniable that different countries manifest different approaches to international politics. For instance, sea powers envision their security differently than do land powers. As Gray observes, "Distinctive political culture, which substantially determines national style in foreign and military affairs is the product of a distinctive national historical experience, and that distinctive historical experience reflects no less distinctive a blend of national geographical conditions".

Since geopolitics describes the nexus of geographic factors, relative power (including economic power) and militarily significant technology, these geopolitical categories tend to be dynamic, not static. This point is often lost on critics of geopolitics. Thus, Halford Mackinder revised his concept of the heartland three times and Saul Cohen modified his idea of which regions constituted the world's shatter-belts several times. Such changes reflect modified circumstances arising from changes in relative power among states, including economic development, or advances in technology.

This is a critically important point to remember that technology and economics are not extraneous to geopolitical analysis. They are integral to geopolitics. The shift in ship propulsion from sail to coal to oil to nuclear power significantly changed the geopolitical landscape as did the railroad and the development of air power. Some analysts suggested that nuclear weapons spelled the end of geopolitics. Some make that claim now on behalf of information technology and cyberspace. However, while technological advances can alter the importance of the geographic determinants of policy and strategy, they do not negate it. The same is true of economic development. The infusion of capital may modify but not negate the importance of a particular geographic space.

Limits and Opportunities and International Politics

Napoleon defined strategy as the art of using time and space. His focus was the operational level of war but his definition applies as well to the level of grand strategy. Geopolitics provides the link between geography and strategy. Geopolitics is based on the undeniable fact that all international politics running the gamut from peace to war takes place in time and space in particular geographical settings and environments. It then seeks to establish the links and causal relationships between geographical space and international political power, for the purpose of devising specific strategic prescriptions.

One purpose of grand strategy is to exploit one's own geographical attributes and an adversary's geographical vulnerabilities. Geopolitics is dynamic, not static. It reflects international realities and the global constellation of power arising from the interaction of geography on the one hand and technology and economic development on the other. Technology and the infusion of capital can modify, though not negate the strategic importance of a particular geographic space.

Finally, geopolitics clarifies the range of strategic choices providing a guide for achieving strategic efficiency. It places particular stress on geographic space as a critically important strategic factor and source of power. It recognizes that geography is only a part of the totality of global phenomena. As Colin Gray observes, geopolitics is "a word as well as a basket of associated ideas that all but begs to be abused by the unscrupulous".[32] Properly understood and employed, however, geopolitical analysis is an indispensable part of strategy making.

It's Cartesian perspective that normalizes a transcendent Western subject as the god's eye geopolitician, a detached and disembodied imperial subject who can decode the surface of international affairs and produce totalizing views of its hidden essence. Its essentialist reading of international politics reveal

the hubris of Western scientific myths about uncovering timeless essences and determining universal causation. Its naturalization of an idealized version of the European state system projecting this upon the world and representing global politics as balance-of-power politics reveal the operation of an ethnocentric grand narrative wherein history has realized itself as European conceptions alone. In sum, modern geopolitics is a condensation of Western epistemological and ontological hubris, an imagining of the world from an imperial point of view. Obviously, these three features of modern geopolitics are no more than a quick snapshot of a much more complex and messy history involving the decline of the British Empire, the challenging rise of the German Empire, and the emergence of the United States as hegemon after World War II. Nevertheless, they serve as a useful contrast to the contemporary situation whereas we approach the end of the twentieth century, all three features of modern geopolitics are in crisis and under erasure. Emanating from the same perspective are the modern theories of geopolitics based on North-South divide, underdevelopment and to the current extent of Post-Cold war international balance of power.

These developments and the later similar ones gathered common accusation of false objectivity and with revolutionary change in communications and transport technology, following the introduction of the aircraft, orbiting satellites, ICBMs, and instant global communication via telephone and television has greatly altered the perception of geographical space and its political organization. But before scrutinizing them it's yet to complete the full course of introducing important landmarks of theoretical developments in geopolitics. The history of containment indicates that the development of long-range airpower did not nullify geopolitics, although it certainly modified the existing framework.

Notes

1. According to Aristotle, an ideal state should be 'well situated with regard both to the sea and to the country, and bear every sort of produce thus enabling the inhabitants "to live a life of liberal and at the same time temperate leisure"; in Nersesyants V.S. (1979), *Political Thought of Ancient Greece*, Progress Publishers, Moscow, p.161.
2. Owens, M.T., 'In Defense of Classical Geopolitics', http://www.nwc.navy.mil/press/Review/1999/autumn/art3-a99.htm.
3. *Ibid.*
4. Husain, M. (1999), *Evolution of Geographical Thought*, Rawat Publications Jaipur, pp.71-75.
5. Adhikari, S. (1992), *Fundamentals of Geographical Thought*, Chaitanya Publishing House, New Delhi, p.135.
6. Dikshit, R.D. (1995), *Political Geography*, Tata McGraw Hill New Delhi, p.12.
7. *Ibid.*
8. Based on *Encyclopaedia Britannica,* http://www.britannica.com
9. *n6.*
10. *Ibid.*
11. n2.
12. *Ibid.*
13. Parker, G. (1985), *Western Geopolitical Thought in the Twentieth Century*, St. Martin's Press, New York, pp.102-19.
14. n2.
15. Owens quotes Mackinder from 'The Geographical Pivot of History' in *Democratic Ideals and Reality*, p.262; n2.
16. n6.
17. Tuathail, G., 'At the End of Geopolitics?' http://www.majbill.edu/Geog/faculty/toal/papers/End.htm.
18. n6.

19. *Ibid.*
20. n2.
21. Spykman, N.J. (1942), *America's Strategy in World Politics*, Harcourt Brace, New York, p.19.
22. n2.
23. Cohen, S.B., 'Geopolitics in the New World Era: A New Perspective on an Old Discipline,' in *Reordering the World: Geopolitical Perspectives on the 21st Century*, (ed.) George J. Demko and William B. Wood, Boulder, Colo. Westview, 1994, p.28.
24. *Ibid.*
25. Cohen, S.B. (1973), *Geography and Politics in a World Divided*, 2d ed. Oxford Univ. Press, New York, pp.86-87.
26. *Ibid.*
27. Loughlin, J.O. (1984), 'Geographic Models of International Conflict' in *Political Geography: Recent Advances and Future Direction* by Peter Taylor and John House (ed.), Croom Helm, London.
28. n17.
29. n2.
30. Based on Owens Paper, 'In Defense of Classical Geopolitics'; see n2.
31. Demko, G.J. and Wood, W.B. (1994), *Reordering the World: Geopolitical Perspectives on the 21st Century*, Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, pp.10-11.
32. Gray, C.S. (1996), The Continued Primacy of Geography', *Orbis*, Spring 1996, p. 247.

3

Development of Geoeconomic Thought

Geopolitics appreciates geoeconomics with a neocolonial perspective in postmodern sense and the Cold War marks a linkage and a boundary between the two. Geoeconomics shows the interdependence between national and global economies. Modern geopolitics shows how far the cooperation with rest of the world is sustained within the precincts of national sovereignty, economic freedom and resource linkages to regional political economy. The backdrop of geoeconomic thinking presumes continuous efforts for liberalization, structural adjustment programmes, common single market and relatively free flow of finance since the Bretton Woods Conference. Besides, it demands opening of socio-cultural vistas for global introduction and exchange. There are certain principal spatial prerequisites for such an analysis, i.e., the region, which is both political (under geopolitics) and economic (under geoeconomics). Scholars have attempted to visualize the world economy in terms of (1) system as international political economy, (2) landscape as economic resource regions, (3) as network of transnational organizations.

Globalization is an important processual aspect of geoeconomics. The universal set of resource evaluation,

commodity pricing and exchange ratio have helped creation of a world market for developed countries. The key components of globalization are also linked to the development and growth of the Third World economies. The new geoeconomic understanding has created a situation where there is a dichotomy of increasing pressures on traditional, sovereign state functions for domestic trade, and their being dissolved under the global economic competitiveness. It is to be seen whether any of these processes create a global polarization between a few states extending their domestic policies to global portal and a large number of smaller states being reduced to regional limits within their own territories. This bears significant consequence to political aspects for any nation, such as security, balance of power and regional stability.

Development of Geoeconomic Thought

The conceptual beginnings can be traced in the works of famous French Geographer Vidal de la Blache. His method latter became popular as *la Tradition Vidalienne*. In 1898, he became Professor at the University of Sorbonne. According to him:

> "Man and nature perform the dialectics of the observed world around us. Man, by his occupance creates distinctive countries, be they states or minor unit areas. In an area of human settlement, nature changes significantly because of the presence of man and these changes are greatest where the level of material culture of community is at the highest level. The same environment has different meanings for the people with different heritage and objectives (*genres de vie*)."[1]

In his article 'The Geographical Conditions of Social Facts' (1902), Blache pointed out that social conditions find their expression in distinctive modes of life (*genres de vie*), which in simpler societies show a close adjustment to the natural environment. He defined a small natural region, the *Pays*, as manifestations of intimate relationship between man and nature that developed through the centuries. It is the task of a geographer to delimit such small natural units. He laid down six principles in this regard—the unity of phenomena, the variable combination and modification of phenomena, the spatial dispersion, the dynamic forces of environment, the taxonomy and the role of man as an object of geographical change.

Concept of a Region

Richard Hartshorne in his book *Nature of Geography* has discussed different precepts of identifying a region. According to him, the regional synthesis is little more than logical artifice, feature of the earth surface form, and the interrelated complexes that differ in its different areal part. Passagre gave the term *Landschaftsteil*[2], defining it as an areal part of a region, and a hierarchy revealing the aggregate of such cellular mass. The inherent character of an area is composed of a multitude of incommensurable elements which are interrelated in no complete sense: temperature, rainfall, relief, slope of land, physical texture of soil, underground minerals, and relative location are all in large degree independent of each other; not to mention the degree of independence which human elements exhibit. A regional division of North America, even though confined to natural factors, is one thing in terms of pre-Columbian period, another in the period of settlement, and indeed has been changing constantly, though less rapidly, ever since.

> "Man in his work practices such a determining influence on the landscape that not only is its appearance completely changed, but it becomes actually an important and difficult problem to reconstruct the original landscape." (Passagre)

> "Whatever may be the fundamental character of the relations between human phenomena and non-human, as they are presented to us in geography. They are often of such an involved character, the products of historical evolution of

centuries, and therefore for all practical purposes in geography we must accept certain major human phenomena as independent elements." (Hettner)

Hartshorne in response to: What are the major aspects of culture that are of greatest importance to regional geography, posits the following views. According to him:

"We might determine cultural regions by finding the areas in which people think alike, e.g., a national community space. Most of the people are engaged in the major activity of keeping their organic solidarity intact, i.e., economic pursuits. Likewise, the greater part of the landscape can be distinguished according to economic activities. These economic activities show marked differentiation over the landuse."

As Broek observes that economic forces are by far the most influential agents in transforming the landscape. Differences in economic forms are closely connected, both directly and indirectly with large number of other cultural differences listed above. There is no question that by far the largest number of people are engaged in landuse for plant and animal produce, primary agriculture. These can be further classified ir to those which are totally uninhabited, those which are taken by man as granted, and the surface where man's activity, chiefly cultivation, dominates. There is a tendency of the previous two forms to get transformed into last one. One can still notice the historic path of development taken by them and they can be differentiated at the primary level as agricultural regions. But, as we know, landuse becomes complex with the growing complexity of labour, any region that may be previously identifiable under primary economic activity now can only be appropriated by secondary and tertiary activity rationalization. However, nations are slow to alter their boundaries than their spatial organization of economy. One can classify them in the three principle forms,

later in the chapter discussed while differentiating between them.

The Economic Activity

Man's productive actions are interpreted as social mode of production. Production functions involve physical and intellectual actions, preferably automatic in nature. The law of transmission of production functions from humans to machines is operative in the historical development of production function. This ultimately results in objective historical development of means labour to give rise to technology; to which a new production function is imparted.[3] The latter signifies a revolution in productive forces and all material production to cause decisive impact on the forming of new types of socio-economic formations.

The diversity of civilizations is primarily determined by the societal production technology involved. A given technology develops under the influence of specific natural conditions, among which the following have paramount significance: physical-geographical belt with its inherent temperatures and humidity patterns, and their reflects, precipitation, air circulation and resultant biogeochemical and geomorphic rhythms, phytomass cover, biodiversity, soil fecundity, area of human settlement. The growing complexity in production technology significantly altered the character of simple labour into specialization of labour giving rise to numerous classes of economic activity. According to their objectives they can be classified as:[4]

Production

1. Primary—harvesting commodities from nature (subsistence agriculture, forestry, fishing, mining).
2. Secondary—purposeful tending of crops and livestock (commercial agriculture); increasing the value of commodities by changing their form (manufacturing).

3. Tertiary—services (clerical, personal, business).
4. Quaternary—financial, health, entertainment, education, information and data processing services, middle-management, administrative services, government bureaucrats.
5. Quinary—high-level managerial and executive administrative position (public and private), scientific research and development services.

Exchange

1. Transportation and distribution services—freight transportation, telecommunication, commuting, warehousing, wholesale trade, and retail trade.

Consumption

1. Use of commodities and services by human beings to satisfy needs and wants.

Spatial Organization of Economic Activity

The patterns of economic behaviour shift with changes in societal structure. The behaviour patterns make up the economic and social organization of an area settlement and in its flow of money, ideas, people, and goods. In the early period of development, marginal returns to the factors of production vary from region to region. But with further development, economic social functions become more and more spatially differentiated and the scales of many functions increase. This spatially differentiated economic organization can be identified in a number of ways. One way is:

> $H \pm A \times (R.S) \rightarrow O$ where H= human motives and capacities, or demand, A= accessibility, R= resources, S= resistances and O= occurrences of economic activity or supply.[5]

The human motives and capacities mean all those behavioural factors that lead to demand for goods and services.

Accessibility means the location of an activity with respect to other sites and ease of transportation. Resources mean the physical existence of resources in the landscape, modified by the group's perception of them, their accessibility, and the resistances such as climatic variations and soil erosion. Occurrences mean the visible evidence of a particular economic behaviour system. Thus, in a landscape, we find primary occurrences (agriculture, animals, etc.), secondary and tertiary occurrences and transportation networks, coexisting as distinct subsystems. The growth in size and complexity of units, with the increasing demands that result from the rising socioe-conomic levels throughout the entire spatially organized system has led in turn to population movements, some of them seasonal, and the population supported by the activity has grown. This in turn has given rise an occasion to particular political feelings, communication systems, and landscape patterns—in short, to regional distinctiveness.

Thus the formula is not just $H \pm A^*(R.S) \rightarrow O$, but



This is meant to express the fact that an economic occurrence is the result of a particular behaviour pattern, and it does not exist in real world in static, isolated form implied by the equation. Economic landscape patterns are thus as much a product of previous decisions as they are of present ones. There are cultural variations that influence the way people perceive the landscape, and variations in the operational

milieu, including variations in the political landscape. This latter factor gives rise to the notion of nation-state, which may lead to the placing of barriers across the total spatial system in the form of customs unions or tariffs.

Geoeconomic World View

Imperialism can be said to be the first global economic process that created a centre-periphery relationship between the capitalist nation-state located in Europe and resource nation-state located around its periphery. This gradually gave way to a network of national economies operating under the global economic laws. Capitalism in these terms has been known as perpetrator of the inequality among nations. Its instruments of inequality are foreign trade, export and import of capital, international migration of labour and currency-financial relations. The World Capitalist system has gone through following stages: (1) the emergence of the world capitalist economy (second half of the 19th century), (2) it's full development (by 1917) on a world scale, (3) its ceasing to be the only, all embracing global economy and coexistence with the socialist economic system.

Marx wrote: "Capitalist production does not exist at all without foreign commerce" (Karl Marx, Capital, Vol. II). At present, world trade is determined by seven major developed capitalist countries, the USA, Great Britain, Germany, France, Italy, Canada and Japan. An important feature of the world capitalist economy is the uneven development of productive forces of individual countries, which result in some countries being pushed back. The deepening international division of labour has made economic ties between the countries even more entrenched. Currency-relations and export of capital are its key features. This brings another feature of global finance and its agencies as important players in world capitalism.

The economic geography of world has changed since the half past of last century. Nations have continuously gathered greater independence, adding new dimensions to the world

economic system. The emphasis has shifted from resources to finance since the world inflation rates accelerated in 70s, then came the crisis of finance in mid-80s and of recent the crisis in South-East Asia and Mexico as possible fallouts of rabid globalization. The structural adjustment programme has rendered world trade, increasingly a crucial factor in the development process. Development model has gained new dimension with international finance as crucial agency. This has brought into focus renewed concerns about international economic order and its leadership. Geoeconomics in this backdrop performs the abbreviation of geopolitical economy. The vast compages of human habitat have organized earth and its socio-natural resources under a territorial production complex, creating an identity that of region, especially an economic region. The superstructural aspects, viz., culture, help a geoeconomic region to delimit its corpuscular identity in a national framework.

The Geoeconomic Poles

World can be seen in a geoeconomic arrangements, as a centre of capitalist accumulation, dominated by what Mackinder termed as "Midland Basin". In its relation, there are large areas of under, or low development spread over the continents of Africa, Latin America and Asia. The quasi-developed status of China and CIS remains more or less the same. Geoeconomics is a two-tier game. At one tier, the history of capitalism continues to determine the fate of post-colonial nations under the advent of neo-colonialism. On the other, there are enormously large corporations, popularly known as Transnational Corporations (TNCs) that command significant potential to develop a single universal market for specific good, such as finance, technology, etc. The spatio-economic variance of development can be seen as centre-periphery relations. The exploitation of periphery by centre through unequal exchanges and other means exacerbates the living conditions of the poorest sections of the population and results

in the relatively slow growth of per capita incomes against the population growth rates, the absolute surplus of labour resources, regional and sectoral discrepancies, extremely narrow production choices and export specialization in most of the developing countries and the growing economic and social marginalisation of the population. Although the theorists of 'transnational capitalism allow for the possibility of certain economic progress of the developing countries within the bounds of 'dependency', they believe that such 'development' has its limitations and in any case, it is merely a reflection since the economic situation in the periphery directly depends on the state of affairs in the capitalist centre.[6]

There are two contrasting views of the way economic growth occurs. In the neoclassical tradition, GNP rises as the result of the long-term effects of capital formation, labour force expansion, and technological change, which are assumed to take place under conditions of competitive equilibrium. In the second broader view, economic growth is regarded as one aspect of transformation of the structure (mode) of production that is required to meet changing demands and to make more productive use of technology. The world situation under global integration of economies can be gauged geoeconomically with the help of labour surplus model given by Nobel laureate Arthur Lewis.

Most of the developing world has dual economy, as a legacy of colonialism. There is a commercially industrialized economic sector along with traditional agrarian sector. A fundamental relationship between the two sectors is that when the capitalist sector expands, it draws labour from reservoir in the non-capitalist sector. Labour is 'unlimited' in the sense that when the capitalist sector offers additional employment opportunities at the existing wage rate, the numbers willing to work out at the existing wage rate will be greater than the demand. This is ensured by the fact that wages in the non-capitalist sector are forced to lower levels by the capitalist sector. The bulk of finance comes from the private domestic

savings. Lewis assumes that all wages are consumed and profits are the source of savings. The rate of growth is therefore equal to product of the rate profit and the propensity to save out of profits.

Taken from this view, one can see that once the investments patterns are subject to global determinants then any fluctuation can seriously mar the growth of any state. Lewis considers another situation where the informal sector may offer a rise in real wages and a reduction in the profits in the capitalist sector. Globalization attempts to minimize that occurrence by integrating its economic and technological advantages across the world against the native traditional and scattered informal sectors, largely consisting of developing economies.

Geoeconomics with this backdrop appears as locational analysis of class struggle and global division of labour. The shift of emphasis from the determinist geoeconomy of natural resources to geoeconomy of human resource has helped reveal important socio-economic aspect for the viability of a nation-state. This mode has also led to the common spatial scales of all resource evaluation under the single scale of World Financial Capitalism.

Its spatial organization can be studied from the point of view of the commodity production at the primary level (Base Structure) and at the secondary and higher (Super Structure) levels as the movement of global finance and *vice versa*. A cautionary injunction is that class structure has acquired newer forms over this period and the New World Order is not infrequently accompanied by a neocolonialist trend, which tries to keep in step with technological development, economic growth and political authority.

The Geoeconomics of Capital: Emerging Perspectives

Universalization of trade laws is the hallmark of globalization. The long waited WTO is its present form. Globalization is a state sponsored phenomenon in accordance with the growing

demands from TNCs. There are certain international public goods that neither market nor nation-states can provide, such as systemic financial investment stability, dispute settlement within a rule of law for open trade, common standards for weights, measures and interconnection, management of global communication networks such as telecommunications and sea lanes to prevent asymmetry or congestion, and management of environmental concerns (UN Group of Experts Recommendations Report: Globalization and State—An Overview: Internet document).

These policy areas require some institutions beyond the nation-state. Some of these activities are largely self-regulating with the main commercial users having a collective interest in providing the public good (e.g., International Securities Association for bond markets, International Standards Association for many standards). In other cases, semi-autonomous national institutions provide the institutional cement (e.g., the role of central banks in the Bank of International Settlements). There are some international institutions that mix public and private sector participation such as the International Telecommunications Union. Some international institutions involve some pooling of sovereignty (as in World Meteorological Institution, International Monetary Fund, World Trade Organization) and the treaty obligations (the Antarctic Treaty, the Montreal Protocol). The UN and its specialized agencies provide support for maintaining peace and security, promoting, economic development, and protecting human rights in the global context.

Awareness of global possibilities may not necessarily lead to preparedness for dealing with the constraints and making use of opportunities offered by globalisation forces. National level and local level groups estimate the impact of liberalization in a variety of ways with differing assumptions based on historic, cultural and social values. Particularly significant is the awareness and assessment of globalization

forces and challenges by key political groups and their leaders and the way they will react to them within the context of short-term costs and long-term benefits.

The complex relationship between global institutions, value system and political environment find their juxtaposition over geographical environment. Globalization under this concern produces several facets, namely, the development of global operational milieu, the socio-economic processes and changing values, transformation in cultural environs of ideas and values, development of socio-psychological milieu and the change in awareness.

Spatially, it represents the sequent occupance of environments and the relict of socio-political dynamics. Development is one of its important consequences and globalization is its specific paradigm, counterpoised to the specific desire of market dominance by developed countries. So far, the institutionalization of this need has failed to address both the developed and the developing regions across the divided world. This brings forth another important aspect of globalization, that is, the globalization from below or in Marxist terms, facing the real need of globalization within and across the unequal world stratum. This remands forces working towards equalization. In this perspective globalization shall have to address the concerns such as global stratification, polarization of wealth, power and prestige on the one hand and on the other, rebelling communities seeking legitimacy of their nationalism.

The accruing economies of scale from globalization have started shuffling nation-resource linkages. The pre-globalization world used to be identified in five major man-resource regions. According to E.A. Ackermann, the first type consists of technologically advanced regions with low population to resource ratio regions; second type consists of technologically advance and high population to resource ratio regions; the third type is technologically deficient and low population to resource ratio regions; the fourth,

technologically deficient and high population to resource ratio regions; and the fifth, technologically deficient, very few food producing resource regions.

World economic regionalization is now more apparent in terms of patterns of world financial flows as seen from World Investment Report. David Yaffe, in his incisive analysis has revealed how globalization is nothing more than geopolitical economy of an uneven world. Contrary to what UNCTAD report asserts, "Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) by TNCs, now play a major role in linking national economies, building an integrated international production system—the productive core of the globalizing world economy", he reproduces certain facts:[7]

1. MNCs' FDI in 1995 was estimated at $230 billion (bn), producing a worldwide stock of $2,600 bn (1995) with worldwide sales of foreign affiliates at $5,200 bn (1995) and up to $7,000 bn, if such contracting, franchising and licensing are taken into account.
2. 70 % of the outflows from the imperialist countries (60-65 % of the total world flows) come from only five countries, France, Germany, Japan, UK and US.
3. The US has reasserted its leadership accounting for one-quarter of the world's stock and one fifth of flows.
4. The relative change in the balance of economic power since the end of post-war boom is highlighted by US share in the world outward stock of FDI falling from 52% in 1971 to 25.6% in 1994, while Japan's share rose from 2.7% to 11.7%.
5. Over the last 10 years FDI outflows from Third World countries have more than doubled growing from 5% of the world FDI outflows in 1980-84 to 10% in 1990-94, reaching 15% in 1994, with Hong Kong alone contributing 64% of the total. Of real significance is the fact that only 6% of FDI outward stock is accounted for by Third World countries.
6. 79% of the FDI inflow into Third World countries in 1993 went only to 10 countries including China taking 37% of the total alone.
7. FDI into Africa has declined from 11% of Third World inflows in 1986-90 to 6% in1991-93, to 4% in 1994.
8. The OECD and China, comprising 43% of the world's population attracted 91.5% of the FDI between 1981-91. Rest 57% of the world received only 8.5% of the total world FDI.
9. The largest 100 MNCs (excluding those in banking and finance) had an estimated $3.7 trillion worth of global assets, and a mere 1% of all MNCs own half of the global stock of FDI.
10. 70-80% of the global R&D expenditure and 80-90% of the technology payments are under MNC systems.

The persistent inequality in developing countries is good enough to prevent the spread of globalization. Nations and super-nations have ample structures to deny the benefit of globalisation to small and poor nations. The role of NAM, G-77 and other developing world organizations is largely been ignored under its rapidity.

There is another complementary and important aspect of globalisation. The agglomeration economies of scale are also evident between neighbouring regions, both in spatial as well as ideological terms. The region-to-region cooperation in decentralized manner is an important feature that has gone unrecognized in the glaze of globalization. In other words, the true structure of globalization demands some address. This has been possible after greater flexibilities in international politics since 90s. Level of specialization at micro-region level has been significant. Initially, the idea was found with Soviet Geographers[8], who had vast land area dispensed with unevenly

dispersed resources providing enormous challenge to bring socialist equity. The magnanimous efforts to integrate the regions are no doubt the precursor to present global edifice of inter-regional cooperation. This approach is finding its place under the global treatment of nation-states. The materialistic base of globalization cannot afford to ignore such forces of decentralization while consolidating the leadership of few nations.

Geopolitics of Globalization: Crucial Aspects of Geoeconomics

A common feature of globalization at the beginning of the 21st century is to recognize that businesses rather than nations compete. One must examine the whole spectrum of countries within the globalization process: leaders, quick adopters, slow adopters, reluctant participants, and those that are still very isolated from globalization forces.

For countries that are significantly involved in the globalization process, national governments seem to have fewer options for policy and operations.[9] They are challenged with redefining the role of state. In this framework, governments retain some influence in steering economic decisions: for example, policies that attract finance capital, policies that raise the educational level of home population, policies that ensure financial stability, policies that improve the physical and cultural environments and policies that create a sense of civic fairness. For countries in early stages of participation in the globalization process, there is both greater danger and greater opportunity. Specifically, the worldwide extension of established trading patterns has generally been longer, slower and to some extent, cyclical.

The Spatial Manifestations of Contradictions of Capitalism

Geographers have always debated over dichotomy between a real *geographical space* and an abstract *economic space*. Noted French economist Francois Perroux, in his article, Economic

'Space: Theory and Application' (1950) attacked geographical space as banal, which, he believed lead to 'Pathological Concepts'. A space that creates illusion of the coincidence of political space with economic and human space. Treating economic activity on global level first implies its delocalisation, second, it should lead to devaluation of frontiers and boundaries leading to a more harmonized way of utilizing resources to optimize employment and development. Perroux gave the concept of 'Growth Poles', the nodal centres for financing growth and development in its hinterland. The change of scales switched the abstract nature of space to real from global to regional level.

The first step to bring the two concepts together is seen in industrial location theories. In 1909, Alfred Weber came out with a book *Uber den Standort der Industrien*. According to him, the location factor corresponds to three orientations of significance: (1) minimal transport costs, (2) availability of cheap labour and (3) economies of agglomeration. His theory was an important spatial attribute of neoclassical economics. But it did not consider some of the important components of capitalist system, such as locational aspect influenced by rate of profit, mobility of labour and movement of capital. August Lösch sought to improve over Weberian model. He came up with his work *The Geographic Location of Economy* in 1930s. According to him, the choice of an ideal place for location depends on a combination of choices for the place of production and the place of consumption. A single combination is a sectoral market, which comprises a part of general market. In the industrial location theory it is the regional market that plays important role. Therefore, Lösch concentrated upon not only on regions but also on system of regions. He believed that the desire for maximum profit is a motive power of location.

Francis Perroux's *Growth Pole* concept has gone unrecognized by the advocates of globalization. He was perhaps the first one to abstract the spatial dynamics of

economic behaviour, which coincidentally fit well into globalization, itself an abstract concept. According to Perroux, development does not appear everywhere and all at once; it appears at points or growth poles with variable intensities; it spreads along diverse channels and has varying terminal effects for the whole of economic space. Perroux was interested in the growth stimulated by the key firm (sector) in the country's economy as a whole in its space, as opposed to within a defined territory such as a region or any other particular geographical space. J. Paelink further examined the conditions of its polarization into a regional compact. According to him, the technical, monetary, psychological and geographical are the four stages and forms of polarization, which arise when a key firm comes into being. Jacques Boudeville, an outstanding French economist further explained the concept of growth as "towns possessing complex of propulsive industries". The Growth Pole fell into disrespect at the hands of spatially fetished geographers. The concept of poles itself, having first been used as a means for describing the anatomy of economic development in an abstract economic space, was later refashioned as a means for resolving particular tasks in the choice of centres for concentrating capital investments.

Another factor that increasingly gained importance was the role of tariff in influencing the economic activity. In fact, in contrast to the cost of transportation, tariff remained important in influencing the supply of goods. Under the state-monopoly capitalism they are sharp instruments to divert trade and economic activity from one region to another. Such was the role of the US tariff system determining the development of the country's western regions; stimulating the movement of raw materials to the east and preventing transportation of readymade goods eastward. In industry itself and transport, the scientific and technological revolution essentially changed the notion of transportation costs and distances. But here one comes across grave contradiction: if an entrepreneur (monopoly) finds itself relatively less influenced

by such costs then why there is no tendency towards decentralization of industrial capitalism? In fact, it allows for more capacity to agglomerate. It only reflects as a potentiality and a reality only when there is an opportunity lying distant for greater profit. How otherwise it would have been possible for electrical-engineering concerns of USA, Western Europe and Japan to set up a network of branches in South-East Asia, with details and units being made in one region of the world, assembled in another, and the finished product marketed in the third.

Lenin discovered the law of unequal economic and political development under capitalism as universal law characteristic of all stages of capitalist development and embracing all parts of the world capitalist economy, including its periphery. International monopolies are not subject nor direct government control create new sets of contradictions in developing world between them and state-monopoly. Outstanding economist Gunnar Myrdal was among the first to highlight this contradiction in his book *Economic Theory and Underdeveloped Regions* (1958). Myrdal believed that an accelerated development of some centres (nucleus) produces a dual impact on other regions. On the one hand, there is a positive *spread effect*—stimulation of development due to the inflow of raw materials, new technologies, etc. On the other hand, there is a *backwash effect*—withdrawal from underdeveloped regions of skilled labour, capital and goods, all of which rush to the dynamic centres of development. Due to the accumulation of concentration advantages, the backwash effect predominates. This increases the relative backwardness of underdeveloped regions.

> "Typical of old capitalism, when free competition held undivided sway, was the export of goods. Typical of the latest stage of capitalism, when monopolies rule is the export of capital." (VI Lenin)[10]

Today nearly 85 years after Lenin's acute hypothesis, there are nearly 63,000 TNCs (parent firms) with around 690,000 foreign affiliates and a plethora of inter-firm arrangements spanning in virtually all countries and economic activities. The grip of imperialism has grown every time stronger as world's top 100 (non-financial) TNCs are still based in developed countries. They are mainly concentrated in electronics and electrical equipment, automobiles, petroleum, chemical and pharmaceuticals. He quotes Schulze-Gaevernitz: "Great Britain is gradually transformed from an industrial into a creditor state. Notwithstanding the absolute increase in the industrial output and the export of manufactured goods, there is an increase in the relative importance of income from interest and dividends, issues of securities, commissions and speculation in the whole of the national economy." Even today United Kingdom is the biggest FDI investor with almost $200 billion of outflows in 1999, followed by US. EU remains the biggest regional outward investor ($510 bn, 1999).

Another important feature of unequal treatment under capitalism is the nature of FDIs. Most of the FDI from developed world to developing countries travels in the form of mergers and acquisitions (M&As). The value of all M&As (cross-border and domestic) as a share of GDP has risen from 0.3 % in 1980 to 8% in 1999. This means there is merely transfer of proprietorship and no generation of employment. The cross-border M&As increased by 35% in 1999 reaching to $720 bn in over 6,000 deals and is expected to cross $1trillion by 2000. The value of cross-border M&As to world FDI flows reached over 80% in 1999. M&As are particularly significant as a mode of entry for FDI in developed countries. Cross-border M&As often represent the fastest means of building up a strong position in a new market, gaining power—and indeed market dominance—increasing the size of the firm or spreading risks. It can also lead to the increase in concentration in host countries leading to anti-competitive results, in fact, M&As can be deliberately used to reduce or eliminate

competition. M&As are important for TNCs as they can internalize border transaction and bypass national controls and scrutiny, effectively. TNCs can use transfer pricing on intra-firm trade to minimize their tax exposure, depriving host or home countries of tax revenues. Furthermore, cross-holdings, share listings in several stock exchanges, the location of headquarters in countries other than the country of origin, and sourcing of inputs from facilities in multiple countries are all examples of overall pervasion of global capitalism.

Globalization versus Regionalization

Mackinder's Outer Crescent could last for only one socialist revolution. The rivalry between Midland and Heartland soon got transformed into an ideological tug-of-war with Outer Crescent of Third World being pulled at either side. The battle was lost by the Socialist Heartland at the end of 90s, rendering the whole developing world gatecrashing at the West, the victors of New International Economic Order. But it served a major blow to the confidence of the Third World.

Since then the Third World has a difficult path to tread upon where they have to strike a balance between comparative advantage under new economic system and a minimal set of drawbacks. There is a need to retrospect the platform, which served them as a source of strength in the multilateral issues and adapt it to reflect the needs of the day. Gone are the days when under political compulsions the capitalist West had to deliver concern to the Third World development situation. But with the collapse of communism a new ideology under the leadership of the US and Europe has come to dictate terms. In fact, the North-South question became secondary to the smooth transition of former socialist bloc to market economies.

The Third World Initiative

Presence of socialist bloc had strong impact on global political economy, which stands only as an imprint today. The earliest

concerns on colonial question in regard to Third World economic development came to be addressed with the increase in super rivalry. The major aim of South after decolonization was to reconstruct their near subsistence economies into viable international unit of exchange. The international secretariat of the United Nations contributed strongly to setting out the analytical underpinnings of international development cooperation. Most of the developed countries launched programmes of bilateral aid to developing countries on concessional terms. Multilateral financial institutions established after the war, particularly the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, shifted their attention from post-war reconstruction and international monetary management to the needs of developing countries. The *Decade of Development* of 60s saw mobilization of developing countries on a global basis. It saw the launching of Non-Alignment Movement as well as the creation of Group of 77 in the context of the birth of UNCTAD. A 'platform' of the developing countries came to be forged to reflect their needs and to identify the responses called for from the developed countries in the arena of multilateral negotiations. The platform embodied such issues as the need to enhance capital flows to the developing countries, to improve and stabilize the terms of trade for primary products, to liberalize the markets for their exports and to provide preferential access to such markets as a non-discriminatory basis.

The early years saw the acceptance by the developed countries of such concepts as the generalized system of preferences, overall targets for official aid, the participation of the developing countries in shipping, the need for production-consumer cooperation to stabilize the prices of selected commodities and international creation of liquid reserves. The decade of seventies saw intensified activities under North-South dialogue. UNCTAD served as a forum for a number of successful negotiations, including the Integrated Programme for Commodities and the Common Fund, Code on Restrictive

Business Practices, the Convention on Multi-modal Transport, the cancellation of the official debts of the poorer countries, and the first conference of the Least Developed Countries. The seventies also saw the inauguration in Paris, outside of the United Nations, the Conference on International Economic Cooperation (CIEC) to which the term 'North-South' dialogue was first applied.

The situation began to change over in the succeeding of 80s. Conservative regimes with market oriented ideologies assumed office in the United States and several countries in Europe. These conservative forces severely affected the demand for the exports of the developing countries with drastic consequences for the external payments and their growth rates. Most developing countries were oriented toward import substitution as the optimal way to achieve industrialization. The stress was placed on balanced growth rather than specialization for export market. The export of goods could raise the foreign exchange reserve necessary to pay for strategic imports. In actual practice the growth of import requirements was not matched with the growth of export earnings. To worsen this situation, their exports mainly consisted of primary goods that acquired relatively smaller earnings compared to the imported capital goods, requiring more and more foreign exchange. As a result, balance of payment crisis got aggravated, for example, the developing countries had export surplus in 1950s, by 1962 accumulated deficit of $2.3 billions.

The attention of developing countries shifted away from multilateral negotiations on global economic issues to corrective measures at domestic level. Such responses were linked to prescriptions provided by World Bank and the International Monetary Fund with the support of the major donors of bilateral assistance. With the end of Cold War, the historic equilibrium too relapsed and the multilateral negotiations with a North-South development orientations.

gradually gave way to the negotiations that essentially reflected the priorities of the developed countries.

The new environment also had institutional consequences affecting, in particular, the development contributions of the United Nations and its organs. With the end of the Cold War vetoes that thwarted the extra-political role of Security Council, a new emphasis came to be placed on the proactive involvement of the UN peacekeeping force. Given the budgetary constraints, this change was at the expense of the previous focus of UN on economic and development issues. The end of Cold War also diminished the voting strength of the developing countries. There was no longer a socialist bloc to support their policies.

There is now an increasing recognition that the benefits of globalization have by and large by-passed the developing countries despite their adherence to its tenets. The poorest of them in parts of Africa, South Asia and Central America are increasingly marginalized in the world economy. Mahatma Gandhi in his speech to Asian Relations Conference, 1947 spoke of these vast sections of society who amid global concerns still constituted the significant portion of world community but was paid no heed.

> "If some of you see the villages, you will not be fascinated by the sight. You will have to scratch below the dung heap. I do not say that they ever were havenly places. Today they are really dung-heaps. They were not like that before. What I say is not from history but form what I have seen myself. I have travelled from one end of India to the other and have seen the miserable specimen of humanity with lusterless eyes."[11]

Globalization and liberalization has enlarged this community by increasing the gap between the rich and the poor nations.

South-South Cooperation: Efforts to Reestablish the Geoeconomic Balance

South-South cooperation has for long been an important part of the overall agenda of the countries of the South on development issues. In the early phase, the South-South logic was based on the needs to widen the markets on a sub-regional or regional basis, as a framework for the import substituting industrialization reflecting the economies of scale. The emphasis was on those manufactured products whose scope for outside markets was believed to be limited. The concept of globalisation and liberalization has shifted the emphasis from self-contained growth within regional or sub-regional parameters to one of enhancing the capacity of developing countries to participate in the global economy. Preferential and free trade arrangements within regional groupings were seen as a 'fast track' within the global liberalization process that encouraged both domestic and foreign investors. As of now, groupings have begun to emerge with overlapping memberships that extend the network of linkages between countries. As mentioned before, groupings have also emerged that include both developed and developing countries as members.

The impact of regional and sub-regional groupings on accelerating the trade among member countries has in most cases been limited. This reflects, in contrast to the situation in Europe, the usual absence of complementaries within groupings of developing countries and the historical orientation of their trade towards the market of the North. This suggests that intra-regional preferential or free trade needs to be supported by other measures of cooperation in such areas as business linkages, technological development, infrastructure improvement and finance. The creation of institutions in the South for the promotion of sectoral issues such as science and technology has also been urged in the context of South-South cooperation. The cooperation of

developing countries across the board at the global or inter-regional level is an important aspect of South-South cooperation. Former Chairman of South Centre, Mwalimu Julius K. Nyerere, while speaking at Havana Conference (1996) underscored the fact that

> "Building up South-South cooperation can increase the reality and practicality of South countries' power to act in solidarity for their long term benefit and in defence of their real independence. For their separate vulnerability to pressure or damage emanating from Northern countries is very largely a result of their continuing over-dependence on North-South trade, expertise or capital."[12]

There is a need in this context to promote inter-regional and trade-related investment efforts. Another hitherto missed component is the role of cooperatives in Third World development. So far, they have worked at local and national level, these can be extended to neighbouring geographical contiguities, in order to benefit the frontier regions of the Third World nations.

Developing countries have strong limitations for participation in world economy. They are low-income countries with very little to invest on their own. If one looks at the table from World Development Report, 1999, there is a huge income gap between low and high-income countries. The global finance is in the grip of these high-income countries. The IMF-World Bank and GATT/WTO is their two-prong strategy to dictate terms of international economic relations.

The coming together of countries of the South in the context of negotiations with the developed countries is also a crucial aspect of South-South cooperation. The G-77 and the NAM played a pivotal role in this process. In the recent years there has been number of influence weakening this unity. In the present context there is growing need for exchange between developing countries on multilateral questions and for

various forms of networking among them. The regional and sub-regional forums can be the focal points for this purpose.

There are certain suggestions that have emerged. A few can be stated below:[13]

1. NAM can take initiative for a framework of the second round of negotiations under the Global System of Trade Preferences (GSTP) to carry out a substantial across-the-board reduction of barriers to trade among themselves, and to consider bringing new areas such as trade in services and trade-related investments within the scope of the GSTP. Clear overall targets for the reduction of tariffs and steps towards the elimination of non-tariff barriers should be set. In this context, the more advanced developing countries should be encouraged to extend special preferences to the least developed countries in the framework of the GSTP, or along the lines of the Generalized System of Preferences currently applied by the developed countries.
2. NAM should also take measures to promote closer linkages between various regions, and in particular between East and South-East Asia and other regions; such linkages should seek to promote closer investment and trade links through arrangements for regular dialogue and consultation between governments and the private sectors. Regional and sub-regional trade fairs are one useful way of promoting trade links and relations.
3. NAM should encourage the more advanced developing countries to consider establishing special programmes of assistance for the less advanced countries of the South. Technical assistance programmes, which would make available to the poorer countries the rich development experience of the more advanced developing countries, could be of particular importance.
4. NAM should also consider creating forum for consultations among governments in order to agree on practical measures to reduce structural constraints affecting

trade, including transport, financial, informational, and technical barriers. NAM could, for example, consider ways in which more countries could be encouraged to participate in South Investment, Trade, and Technology Data Exchange (SITTDEC) as a practical way to promote South-South trade.

5. NAM should consider commissioning a special study by a team of experts from the South on the implications for regional and sub-regional groupings in particular, and on South-South cooperation in trade in general, of the emergence of mega trade blocs involving countries from the North and South.

Geopolitics versus Geoeconomics

The first wave of globalization is towards integrating economies, which started over a century ago, dominated by autocratic empires and colonial powers. It culminated just before the outbreak of Cold War. In the post-bipolar world, it is given that the New World Order had hatched out of the shell of economic considerations developed over the period of swelling of international commercial linkages. At the same time, it has also been the manifestation of global concerns, such as the degradation of air, water and environment, international trade in illicit drugs and arms, mushrooming of corruption and violation of human rights. Though the military notion may seem to have fallen back, all these show the newer dimensions of integration of regional dynamics into across international scales.

Thinking this way brings geopolitics in close to conceptualize the geo-strategic concerns along with geoeconomic weights. The transnational institutions have created a new condition where world appears single body in several processes, for e.g., furthering international political cooperation by making citizens more informed. As for the dominance of economic considerations, there are two contrasting viewpoints post the Soviet collapse.[14] One, that

rising economic interdependence means less risk of global war and greater conditions for peace and security; or, two, that clashes of economic interest will exacerbate territorial or ideological disputes. Geoeconomics shows the interdependence of global and national economies and how to sustain development, each is dependent on the other. In other words, national development is now inextricably linked to the state of the world economy—the impact of the events in South-East Asia on the global economy can now be discernible in world financial patterns.

Global economic development with modernized technology is able to change the geopolitical *status quo*. During the collapse of colonial system, some Asian and African countries chose a socialistic or planned economy. Gradually most of them turned to market economy. Strengthening the market in these countries has progressed through their own internal working resources and socio-political dynamics. Geoeconomics becomes critical with multidimensional levels of conflict. Geopolitics is a part of globalization. In order to conduct a conflict relationship sound economic base is essential. Looking beyond the rhetoric one can identify the main features of post-bipolar world order with following characteristics[15]:

1. Military power continues to be dominant. States are still classified in terms of their military strength. The US appears to be leader at present.
2. It is an era of imposed peace backed by military power.
3. There is growing focus on economic issues in global international relations. But the geoeconomic as well geopolitical concerns are equally important.
4. One of the dialectics of post-Soviet world is the continued military ascendancy of the US and the new economic centres of power on the other hand, in the form of EU and Japan.

5. The integration of national economic and security concerns as well as identification of newer political formations within the nations. There is an increase in ethno-nationalism that has led to cleavages, bringing up new states.

The geopolitical and geoeconomic interests have been changing with the swing in global values. The state institutions as tool of violence have yielded to the growing international pressure to make world more conscious of human rights. The state seems to have relegated into Marxian view of the 'withering' state.

Dr. Maurice Duverger, a famous French political scientist explained that internal and external policies are a continuum of a singular state apparatus. A struggle between propertied and un-propertied, privileged and oppressed people is bound to transfer itself from a national scale to international relations. According to him, there will be no more proletarians several years henceforth, but the 'proletarian nations' will exist so long a time there are adequate conditions for democracy and reduction in tension and crisis.

The Russian political scientist, G. Ashin gives the following scheme of society's social structure that ultimately influences the state polity: (1) *Ruling Class*—the most active group of political leaders: (i) *Economic Elite* (groups or strata affecting economy), (ii) *Political Elite* (political bodies, state power machinery and parties), (iii) Activists of culture and ideology and owners of mass media; (2) *the Middle Class*; (3) the *Exploited Class*.[16] In accordance with the social structure, the global development of human societies may have several paths. All the three elites interact mutually yielding in their positions. The middle and the exploited classes may enter the elite depending on personal abilities, education and financial means. The interest of these strata is defended by trade unions. The legal regime also guarantees them social assistance and economic and political freedom.

Geopolitics is not only dependent on the form of state rule, economic potential and people's mentality, but also on the kind of elite, which is ruling. The present politics of globalization irreversibly increases the spreading of a broad network of new technology, electronics and satellite communication finding assistance and support from economic and cultural elites in the world. Rival political elites gradually yield their positions to pressure by the economic and cultural elites, middle class, non-governmental public bodies and world publicity. No country can develop without geopolitical and global dimension. Humanity develops through mutual contradictions. A de-ideologization of international relations allows a change from the world of confrontation to that of cooperation. The priority of human values, mutual interests and international law promotes a qualitative change in world development.

Notes

1. Adhikari, S. (1992), *Fundamnetals of Geographical Thought*, Chaitanya Publishing House, Alahabad, pp. 141-42.
2. Hartshorne, R. (2000 *reprint*), *The Nature of Geography*, Rawat Publications, Jaipur, p. 292.
3. Gudoznik, G.S. (1990), *Civilisation & Global Problems*, Progress Publishers, Moscow, pp. 18-25.
4. Hartshorn, T.A. and Alexander, J.W. (1992), *Economic Geography*, Prentice-Hall, New Delhi, pp. 1-15.
5. Hurst, M.E. (1972), *A Geography of Economic Behaviour*, Duxburry Press, Massachusetts, pp. 316-43.
6. Meir, G.M. (1995), *Leading Issues in Economic Development*, 6th ed., Oxford University Press, New Delhi, pp. 107-10.
7. Yaffe, D., "Globalization: A Redivisoin of the World by Imperialism", http://www.rcgfrfl.easynet.co.uk/Marxism/articles/glob131.htm.

8. Lavrov, S. and Sdasyuk, G. (1988), *Concepts of Regional Development*, Progress Publishers, Moscow, pp. 165-80.
9. Mazari, S.M., "Continuing Centrality of Geopolitics in the Post-bipolar World", http: // www. Defencejournal. com.
10. Lenin, V.I. (1977), 'Imperialism—The Highest Stage of Capitalism', *Selected Works*, Vol.1, p.678.
11. At the closing session of the Inter-Asian Relations Conference held on April 2, 1947 at New Delhi, Mahatma Gandhi spoke to over 20,000 visitors, delegates and observers. http://www.coffeecup.com.
12. Challenges and Imperatives of Growth and Sustainable Development—Putting People First, Address by Mwalimu Julius K. Nyerere to a UN General Assembly Consultation at New York on 7th June 1994. http://www.southcentre.org.
13. Elements For An Agenda Of The South: Report of the Ad Hoc Panel of Economists of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) presented to the Twelfth NAM Summit, Durban, South Africa, 1998. http://www.southcentre.org .
14. n9.
15. *Ibid.*
16. Khidirbekughli, D., "Geopolitics and Democracy", http://www.freenet/~alumni/doulatbek/book2/.

4

South Asia and Central Asia
The Regional Semblance

The major aim of this chapter is to seek a case for two regions that share a lot common in their history, nationalist perspective, constitutional aspirations and geopolitics where their social and political interaction can lead to the invention of an environment for natural growing cooperation amid global efforts to race past the attempts to monopolize them. Both, South and Central Asia have been interactive regions since prehistoric times. The strong ties between their history, culture and traditions have created a sense of privilege among the leading elite within the nations of both the regions.

The post-Cold War scenario has invited a host of pressures and amendments to policy structures to accommodate them. This does not take away from both the regions, the long array of concerns that were quite conventional during Cold War period. The major difference of milieu is the growing urgencies amidst globalization to address them so as not to lag behind in the attempts to be a part of global community. More so, the hitherto possessed security cover being no more available, the newly independent Central Asian Republics (CARs) are in a constant search for clarity of interest with other nations, zealously safeguarding their

national boundaries from all types of intransigencies such as fundamentalism, narco-terrorism, nuclear safety and others. Central Asia under nation-state framework is new to these concerns and eagerly seeks to recuperate from the ills of being inexperienced by cooperating with several neighboring regions. On several accounts South Asia appears to them as one of the most diverse and keenly felt neighborhood where they can seek a parity of status. No other community of nations is willing to accord them the kind of respect, brotherhood, and recognition to their history, culture and civilization with such grace. This has enamoured these states to seek a greater participation among the community of South Asian nations, in all spheres, such as economy, culture and polity. This brings forth the need to investigate the socio-cultural compag of these nations and gauge the possibilities of cooperation in a manner that can exemplify another union equal to the European Union.

Central Asia: Land and Its People

The vast tracks of Eurasia have encompassed a cultural hearth, which has sent cultural reverberations since times anon. This landlocked civilization has unique aspects in its geography, society and culture. A brief introduction has already been met out in the first chapter, however a pertinent recollection of these features is needed here.

Geographical Setting

Central Asian landmass, geologically speaking, it is situated on Turan Platform. Much of the rocks in region belong to Paleozoic period. The southern most regions consist of Alpine period rocks merging into Trans-Himalayan cordillera. Oil and gas deposits commonly occur in sedimentary rocks on the folds around these tectonic shields. The region is tectonically sensitive and geographers believe that only during the last one

million years, the Central Asian land mass uplifted to 700 meters.

The major physiographic regions of Central Asia are as follows:

1. The Huge Asian Mountains comprising of (a) the Middle Asian Mountains and Uplands; (b) the Central Asian Mountains and Uplands, and (c) Dzungaria, containing some of the highest peak of Central Asia. The extreme southern part consists of the very high Pamir region of the Himalayas. Ferghana Valley is one of the important lower regions.
2. Kazakh Plateau has elevation between 500 to 1,000 meters above sea level. It is fairly even surface interrupted with small elevations.
3. The Turan Plains are the major relief features of Central Asia. It is situated between the Caspian Sea in the west and surrounded by various mountainous regions in the north and south. At the center is Aral Sea into which two major rivers Amu Darya and Syr Darya drain. It is an extensive desert area covered with wind blown sand dunes. The Karakumy and Kyzlkum are two major deserts of considerable extent. Towards its south, mountains of Kopet Dag appear as fringe.
4. Parts of Eastern Europe Plateau containing Volga and Ural river basins; the southern Ural mountain range; southern part of West Siberian Plains and western parts of Altay-Sayan mountains run along the northern hemisphere of Central Asian land mass.

Brief history[1]

Central Asian history connotes much wider geographical dimensions than the present territorial compage. In terms of historical geography a more precisely delineated Central Asian heartland consists of three adjacent regions, collectively referred to by 19th-century explorers and geographers as

Russian and Chinese Turkestan. The first of these regions, known to the ancient Greeks as Transoxania and to the Arabs as Ma wara' an-Nahr meaning, that "Which lies beyond the river" consisting of the area between the Amu Darya (the Oxus River of the Greeks and the Jayhun of the Arabs) and Syr Darya (the Jaxartes River of the Greeks and the Sayhun of the Arabs). The second, predominantly steppe, region extends northward from the upper reaches of the Syr Darya to the valley of the Ili River and to the foothills of the ranges lying between the Altai Mountains and the Tien Shan. The third region, centering on the Takla Makan Desert, is bounded on the north by the Tien Shan, on the west by the Pamirs, on the south by the Kunlun Mountains, and on the northeast by the Dzungarian (Jungarian) Basin. Cimmerians and the Scythians are known to be the first identifiable compendium of human culture. Cimmerians began their occupation of Southern Russian Steppe as early as 1200 BC, and by 700 BC the Sythians are believed to have replaced them. The 6th century BC events in Central Asia were marked with the invasions of the Achaemenids of Persia under Darius I and Cyrus. The Greeks appeared on under the leadership of Alexander the Great in 329-8 BC. The group of barbarians called the Huns emerged on the western borders of China by 200 BC. They played a considerable role in early Chinese history, leading to the introduction of cavalry and the adoption of foreign clothing, more suitable than its traditional Chinese counterpart for new types of warfare. Chinese faced regular incursions and attacks from the groups of barbarians living in the west. The Huns were split into two hordes, with the Eastern Horde under the Chinese subjection. The Chinese army had reached the Caspian Sea by 100 AD. The 2-3rd century saw the rise of Kushanas and the Parthians who included much of the Soghdiana and Bactria in their realm. The White Huns (Avars) invaded the whole of Central Asia and Europe in 370 AD, a main source of the heartland proposition by Sir Mackinder.[2]

Turks appeared on Central Asian lands by 552 AD. The tribe of the Turks (T'u-chüeh in Chinese transcription), living within the Juan-Juan Empire and apparently specializing in metallurgy, revolted and established Turkic Khannate that remained for about two centuries as a dominant force in Asia. In alliance with the Sasanians, the Turks attacked and destroyed the Hephthalite Empire (560), thereby gaining control over an important portion of the Silk Road leading from China to Byzantium. The Arabs came with heavy raids in 7th century AD. They succeeded in capturing Khurasan in 652 AD. They crossed Oxus river by 667 AD. Their expanse included Bukhara, Samarkand (709 AD), Khiva (711 AD) and Kashgar (713 AD). Meanwhile, the Turks of Mongolia faced defeat at the hands of Uighur in 744 AD. The western Turk empire continued to thrive and, in its westward expansion, reached the borders of Byzantium headed by a smaller tribal confederation standing under Uighur leadership. The Kyrgyz replaced the Uighurs in Mongolia in 840 AD.

Advent of Mongols in Central Asia is dated with the defeat of Kyrgyz in 924 at the hands of their leader, A-pao-chi. The creation of the Mongol empire by Genghis Khan (1206) was a great feat of political and military skill that left a lasting imprint on the destinies of both Asia and Europe. In Iran and China the Mongol rulers increasingly linked their destinies with those of their sedentary subjects, but in the Central Asian heartland the descendants of Chagatai and Ögödei, sons of Genghis, maintained traditional steppe polities geared to the interests of their nomad followers and increasingly opposed to the policies of the Great Khan in China and his ally, the Il-khan, in Iran.

The Chagataid khanate, coterminous with the Central Asian heartland, enjoyed a checkered fortune. For the next 30 years it remained united, but during the 1330s and 40s it split into a western and an eastern khanate, the former consisting of the area between the Syr Darya and the Amu Darya, together with much of what is today Afghanistan, while the latter

comprised the Semirechye and Kashgaria. The inhabitants of Transoxania and Iran knew the eastern Chagataid khanate known as Mughulistan (literally, 'Land of the Mongols').

The late 14th century saw weaning of Chagataid rule as a result of the rise of Timur. Timur first united under his leadership the Turko-Mongol tribes located in the basins of the two rivers. With the assistance of these tribes he expanded into the neighboring regions of Khorasan, Sistan, Khwarezm, and Mughulistan before embarking upon extensive campaigning in what are now Iran and Iraq, eastern Turkey, and the Caucasus region. In addition, he launched two successful attacks on his erstwhile protégé, Tokhtamysh, ruler of the Golden Horde. In 1398-99 Timur invaded northern India and sacked Delhi. Ulug Beg, his grandson ruled Samarkand between 1409 and 1447 that witnessed a considerable measure of tranquility to the long-troubled region. Throughout the second half of the 15th century, the western part of Central Asia was divided into a number of rival principalities ruled by descendants of Timur, among which Bukhara and Samarkand were the most important. By the close of the century, therefore, all the Timurid possessions in Central Asia had passed into the hands of the Uzbeks.

In the 1700s, the basins of the Amu Darya and Syr Darya passed under the control of three Uzbek khanates claiming legitimacy in their descent from Genghis Khan. These were, from west to east, the Qungrats based on Khiva in Khwarezm (1717-1920), the Mangits in Bukhara (1753-1920), and the Mings in Kokand (Quqon; c. 1710-1876), in the upper valley of the Syr Darya. During this same period, east of the Pamirs, Kashgaria was torn apart by the rivalries of Khwajahs and Kyrgyz; in the Semirechye the Kazaks were locked in conflict with the Mongol Oyrats and Dzungars; while between the Aral and Caspian seas the Turkmens roamed the northern borders of Iran, enslaving the sedentary peoples there and transporting them to Bukhara to labor in the oases.

Russian expansion under Tsarist rule culminated with the annexation of Uzbek Khannate of Kokand in 1876; those of Khiva and Bukhara became Russian protectorates in 1873 and 1868, respectively. The conquest of the Turkmens in the last quarter of the 19th century defined Russia's (now Turkmenistan's) southern frontier with Iran and Afghanistan.

The communications were strengthened with the construction of Trans-Caspian Railroad by 1888, reaching Samarkand; The Orenburg-Tashkent Railroad was completed between 1899 and 1905; the Turkestan-Siberian Railroad came later, begun just before World War I and not completed until 1930.

Among various ethnic groups in Central Asia, esp. Uzbeks, Kazaks, Turkmens, Tajiks, and Kyrgyz, the Kazaks were the first to respond to the impact of Russian culture. This 'dialogue' between the Russians and Kazaks was, however, doomed by the government's policy of settling peasants from European Russia and Ukraine on the Kazak steppe, where agricultural settlement on an extensive scale could be undertaken only by curtailing the area available for grazing by the nomadic livestock and by restricting their seasonal migrations.

After 1917 Socialist Revolution, Central Asia was increasingly integrated into the Soviet system through the implementation of planned economy and improved communications, through the communist institutional and ideological framework and many young Central Asians joining the Red Army. The economy of the region became further improved to meet the needs of the backward Central Asian people.

Lenin had examined deep into the question of national identity and their ultimate solution was the creation of five Soviet socialist republics in the region: the Kazakh S.S.R. (now Kazakhstan) in 1936, the Kyrgyz SSR (now Kyrgyzstan) in 1936, the Tadzhik SSR (now Tajikistan) in 1929, the Turkmen

S.S.R. (now Turkmenistan) in 1924, and the Uzbek S.S.R. (now Uzbekistan) in 1924.

Emergence of Modern Central Asia

If ever, there has been example in the history of socio-economic theory, where a community has skipped the capitalist stage, under the Marxian scheme of societal evolution, then Central Asia is its reckoning example.

This has significant bearing on the future course of the evolution of a stable relationship between the two Asian regions.

The present nationalist sentiments, quest of economic aspirations and global partnership, all are deeply influenced by the history of nation-state formation and economic reconstruction by Central Asian peoples under USSR aegis.

Ethnicity and the Nation-State Formation in Central Asia[3]

Central Asian history ordained a plural society with differentiated Turkic tribes living under autochthonous communitarian spaces that were ultimately the basis for political mortification into a state. The state delimitation was carried out in Central Asia in 1924 that gave birth to Soviet Socialist Republics. The Uzbek SSR and the Turkmen SSR were formed as union republics within the USSR. The Tajik SSR came into existence as an autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic within the Uzbek SSR. The Kazakh areas of Central Asia became united in what was then called the Khirgiz Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic within the RSFSR. Kara-Kagsakia entered the Khirgiz ASSR as an autonomous oblast. The Khirgiz formed an autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic within the RSFSR under the name of the Kara-Khirgiz ASSR.[4]

According to Prof. Devendra Kaushik, there is also an opinion that the issue of delimitation was politically motivated

to down size the republic of Turks. The Turkestan Commission had decided in favor of carrying out the administrative re-grouping of Turkestan in conformity with the ethnographical and economic conditions of the region. Yet it opposed the suggestion to divide immediately the territory of the Turkestan Republic into a number of national republics. The policies pursued by the Soviet governments of Turkestan, Bukhara and Khwaresm prepared the ground for national delimitation by creation of national divisions, establishment of national autonomous oblasts, development of languages, literature and press of indigenous nationalists.

The All-Russia Central Executive Committee proposed to the Turkestan Central Executive Committee in August 1920 to elaborate a plan on the re-division of the administrative districts of Turkestan in conformity with their national composition. In the Central Executive Committee of Bukhara and Khwarezm Republics of Turkmen and Kyrgyz national divisions were created. The Uzbek majority areas were separated to form Novo-Urgench oblast and Khiva rayon. On May 10, 1924, the National Delimitation Commission scrutinized the recommendations of national commissions. It favored the establishment of a full-fledged Uzbek and Turkmen national republics and the Tajik and Khirgiz autonomous oblasts. The Politbureau of the CC of the KCB (B) scrutinised these recommendations on June 2 and 12, 1924. It adopted a resolution on national delimitation of the republics of Central Asia suggesting the following course:[5]

1. Create independent Uzbek and Turkmen republics and retain the Khwarezm Republic in its present form after separating the Turkmen areas from it.
2. Merge the Khirgiz (i.e., Kazak) areas of Turkestan with Kirghiz (Kazak) ASSR.
3. Establish an autonomous Kara-Khirgiz (i.e., Kirghiz) oblast and incorporate it into the RSFSR.

4. Create within the Uzbek Republic a separate autonomous oblast of Tajiks:
5. Conclude a treaty between the USSR and the independent Turkmen and Uzbek republics on their entry into the Union in the forthcoming Congress of Soviets of the USSR.

The Territorial Commission concluded its work at the beginning of September 1924. On October 24, 1924, the Central Executive Committee of the USSR adopted a statute recognizing the national delimitation of the Soviet republics of Central Asia and the entry of the Uzbek SSR and the Turkmen SSR into the union. Lenin had pointed out the need for a division of territory as far as possible according to the national composition of the population.

Before the 1924 delimitation, a large number of Uzbeks (66.5%) lived in the Turkestan ASSR but comprised only 41.4% of the entire population of that Republic. After delimitation, 82.6% of all Uzbeks in Central Asia entered into the composition of the Uzbek SSR where they formed an absolute majority of 76.1%. The Turkmen before national delimitation did not form a clear majority in any of the three republics of the Central Asia. However, after delimitation of the Turkmen SSR, 94.2% of all the Turkmen were joined together forming 71.9% of the total population of the republic. Similarly the Tajiks, who had earlier formed 7.7% of the population of the Turkestan ASSR and 31% of the Bukhara Republic, formed 71.2% of the population of the Tajik ASSR within the Uzbek SSR. 75.2% of all the Tajiks in Central Asia joined the Tajik ASSR, which was raised in 1929 to the level of a Union Republic. The Khirgiz who had formed only 10.8% of the population of the Turkestan ASSR, constituted 66% of the population of the newly organized Kara-Kirghiz autonomous oblast within the RSFSR. 86.7% of all Kirghiz in Central Asia lived in their autonomous national oblast, which was converted into the Kirghiz ASSR in 1926. In 1936, it was

raised to a Union Republic. 79.3% of all Kara-Kalpaks were organized into the Kara-Kalpak autonomous oblast within the Kirghiz (Kazakh) ASSR where they formed a significant portion of the total population of the oblast (38.1%). The Kara-Kalpak autonomous oblast was made the Kara Kalpak ASSR within the RSFSR in 1932. In 1936, it entered the Uzbek SSR as an autonomous republic. In the Kirghiz (Kazakh) ASSR within the RSFSR, 93.4% of the Kazakhs were included forming 57.4% of its population. In 1936, the Kazakh ASSR was also made a Union Republic.

Elimination of Economic and Cultural Backwardness in Central Asia: The Case of Soviet Geoeconomic Planning[6]

The Twelfth Congress (1923) called for the elimination of inequality between the nationalities by raising the cultural and economic level of the backward peoples. To overcome this great economic and cultural backwardness, huge capital outlays and a large number of highly skilled specialists were needed. Central Asia was also supplied with technical equipment and machines for industrial enterprises and agriculture. Numerous experienced political functionaries and other specialists also went from Russia to C. Asia.

The working people of Central Asia began the industrialization of their republics in 1926-27. In March 1927, the Second Congress of Soviets in the Uzbek SSR considered it necessary to create a textile industry, organize new branches of industry to process agricultural raw materials, carry out an electrification plan and organize the production of agricultural machines and implements.

Initial steps were taken towards the industrialization of Uzbekistan in 1927. In November 1927, the Third Congress of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan discussed the problems concerning the First Five Year Plan. One of the important objects of the first plan was the attainment of self-sufficiency in cotton for the textile industry of the USSR.[7] The plan paid

great attention to the development of coal and oil industries in Uzbekistan. It also laid stress on the creation of metallurgical industry in Central Asia. The allocation of industrial development in the first plan was 288.4 million rubles, which constituted 26% of the capital investment under the plan in the republic.

Major characteristic of the industrial development in Uzbekistan during the First Five Year Plan was an impressive development of power production, machine building and metal industries. In Tashkent, an agricultural machinery plant was built, which supplied machines and other implements required by agriculture in the republic, particularly for cotton cultivation. The Slmalysk copper processing plant and the Chirchik chemical combine came into existence during the first plan. In 1932, the construction of a big textile combine at Tashkent was commenced. A number of silk-cussing and spinning factories were established at Bukhara, Ferghana and Margelan. Additionally, several factories for fruit and vegetable preservation were also constructed. During the First Five Year Plan the Uzbek SSR achieved a great success in task of socialist industrialization. As against an increase of two times in the central areas, the volume of industrial production in Uzbekistan increased 29 times.[8]

The achievements made by the Uzbek SSR during the Second Five Year Plan may be summed up as follows. Power output rose from 93.6 million Kw.hrs. in 1932 to 276.2 million Kw.hrs. in 1937. In 1913, it was only 3.3 million Kw.hrs. The production of heavy industry in Uzbekistan went up by 15 times in relation to the 1924-25 level. The value of its output increased from 630 million rubles in 1932 to 1,512 million on 1937. Thus, great success was achieved in the industrialization of Uzbekistan, which in a decade's time became a powerful industrial republic.

A big advance was made in industrialization of the other republics of Central Asia too. In the Turkmen SSR, the value of industrial production rose from 129 million rubles to 293

million rubles, i.e., 2.3 times, during the Second Five Year Plan period. Industrial production increased from 27.9% in 1925 to 68.9% in 1937, whereas that of agriculture dropped from 72.1% to 31.1%, notwithstanding the general growth of production. A special feature of industrial development in Turkmen SSR during the second plan period was the rapid development of oil and chemical industries. A big stride was made in the chemical industry with the exploitation of mineral riches of Kara Bogaz Gol Bay. The production of oil increased from 34 thousand tons in 1937 (a rise of 13 times).[9]

In Khyrgyz SSR, 61 big industrial undertakings were constructed in the period 1932-37. A number of heavy industries made their appearance along with light industries, connected to local agricultural products. In 1935, work began on the Tash Kumyr coal mine. The Kara-Balty sugar works were also established during the same period. Khyrgizia became the coal base of the Central Asian Republics. The production of coal rose from 720 thousand tons to 896 thousand tons.

Similarly, industrialisation in Tajikistan advanced quite successfully. Before October revolution industrial undertakings of the modern type were completely absent in this area. At the end of the first plan, the republic had come to have about 100 industrial undertakings. During the second plan the number further increased to 125. The value of industrial production rose 3.7 times, from 51 million rubles in 1937. The production of oil increased by 50%. Progress was made in the preparatory work on the Shurab coalfields. Alabaster and lime factories were constructed in Dushanbe and Isfara. A big powerhouse was constructed at Varzob. It was also during the Second Five Year Plan that work began on the Dushanbe giant textile combine.

Vast changes were visible in the economic structure of the republics, and their socio-economic form changed beyond recognition. With socialist industrialization the gap in the level of development of the Central Asian regions of Russia and

Central Asia was to a large extent equalized. While the increase in the value of industrial production for the whole of the USSR for the second plan period was 220.6%, for the RSFSR, it was 220.5%, 243.0% for the Uzbek SSR, and 355.7% for Tajikistan.[10] In general, the rate of capital investment was also higher in the Central Asian republics than in the USSR. The increase for the USSR during the second plan was 2.8 times, for the Uzbek SSR, it was 3.8 times. The growth in the number of workers in big industries in Central Asian Republics was 59.5% in comparison to an increase of 22.2% in the Central Asian regions of RSFSR between 1932-37.

Socialist Transformation of Agriculture

The history of socialist construction in the agriculture of Central Asian countryside may be divided into three basic stages:[11] (1) Preparations for transition to the socialist path (1920-29); (2) Mass collectivisation of agriculture (from the autumn of 1929 to the mid-1930s); (3) Consolidation and development of the collective farm system (from the mid-1930s to the initial period of full scale communist construction).

It was necessary, first, to carry out land and water reform; second, to provide irrigation facilities; and third, to supply peasants with modern implements, introduce new agro technical methods and advance credits to make these improvements possible. In the early 1920s, the Soviet Government distributed private estates of the Russian Tsar, the Khan and the Emir, the big counter-revolutionary feudal and the rich Russian settlers, among the Central Asian peasants. The agrarian policy pursued by the Party and the Soviet Government in Central Asia was bitterly opposed by the kulaks, bais and the moneylenders, who realising that expropriation of surplus land and water resources, expansion of the network of the state machine-hire stations and easy term credits were depriving them of their weapons of exploitation, launched a violent campaign against Soviet power, formed armed bands, murdered Soviet functionaries and village

activists. This aggravation of class struggle also broadened the peasants' political outlook and increased their political activity.

Lenin was convinced that it was not possible to transform a small holding economy into a large one, at once. He showed the way to gradual cooperation for small farmers. Lenin's cooperative plan went into effect in the early 1920s and many rural cooperatives soon appeared in Central Asia. The simplest were the consumer's cooperatives.[12]

A somewhat higher type of the cooperative was the credit and marketing cooperative. It received easy term credits from the state and distributed them among its members. The peasants organized the sale of farm produce to state purchasing agencies, through cooperatives. The land improvement and machine cooperatives were closely linked with production, which united peasants to use water from one aryk (small canal), repair, clean and re-equip small irrigation facilities, and drain peasant's fields to prevent their swamping. The machine cooperatives bought modern farm tools from the state on an installment plan and then used them on their member's fields. In 1929, agricultural cooperatives in Uzbekistan and Turkmenia united 80% of the peasants. The simple forms of agricultural cooperation and the system of state contracts for farm produce played a huge role in preparing the peasants of Central Asia for transition to socialism.

Contemporary Culture, Society and Politics in Central Asia

Central Asian republics came into existence after the collapse of Soviet Union in 1991. The five states of Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan have their own economic and political priorities and dependencies with Russia. A common cultural, geographical proximity has prompted them to have a CIS based Central Asian States regional union. Turkmenistan abstained from these efforts, however in 1998, it was

transformed into Central Asian Economic Community (Eurasian Economic Community).[13]

The modern Central Asian states owe their present strength and national identity to Soviet socio-political transformation in relatively a short period of time. Infrastructures that never existed before were created which enabled the local culture not only to prosper but allowed a world of interaction with other's cultural milieu. Radio, television, print media, universities, theater, and films all helped project the Central Asian culture and restored their confidence. The economic organization of territory created conditions for fruitful inter-cultural exchanges, thereby allowing thousands of Russians to come and settle in these states.[14]

The post-Cold War scenario challenged this order and the new nationalistic and ethnic assertions at once present fresh concerns for the state harmony. During the Dushanbe riots in 1990, thousands of Russians were forced to migrate to other Russian cities. By the end of 1992, nearly 1,50,000 Russian speakers left the war ravaged Tajikistan.[15] Russian were mostly engaged in heavy industries and their departure created shortage of skilled manpower further declining their production.

The economic crises of Central Asian states further got aggravated due to the ethnic tensions resulting in large scale out migration of skilled labor, mostly the Russians, from Kazakhstan and Tajikistan. The ethno-nationalist sentiments were further buttressed by Islamic fundamentalism. This has helped culminating into inter-ethnic tensions between Uzbeks and Tajiks, between Uzbeks and Kyrgyz groups. What is worrying is the intra-group rivalry that has threatened to split these newly independent states. Regional and clan rivalry have been a tacit constant of Central Asian politics.

In Kazakhstan, the Great, the Middle and the Small Horde live in compact areas—the first in south, the second in the north and east and the last in the west. The Kyrgyz are

divided into the rich north and the poor south. The tensions between the northern clans and those of the poorer south are so strong that many Kyrgyz fear this would eventually render the republic ungovernable, possibly leading to partition.

Tribalism could pour in an upsurge of regionalism thereby further strengthening the forces of separatism endangering integrity of the state. The geoeconomic differentiation already appears in the society, the people of the Southern city of Osh live upon cotton, non-ferrous metals and other minerals produced locally, whereas the people around Issyk-Kul live on gold at Kumtor and Sanatoria, and the residents of Chu oblast depend upon the high level of economic development and potential of the oblast. The average monthly wage in Kyrgyzstan is about 523 soms, but in Jalalabad it is 453 soms and in Osh 392 soms (1995).[16] Much of the territory of Turkmenistan is in the traditional domain of Ahal-Tekke tribes. Among them, the Tekke, the Yomuts and the Ersary are particularly influential. Clan consciousness is reportedly maintained by high rates of endogamy as well as through differences in dialect and dress. Care is taken to ensure equitable representation of tribes in the cabinet and other governmental institutions. Turkmenistan's oil and gas minister is usually Yomut, as gas reserves are located in the western parts of the country.[17]

The Groups, and not the individuals are the key factors in Uzbekistan's politics. During the first five years of perestroika, the contestations between Uzbekistan and Moscow were less intense than that among the groups of Uzbekistan. With the erosion of party unity, central control and the anti-Moscow coalition among native groups, the emergence of differences got quickly transformed into geopolitical landscape. The Tajiks show segregation between local and cultural groups at various levels. The inhabitants of Khojand have always felt little in common with rest of Tajikistan. Uzbeks have generally occupied the prominent positions in the republic. The most consequential is the economic and political

competition among different regions. The northern province of Leninabad and the southeastern province of Kulyab are up against eastern province of Badakshan and the central valleys of Garm and Qarategin.

There is an open acknowledgement, both at the official and public levels, about the important role of Islam in imparting spirituality and moral values to the people. The prime effort has been to consolidate the national identity of CARs on the basis of indigenous Islamic heritage. However, the local perception of Islam is liberal as against the more conservative and fanatic precepts and practices as in West or South Asia. It is important to read Islam Karimov, the President of Uzbekistan, in this context:

> "Historical memory, restoration of an objective truthful history of the nation, native territory of the state is given an extremely important place in the revival and growth of national self-consciousness and the national pride. We regard the revival of spiritual values as a national process of the growth of national self-consciousness, of returning to the roots. The revival of the spiritual-religious foundation of society, of Islamic culture, is important step on the path to self-identification and restoration of historical memory and historico-cultural identity."

At parallel, there is an effort to revive linguistic-cultural traditions. Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev has instructed the use of Kazakh as the state language. Earlier in 1990 only 40% Kazakhs had partial command over Kazakh language, now nearly 75% of Kazakhs speak and write fluently. Language is seen as an important unifying factor to consolidate the ethno-national identity of independent Kazakhstan. Similarly in Kyrgyzstan, special emphasis is laid on learning about Manas, the national hero of the country. Each Central Asian state is thus seeking to revive its history and distinct ethno-cultural heritage as a means of preserving and consolidating its national identity and sovereignty. Thus,

the independent CIS states are witnessing significant changes in social and cultural spheres.

The post-Soviet scenario has brought a host of concerns. One of the major factors that has caused the greatest worldwide interest in the Central Asian region is the large deposits of oil and natural gas in the area. Although not on the same scale as those of the Middle East, the proven reserves are larger than those of Europe, and there are still promising geological structures that are not yet explored.

Most of the proven oil in the region is in western Kazakhstan, and most of the gas is in a huge basin below Turkmenistan's desert. In addition, there are potentially large deposits under the bottom of the Caspian Sea. This has caused yet another unresolved property rights dispute with the other Caspian states, such as Russia, Iran and Azerbaijan. International interest in the energy resources in the region is great, but development has hitherto been slow. This is partly due to the instability in the region, as demonstrated by the civil wars in Afghanistan and Tajikistan, and by the war between Armenians and Azerbaijan. Equally important is the difficulty of getting the oil and gas to market. The only existing pipelines go through Russia, and the Russians have created numerous barriers for export of central Asian oil and gas. Therefore, a number of other solutions have been proposed. These include western lines under the Caspian Sea through Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey to the Black Sea or to the Mediterranean; southern routes through Iran to the Persian Gulf or through Afghanistan and Pakistan; and an eastern route through China. Geo-strategic interests as well as cost considerations weigh heavily in the choice of pipeline routes, and firm decisions have yet to be made. A special case study is taken up on the oil geopolitics in Central Asia later in the chapters.

Comparative South Asian Social Semblance: A Theoretical Perspective

South Asian cameo offers one of the most varied and complex webs of inter-ethnic group interactions. Unlike Central Asia, where national organization of state was a result of Soviet Empire occupying the feudatories, the South Asian states emerged as a conglomerate mass of tradition and modernity with caste, class and communal polarizations held together by national bourgeoisie. These diametrically opposite paths could only locate their convergence deep into historical and cultural linkages at the one end, and on the other, the socialist democratic path taken by South Asia under the leadership of India.

One of the important historic imprints of South Asian society on state has been the primary organization based on communal lines. The whole of South Asian sub-continent comprising of India, Pakistan and Bangladesh polarized between secular, democratic and majoritarian and 'sub-secular', authoritarian and minority principles.

The Ethno-Political Formations

The plural character of the South Asian people on the one hand has facilitated the nationalist and anti-imperialist movement. On the other, it has narrowed down to ethnic nation-state preferences in some parts of the sub-continent. Talking solely in spatial terms, it is worth questionable whether any such movement can be identified as proto-nationalism? The degree of integration is one of the quests of theoretical model making it widely applicable. Broader examples of ethnic conflict and their areal distribution in the South Asian region may be seen as:

> A politically dominant majority v/s a subordinate minority(s): Sri Lanka (Sinhalese v/s Tamils, Moors, Burghers); Pakistan (Punjabis v/s Sindhis, Pathans, Baluchis); Bangladesh (Bengalis v/s Tribal groups).
>
> A politically dominant minority v/s a subordinate majority as in most colonial situations: Bhutan (tribal groups v/s Nepalese), Nepal (Valley Hindus v/s Terai people, Newars, tribal group).[18]

A multiplicity of ethnic groups of various sizes and power confounded by a multiplicity of loci of contacts among them make ethnic configurations in terms of politically dominant and subordinate groups at the state level well-nigh impossible. India falls in this category. However, the loci of ethnio-political interaction on ethnic lines assume the dominant-subordinate configuration and vertically percolate stratification in federal polity at tiers below central authority. Quite reciprocally, the greater the concentration of an ethnic group within a territorial confine, the larger its potential for demand articulation and aggregation, e.g., the East Pakistan-West Pakistan conflict, the Sinhalese-Tamil conflict in Sri Lanka, the Tamilnadu, Nagaland, Punjab and Assam situations in India.

Apart from dispersal or concentration, the numerical dimension of an ethnic group has also the same relevance (e.g., Newars in Nepal, tribal groups in Bangladesh, Moors in S. Lanka), as the spatial dispersal and numerical weakness limit the capacity of the group for manoeuverability, bargaining and conflict with the centre.[19] Notwithstanding the numerical dimension, if an ethnic group has been historically insulated and has consequently perceived its stakes to be limited in the center, its historical insularity may act as an additional input in its demands for greater autonomy or self-determination. The people in northeastern India, Baluchis and Pathans in Pakistan and tribal groups in Chittagong Hill Tracts of Bangladesh suffer from historical insularity. They see the national mainstream to be non-representative of their own cultural and power aspirations.

Another situation is generated by the quest for control over resources by competing ethnic groups. A case may be sighted that of Nepal, where economic resources have been controlled by a minority of the Terai people. The hill echelon (notwithstanding the general level of poverty of the hill areas) has centralized political power in both the hill and the plains through the institution of monarchy. The inter-ethnic group conflict has remained latent in Nepal because of the slow and the tardy pace of social and non-competitive character of the political economy. Even in the present Pakistan, the monopolizing thrust by the Punjabis is seen at the center. The Pathan and the Baluchi movements have also had violent manifestations. A feeling of alienation and a relative sense of deprivation appear to be far more intense amongst Baluchis than in Pathans because the latter have share in power-cake. Sri Lanka coupled with an increasingly bland affirmation of the majoritarian principle in a multi-ethnic society and a mal-developed economy has cultivated a deep ethnic divide. The Sinhalese-Tamil hiatus has exacerbated over the years by the enmeshing of three types of violence: violence perpetrated by the Tamil militant—the Elamists; violence by the state apparatus—the police and the military, and the communal violence in which political forces have been involved. This again is one of the examples that political boundaries do not define territorial jurisdiction, which is bound to the historicity of spatial links.

The emergence of India too witnessed rumbling for greater autonomy and self-determination during the fifties and sixties. The ethnic demands at this juncture were varied. The two major contending demands were language and tribal self-assertion in Nagaland (the part of Assam). Added to this was also the secessionist demand in Tamil Nadu. The collective manifestation of the quest in Assam has been linguistic-regional, and in Punjab religio-linguistic. Overtly started on the issue of electoral list in 1980, the Assamese movement

aimed in effect at the advancement of the rising Assamese middle class.[20]

The communal monopolization of economic resources (political economy under spatial laws) and the ethno-communal issue in Punjab shares the common traits, but it has its own specifications. The intricate web of criss-crossing linkages within Punjab reveals that at times imperatives of power have cajoled the two major communities in the state—the Sikhs and the Hindus. The very formation of the present—day Punjab, for instance, underlines the role of the state. It was partitioned twice—once in 1947 and then in 1966 when it was trifurcated into Haryana, Himachal Pradesh and Punjab.

Social cleavages between the two communities also have spatial dimension. The Sikhs were a numerical minority in urban areas where the Hindus enjoyed numerical prominence. The urban Hindus controlled trade and services. The Jat Sikhs, constituting 69.4% of the rural Sikh population, held a dominant position in agricultural sector. Rural-urban occupations therefore show communal segregation and concentration. With the Green Revolution reaching platter, the clash between the Sikh peasantry and the trader Hindus became sharper. The Sikh peasants were adversely affected by the politics of trade. The price of agricultural inputs went up and so did the price of industrial goods. Added to this was the problem of irrigation. The distribution of inter-state water being the jurisdiction of the center, encompassing the adjoining states of Rajasthan and Haryana, found yet another grievance point vis-à-vis the center so far as the Sikhs were concerned.

This tells about the broader idea of the spread of intra-regional and extra-regional linkages of the ethnic groups in the South Asian states. The bases and patterns of South Asian linkages can be discerned in the migration of the people as well as the ideas and ideologies stretched over a long period. India has provided the core of civilizational thrust, which has permeated across the countries in its neighborhood in many

ways. Among South Asian states, the cultural influences of India or the India-derived factors are a fact of life whether this is in terms of ancestry of the major ethnic groups in the states or their religion or language. Whether it be dominantly the Buddhist Sri Lanka, Hindu majority Nepal or the Muslim majority Pakistan and Bangladesh, the evolution of these religions and the process of their transmission gets traced to India. As with religion, so with the language, Indian influence looms large whether it is in relation to Nepali or Sinhala, Burmese or Divehi. In some cases like Bengali in Bangladesh, Urdu and Punjabi in Pakistan, Hindi in Nepal and Tamil in Sri Lanka; these are spoken and are also official languages of some of the states of the Indian Union, of which, Hindi is the national language.

The 'Indian' element has important bearing over the task of national building in the South Asian states. Identity assertion in the states of Indian neighborhood has been by and large, anti-majoritarian. In process, the 'Indian' element has struck in because some of the minorities in other states are present in Indian territory contiguous to them. On the other hand, India's relations with its neighbors have been strained by two-way traffic of the insurgent/separatist/anti-systemic groups.

Amid such frictional drags how the arrangements for regional cooperation do gets affected? If the ethnic conflict is taken *per se*, then it is not very much. Ethnic conflict is the input, affecting the milieu of bilateral relations and consequently vitiating cooperative arrangement. It appears to have the potential to hamper regional cooperation. The ethnic factor is one of the many impulses of social conflicts. The transfer of power in 1947 leading to the partition of the old colony into two new states of India and Pakistan had its apparent legitimization in ethnic distinctiveness of the two 'nations'. On similar account, the emergence of Bangladesh in 1971 has been the only successful venture of secessionist movement in this region so far. The integration of Sikkim

with India in 1975 though overtly explained in terms of domestic conflict between the Sikkim ruler and its representative institutions had strong ethnic undertones too.

Several questions thus confront us in the South Asian context. Why is it that in India, ethnic conflicts on the one hand have been contained in some cases but escalated in others? Why is it that in Sri Lanka the ethnic conflict being exacerbated over the years, and in Pakistan, it has led to country's bifurcation? Why is it that even after the bifurcation of Pakistan, ethnic movements of the minority communities continue to be present? Why is that in Nepal and Bhutan, despite their respective policy, ethnic social structures have led to ethnic cleavages, by and large latent, and have not manifested themselves in violent forms?

Neo-Marxist approach explains ethnic conflict as emerging: (1) at a general level in which ethnicity is viewed as a device in the hands of the vested interests, and (2) is a situation where there has been a 'cultural division of labor', when members of an ethnic group are systematically assigned to a subordinate position within a given state (internal colonialism) or in global context (international division of labor).

In South Asia, many areas can be specified in which despite the existence of the conditions above, inter-ethnic group conflict or the center-periphery conflict has not occurred. While on the one hand, one does discern conflict prone areas fulfilling the requisites of 'internal colonialism'[22] (e.g., Bangladesh, Baluchistan and to some extent Assam). There are others where conflicting conditions exist, but conflicts have remained latent (e.g., Nepali dominated southern Bhutan). Furthermore, the internal colonial model has an imbibed limitation and does not provide an explanatory framework for the ethnic violence in Sri Lanka or the recent turbulence in Punjab. In sum, through the evocation of ethnic conflict or ethno-nationalism, underdevelopment (real or perceived) has fettered a strong emotive component and it can

only partly explain the ethnic conflict phenomena. Alongside the economic denominators, the socio-cultural concerns for status and prestige coupled with the stakes in political arena of the elite are equally critical in ethnic harmony and conflicts.

This is synoptically drawn interface to compare picture of the two regions, Central and South Asia and locate the universal coordinates to solve the question of ethnicity within the realms of regional assimilation and strengthen the scope of cooperation. However, every projection has some distortion over the edges. There are also the cases where the spatial laws just cannot be applied in toto. These deviations need keener observation of the micro level operators. The hierarchy within the region leads to its furtherance of autonomy and consolidation of power in global politics. The South Asia has witnessed a supra-oligarchy, which can be defined as tussle between India and Pakistan that reduces all other nations to very low political status. The sheer size of nations delivers their ranking quite significantly, although, Sri Lanka has been able to modify it's status, owing to its geopolitical location. It commands a harborage to Indian Ocean trade routes. Size and landscape also become important source for identifying the political ambitions of a state.

The ideas that are incapacitated by the state like Bhutan and Nepal e.g., the monarchial form of govternment reveal nationalism as a convenient tool to alienate a sizeable section of their nationality. Indian polity found it very difficult to raise this sentiment on political platter. Pakistani despotism too did not rely on it. A situation may arise in some cases that division of national opinion may lead to intervention of a neighboring state and a pattern of hierarchy may generate. The faith in polity may starkly vary from 'command intervention' to 'demand intervention'. India's role has been sought in solving ethnic crisis of Bhutan, Nepal, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Maldives and even Pakistan is hooked up in its internal inferno. But quite interestingly, Pakistan has opposite equations in the region owing to historical peculiarities.

Ethnicity and Nation-State: The Case of Afghanistan

Afghanistan amid the two giant cultural hearths lies as a derelict socio-cultural interface. A perpetual disintegration has become a brand identity of Afghan society. Various attempts have been made to discern the nature of this disintegration, which appears *prima facie*, a political one—a reproach from the cold war or a culmination of a moribund society. What remain basic are the core tribal family polity and its modifications that are no more than the falsity of nationhood. Berntz Glatzer[22] notes that Afghan society is a complex product of thousands of years of imperial policies and of far-reaching spiritual, artistic and social achievements as well as of destruction and chaos. The change and continuity in Parsonian terms can be explored in Afghanistan though acclaimed as a failed state yet holding a full impression of a nation. The role played by ethnicity makes it an important coordinate of Afghan social-polity in terms of destruction and chaos being an integral part of Afghan social system.

The 'Afghan ethnicity' is a moving principle of relationship between social groups.[23] Thus, while modeling out this ethnic relation between different communities what appears is a set of equations in which the Pushtuns largely grouped under Taliban aimed at printing their ethnic stamp on Hazaras, Tajiks, Uzbeks and non-Pushtun minorities. The Pushtuns are the main stock roughly amounting to 40-60% of Afghan nationals. They have an explicit and elaborate tribal system and in possession of their own language and code of ethnic values and norms (Pushtunwali). It is often interesting to observe that just as cast and class dichotomy is observed in the Indian main sub-continent as a part of social-polity dynamics, one can see tribe and ethnicity cross-cuttings in Afghan society. The Tajiks are another equivalent group. They are usually considered as non-tribal people and bear Persian speech as non-tribal identity.[24] Here it is important to insert that ethnic considerations are more homogeneous whereas

tribal institutions often allow heterogeneous socio-political groupings; in exception to this, the Hazaras are one such community that has consolidated its ethnic and tribal segments into a firm complementariness with anti-Pushtun ideology.[25] Their remarkable success against Taliban in Ghorband, Wardak and Majar is one testimony to this. They have well organized themselves under Hezb-e-Wahadat. Uzbeks are the next in line in political standing with unilateral force asserted behind Rashid Dostum's Jawzjani militias, although some have aligned themselves with pro-Pushtun bodies such as Malawi Mohammad Nabi Mohammadi.

Under the Afghan social system the tribal and ethnic identities are reflection of mutuality and distinction. The ethnic identities derive their cognition from comparative locations within social hierarchy though they are inconsistent. The tribal identities draw their cognition from relative autonomy felt in comparison to ethnic identity as well as an acquisition of a sort of pattern variable maintenance where all socio-political manoeuvers are allowed within a fixed coordinate system maintained by ethno-linguistic distinctions. Thus, in this sense tribal identity is a limited freedom to ethnic propositions and conversely the ethnicity identity is a sublimation of tribal crustations. A probable corroboration to this assertion is the fact that throughout the Afghan society there has been need felt for an ordering principle of each tribal group. Thus there have been attempts to codify the Pushtun tribal system, such as the one Makhzan-e-Afghani,[26] which lists some thousands of tribes with legends and anecdotes. With such parameters for governance in a society a best development can be pursued is that of chieftainship or individual abilities to ride the unknown rise. Once an influential leader is able to master it, his departure is ritually followed by the divisive character of the segmentary tribal system.[27] Since tribal polity and its institutionalization are of preoccupant character, its geographicity lends credence to its spatially autonomous nature. For egxample, there has been a

degree of localization among tribes. There are dispersed tribes one as Ghilzai to the Afridis who have a clearly defined homeland. The greater the degree of localizatic n, the greater is the tendency for mono-tribal polity. This also influences the degree of egalitarianism, which has positive correlation with the degree of localization. It is argued by the fact that the Pushtun dominated south and south-west Afghanistan have multi-tribal, less localized political units with overarching leadership of Pushtuns.[28] It is unclear at this moment what are the credentials for a stable society in Afghanistan. Is it tribalism and ethnicity in dichotomous sense or a tautological one? But it is important to see their dissipance capacity serves only as negative factor to stability. The more the tribal and ethnic feelings grow, the more is the consternation in Afghan society. A somewhat lost in the midst is the relevance of Grand Councils, the Loya Jirgas that were perhaps the apt mechanisms to prevent their spread in undesired propositions. This is correlated by the fact that increasing barricades to such inclusive institutions has been one of the preferred games of local political bodies and their international patrons. Organizations and leaders of conflict use ethnic and tribal emotions and feelings of honor and shame as a weapon for fomenting war-like sentiments, which eventually follows by a chain of repercussions. And quite fuelling is the attitude of forces in the immediate neighborhood who continue to apply ethnic criteria when choosing their 'friends'. This is one of the important features of Afghan crisis where we see warring hierarchy as an important compages in Afghan political scene.

Political institutions in Afghanistan have been in search for identity. Some of the historic identities are that of: a heroic nation of Mujahideens, militarily successful anti-Soviet regimes, Islamist ideological tribal polity, a nodal reference of power center and community. There have been attempts to see democratic elements in tribal polity. Any attempt to define nation within such parameters will be an eclectical exercise. In case of Afghanistan, it has been alleged that the state has been

hijacked under the garb of a nation that never was in conventional terms. According to Shahrani, Pushtun hegemony over the self-governing non-Pushtun regions of western, central and northern Afghanistan presents a new challenge to the viability and integrity of Afghanistan as a multinational state. It has been asserted by the fact that over a period the Islamist parties have had lost their political base to intense intercommunal proxy wars fought by coalitions of tribal, regional and/or ethno-linguistic sectarian forces, and financed and managed by foreign powers.[29] This has led to a situation where a single group, here Pushtuns having enlisted the suppression of non-Pushtuns. Another reason for this has been the repeated failure of Afghan governments to consolidate the nation into a centrally strong state as the nomadic tribesmen and peasants have jealously guarded their freedom and liberty against state interference.[30] There is a need to search for an array of social factors that have failed to gain attention while augmenting state system. The extended family formations (Khandan) are the most durable and pervasive solidarity units governing inter-personal relationships. They are generally arranged hierarchically assuring membership to each system of constituent population. Keeping in line with them is the kinship norms, codes of honor (nang), and the rules of Sharia and loyalties in traditional political culture. These tradition bound communities are well organized, armed and self-governing throughout the nation.[31] Their sustained character is basically antithetical to modern nation model. The process of modernizing Afghanistan was initiated by Amir Dost Mohammad Khan (1832-63), he initiated and successfully implemented state policies aimed at demilitarizing the society; and create and maintain national unity. But this, too, simultaneously imbibed Pushtunwali as an ideology and took for state customs and moves. Indeed, the dominant constitutive principles of paternalism, nepotism, tribalism, and ethnic-regional favoritism suffused all aspects of state and society relations. Thus, what could have been a secular attempt

to national building became 'the tribal model of seizure of power'. An important peculiarity of the Afghan political system is the concept of balance of power between tribal communities. Though difficult is its assertion, it reveals an important autonomy function responsible for a national consensus on statehood. Attempts to defunct it has often generated reactionary nationalism ranging from Mujahids to present Talibanization of Pushtuns. It has also led to an increase in distrust against state agencies and officials as collective ascription to them of being abusive and corrupt and oppressive. Another felt consequence is the politicization of ethnicity and tribalism. The latter itself is a tautology as political units include tribal polity. A common misgiving is the exaggeration of tribal polity at par with the nationalist overtures of Pushtuns. It is equally an attempt to underrate the necessity of changes from old communitarian governance to central-state based governance. The nature of state is also dependent on the emerging victor in ethnic conflict. The divergent opinions are stronger within each ethnic group and their leadership is also not uninfluenced by foreign powers. There are stronger urges to investigate in the area that why there have been the prolongation of transition from communitarian polity to central-leadership based state policy. Taliban's rise is an important transitory step in this and due to the strong geographicity of political factors, a possible accentuation of inter-ethnic conflict may lead to plural state in Afghanistan such as Yugoslav federation with a caveat that similarity appears only on the convergence at the horizon. Though it is difficult to infer without undergoing a nation-building process based on European model, how much there is conflict between universal values of a state and that of particular values of Afghan society. Proceeding from this inconsistency, if there appears to be a tribalization of an 'old-modern' Afghan state, it only confirms a step in the direction towards stability and Taliban a natural successor, which Saharani would not like to infer. There is general will that if

democracy in any form accompanies the Islamist Sharia, Iran is one example. There is stronger hope that in spite of suppression of ethno-linguistic cultural bases there will be consensus external to it on common interests and national goals. However, only caution is whether it will be led by Pushtuns or then by Pakistani and other foreign-based patrons.

Taliban's mercurial appearance was confirmed on 26-27 September 1996 when they successfully launched an attack on Kabul. There was a strong speculation that this more consolidated Pushtun alternative shall be able to command Afghan polity in such a manner that a possible trade route between S. Asia and Central Asia can once again become a reality.[32] There was an immediate apparent legitimacy accorded owing to the lackadaisical nature of Rabbani government.[33] Taliban assured local people to give a fair and Sharia abiding state and all lumpen power pockets shall be fixed in line to obey them. However, their own difficulties became clear when they advanced further north and Mazar-e-Sharif incident made clear the limits to their manoeuverability. Their main support base came from the migrant Pushtuns living in Pakistan and several Afghan brotherly tribes. And their increased popularity on both sides made them autonomous political-military organization one such as IRA. Pakistan provided all necessary support to launch Taliban as policy instrument in Afghanistan, however, its efficacy often got entangled with different interests groups operating in Pakistan with their particular agenda for Taliban, whether they are provincial governments, ISI or the business groups, and political parties, etc. This allowed them to develop an independent organizational outlook as Ahmed Rashid provides confirmation. Taliban's main advantage was that they never depended upon an exclusive relationship with just one Pakistani lobby.[34] The immediate success of Taliban launched a debate in Pakistan that what type of state structure should be provided so as to make a stable system for Pakistan's varying degree of interests. An instant observation was that there

should be sliding back into tribal forms of governance (as Shahrani elaborates). Pakistan found itself in an increasingly difficult situation when Taliban began to interpret in the direction of Pushtunwali; this was because to outcast the aspirations of the Durrani Pushtuns who were interested to see Taliban hand off state power to erstwhile ruling elites from Zahir Shahs family.[35] An increasing distant loss was to the overseas financiers of Taliban who went perplexed over newer pages being added to the script of Afghan theatrics. This all made them cast aspersions at the feasibility of their grand oil-pipeline program. And after Osama Bin Laden's incident it became quite clear that Taliban is now an irredeemable factor over Afghan scene (or a Pushtun factor—for ethnographers) and the 'making do' approach has exhausted of its purpose.[36]

Over a longer period since 1996 there has been development of economic relations between drug traffickers, transporters with Taliban. This immediate source of revenue, which is relatively free of any political masterhood, became their mainstay and the regimes of Pakistan Government also found worth transferring their economic load.[37] But these hopes were soon belied when debts kept mounting without any compensation to state exchequer, as Rashid notes, Afghanistan became virtually a fifth province. A stronger economic relation crept in terms of unaccounted cross border trade which developed into opium⇔consumer goods nexus worth up to US 2.5 bln dollars.[38] Events in 1997 made these indicators appear only a transitory inconvenience as the leaders in Pakistan were very keen to realize Central Asian Oil inflow into a reality. But there is an old village saying how can you expect harvest of mangoes when you have sowed acacia. There were several aborted attempts to bring various warring factions to a negotiation. General Dostum, Hekmatyar and Rabbani all were persuaded with US assistance. But Taliban did not yield, developing into a sole stubborn sovereign power in maximum territory in Afghanistan. Their ethnic jealousy

soon came to open when Mehmood Khan Schakzai openly warned Bhutto not to poke into Afghanistan.

An important aspect of this reproach was the considerable independent meddling by provincial governments. Various bodies found themselves on profiteers end at the *status quo* of the crisis and thus an amicable settlement was considered detrimental to their interests. Islamabad's policy was itself increasingly seeping into corruption, infighting and inefficiency[39] so what once was a political agenda became increasingly a mafia picketeering. The period saw considerable lowering of US concentration on Afghan situation, perhaps Yugoslav crisis became an opaque layer and exhausting concern. Same opinion in CIA also developed that after Russians having washed off now it's time to be more efficient as much of the work responsibilities were delegated to ISI. By and large, there was a growing inference that mere utilitarian objectives were left far behind and means have grown far bigger than ends. This ultimately led to the breakdown of US policy in Afghanistan.

Coming back to the question of ethnicity, it became clear that a continuum of ethno-tribal pattern variables have been gaining complexity with increasing geographical scales of power and conflict as several newer factors have kept percolating in them for example, the poverty, economic system, black money, Pakistani links, all only heating up the traditional Afghan societal values rather than mitigating them. What's astounding is the extreme sectarian nature has successfully coped with all utilitarian agenda pursued by different interest groups, be they regional powers or overseas interest groups. This only makes Afghan polity an indomitable survivor of odds. One does not decipher whether ethnicity concerning social boundary is a contributory factor to stability or instability. But it has consistently served as factor to the viability of Afghanistan's political interests appropriately summed as Basmachi.

It is worthwhile to get into the nature of role players in Afghan crisis country-wise and delineate their patterns of behavior of geopolitical importance. The countries are: Iran, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Turkey. The two categories applied are: the socio-cultural Islam and religious polity of Islam. Both have been treated as covariant of Geopolitical Islam—the inner circle mastered by Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and the outer circle pushed by Turkey and Iran. There is also another distinction drawn between Euro-centric or 'white' Islam and the 'Asiatic' (pluralist) Islam, former adhered to Turkish or Iraqi socio-cultural milieu and largely favored by Central Asian Republics. Afghanistan has four major players (as far as Islamic countries are concerned) in their influence capacity. Of the two immediate neighbors, Iran and Pakistan both can be put under comparative study. Before proceeding to analyzes, it is prudent as to delineate the coordinates of the cultural polity of Islam.

The term 'political Islam' is already in use, however, it overshadows rather than reveal the complexity of Islamic political situation in a country like Afghanistan. Cultural polity is effective in two major conditions. One, when it serves the cause of hierarchy for the influencing power. Secondly, the availability of historical linkages to command the hierarchy. In case of Pakistan, it is the ethnic and politico-economic linkages. The region has been commercially linked with Pakistan in various sectors of economy, most notably transportation and consumer goods. Searching links for Turkey in this context becomes an interesting phenomenon. Actually, cultural-polity wise it's not Afghanistan but the newly independent CARs that find direct relationship. But it's Afghanistan, which is the inevitable focus of these consolidations. This has been continually evident in history and even now so. Underscoring the importance of cultural polity it can be said that it is more a time-oriented factor rather than a force in itself. Besides these, the obverse side of the coin is the historic positioning of Afghanistan between the

Anglo-Russian rivalry (during the days of Great Game) and later as a focal point of Cold War.

According to Raja Anwar, the unprincipled support lent to the undemocratic and religiously bigoted rebel forces by the US has played a major role in bringing Afghanistan to its present predicament.[40] This stretched deterioration of Afghan situation later on became a unilateral affair in manoeuvering the Afghan polity by what Glyn Davis[41] has elucidated as 'making do' approach. Besides, there are also collateral interest groups engaged in Afghan crisis bound by their native interest such as Israel and China.[42]

Coming to the Islamic polity in Afghanistan it's clear that initial onslaught was motivated by Saur Revolution. The Mujahideen emerged as a co-parallel word to Afghan nationalism and it ensured loyalty of all shades of political factions on the conditions of Islamic statehood. Before analyzing the external influence on Afghanistan's religio-political situation it is important to delve into some key politico-economic bases of Afghan society that lent strong credence to the nature of these influences. According to Anwar, despite rural Afghanistan's feudal economic and land ownership system, the hold of time-honored tribal customs have been still very powerful.[43] It is a mistake to categorize Afghan society primarily as feudal in a classical sense. It can be but described as tribal confederation comprising multi-racial groups and nationalities. There has been perennial conflict for supremacy between the Pushtun and the Tajiks. This has often led to significant change in the spatial dimensions of politico-economic structures.

In fact, it is an observation that the fringe areas of 'Monsoon Asia', especially the Southern had a whole history of social conflict based on game theory. Their choice of settled occupation vis-à-vis nomadism varied in degree with uncertainties of rainfall. With certain geographic interpretation of resources and preference for a particular skill level—a possibility of conflict is bound to occur at differences

of interest over operating scales—i.e., a conflict between pastoral and agrarian communities. Quite corroborating is the fact that out of country's 160 million acres of land only 12% is cultivable. However, almost 60% of this arable land has not been brought under cultivation due to poor agro-climatic conditions. In 1978, according to government statistics nearly 45% of land was in the hand of 5% of owners. Whereas on the other hand, nearly 83% of the landowners had 35% of the total cultivable land. The remaining 12% of landowners had 20% of the arable land. This shows estate-ship on the one hand followed by medium sized landowners strongly representing feudal state of economy. Besides, nearly 13 million people had no land titles. Under these conditions it is not very hard to presume that the rapid growth of population number, evolution of a village hierarchy and conditions for feudal polity were far from sufficient. Hence, it is not difficult to see the nature of their political struggles emerging from tribal, sub-tribal, naturalistic and regional differences that "possibly escape the definition in terms of modern political theory". The institution of Jirga is the agreed focal point of tribal life. All tribal matters relating to war and peace, all personal scores are set through group representation under Jirga. It is well known that 'blood money' particular to Pushtun tradition is popular in Afghan society. A cease-fire would generally mean 'placing the stone' and ' breaking the stone' would signify lifting the moratorium.

Much of summary result of Afghan crisis is contained in its abandonment of tribal polity and transition to authoritarian repression leaving cleavages in state structure with deep territorial marking of major tribal groups. As far as Islam is concerned, it had neither penetrated the Jirga system nor it was able to cement the ties between rival factions. That is why it is easy to observe that all are fundamentally Islamist but at no point religion is able to merge with the state. This important failure has been a key recognition of the fact that Afghanistan could never be towed into Iranian or Arabian

statehood. And the key diffusion of Afghan polity is not Islamic fundamentalism but ethno-Islamic sectarianism. But the most important influence witnessed in later days revealed the kind of orthodoxy perpetrated by the incumbents pushing whole Afghan society to severe disillusionment with the state. It was not difficult to locate the Pakistani interest in a weakened Afghanistan. The most important role that of a frontier territory could be transferred now from NWFP to Afghanistan.

Pakistan's major initiative became conspicuous when Taliban opened up fronts against its opponents with such proficient material and logistics support that opening up of trade route to Central Asia via Afghanistan became a manifest destiny. And with independent CARs, Pakistan got additional leverage against Russian geopolitical tactics in Wakhan corridor. The attempt to relocate this historic role was based upon obviating the historic identity of Pakistan, which had put it to unintended restricted manoeuverability between ethno-sectarianism and geopolitics of Islam. This is evident by the fact that much of the benefit from current situation is drawn out by transport mafia based in Peshawar. Customs duty became the major source of revenue for Taliban and much of the foodstuffs, fuel and other goods became a regular Pakistani supply to Afghanistan.[44] The country hoped to offer a competitive transport and trade vis-à-vis Iran.

Iran's comparative politics became identified with narrow focus on revolutionary Shiite organization often offending Pakistan based Sunni-Pushtun resistance groups.[45] Tehran also emphasized state interests in Persian nationalism and concomitantly in 1991 signed an agreement with Tajikistan and Afghanistan's Jamat-e-Islami for increasing cultural interaction between Persian speaking Iranians, Afghans and Tajiks.[46] Iran threw open support for Northern Alliance comprising Dostam, Massoud, the Hazaras led by Mazari and Ismailia led by Nadir. Later, Iran's efforts were curtailed by Hazaras, showing their shift towards Hikmatyar against

Massoud. At this juncture Taliban began to appear as anti-Shia and anti-Iran force. Consequently, Iran decided to cooperate Rabbani and Massoud in opposing the Taliban.[47]

The underlying competition between Iran and Saudi Arabia complicated Pakistan's policy initiatives of aligning Afghanistan into its Central Asian policy framework. The Arab volunteers who were now residing across both the territories after the Soviet withdrawal started conducting extensive raids in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan as well as in the Kashmir. Bearing this situation in mind Iran decided to have an extended circle by identifying the common interest with Russia and India. Thus a qualitative shift appeared in Iran's policy; and Iran's intervention in Afghanistan largely veered around containment of ethno-sectarian tendencies led by Taliban. This is quite in contrast to Pakistan's approach as far as Islamic geopolitics is concerned.

Initially the Saudis believed that the Soviets had aggressive intentions in the Persian Gulf and the invasion of Afghanistan was a first step in their desire to control of Persian Gulf oil.[48] Between 1979-88, Saudi Arabia along with the US became one of the major financial backers of Afghan resistance organization. According to the Middle East, Saudi Arabia had been spending as much as two billion dollars per year in Afghanistan with Hikmatyar as major beneficiary. Their primary goal was to obliterate the communist advances in Afghanistan and the transfer of power to Sunni-based Islamic faction. Saudis being more pragmatic found Iran as a serious Shiite intervention and to stop it, cultivated various rival factions. For example in 1994, they financed Dostum hoping to prevent Iran from forging an alliance with him. On the other hand, with a growing criticism in Rabbani-Massoud camp against Iran's policy on Hazaras they provided $150 million to Rabbani-Massoud government. With the emergence of Taliban they no more needed the liability to facilitate these factions and consequently the interests became more articulate with Saudis largely backing Taliban and Iran opposing it. This

led to another development in Islamic political world. According to Iran, Pakistan has been responsible for the logistics to create the group, Saudi Arabia for financing the movement, over the US for overall strategy. In all this cross-play of power game, the masters tried to their best not get their pawns too powerful enough detrimental to their flexibility. The absence of social and material resources to transpose anarchy into a viable state makes Afghanistan one of the most perplexed nations in search of an identity.

A scanner's view of the current situation in Afghanistan reveals that much history has been disowned by major players as well as limited interest shown by the UN. The inter-linkages between ethnicity, nationalist polity and geopolitical identities seemed too much of a complexity left for the war-weary Afghans. The only reality that seems prevailing is a monolithic desolation looming in the form of Taliban with all the fundamentalist preoccupations. Nowhere in the world of communities there is found such overwhelming pride and fervor good enough to command any sloth's sense of nationalism yet nowhere in the world of nations there is found such falsity of traditions good enough to defy even the humblest sense of citizenry necessary for a nation.

Afghanistan is an important geopolitical linkage between Central and South Asia. Its present state lends cross-currents of insecurity among major countries on both the sides. India and Uzbekistan are the most portend victims of fundamentalist activities emanating from its soil. Inability to resolve the ethno-cultural power arrangements multiplied by Cold War ravages has left permanent source of concern between the sub-continents.

Afghanistan is a constant concern for all the states of Central and South Asian region. Former Prime Minister of India, I.K. Gujral, speaking at one of the seminars at IDSA, remarked that the ascendancy of Taliban had a potential to destabilize the Central and South Asian regions. India should make coordinated efforts with Iran, Russia and Central Asian

countries to stem the influence of Taliban. The Kashmir issue having being internationalized, India's foreign policy needed to be reviewed following the nuclear tests and fresh threats emerging from Afghanistan.

A conference that was held at the Asian Peace Center in Tajikistan, described the war and unrest in Afghanistan as a serious threat to the peace and security of Central Asia. The chief of the center, Dr. Saifullah Safarov, while elaborating the objectives of the conference said that the world community, particularly the member countries of the six plus two and India should not maintain silence about the issue of Afghanistan. He expected the Taliban and the Northern Alliance to hold early peace talks. The ambassador of the deposed Afghan President Rabbani in Tajikistan, Syed Ibrahim Hekmat said that the issue of Afghanistan could only be resolved when tremendous pressure is exerted on Pakistan. He said that no efforts for Afghanistan settlement would give any result unless Pakistan is convinced on this. Contrary to the past, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan had recently softened their standing regarding Afghanistan. The Tajik Deputy Foreign Minister Abdul Nabi Safarzda said that these countries did so for their economic interests. He said that Taliban want to be a dominant force in the region. He said that an expert of Afghan affairs recently said that a plan had been prepared long ago that Taliban would occupy the Central Asian region. "We should never adopt a policy against Taliban which is not well thought out". He said Taliban's presence is a big danger for the region, particularly for Tajikistan.

An expert of Russian Strategic Study Center, Makarov said that Russian and Central Asian countries should not adopt only the path of confrontation against Taliban. He said talks were necessary with Taliban and the latter should be convinced that the Afghan issue couldn't be resolved through military means. He said that it should have been prevailed upon the Taliban that the regional countries do not accept the military solution to the Afghan issue.

Another Russian expert of the Institute of the Oriental Studies said that pressure should be exerted on those Afghan groups, particularly Taliban, which do not become ready for talks. He recommends a military action if such pressure does not work. He added that Russian wanted peaceful solution to the Afghan problem. He said that talks could be held between Taliban and their opponents in Kabul, Islamabad or Dushanbe. This backdrop of ethnological milieu and the Cold War legacy of Afghanistan that goes a long way to influence the course of peace and stability in the region forebears the future course of relationship between Central and South Asia.

Reflexion

Central Asian peoples have a unique socio-cultural history. Their past has full reverberations of cultural transfusions, political turmoil and social changes of distant consequences. The role of ethnic formations in Central Asian identity is conspicuous from historic times to the Soviet state system.

Central Asian Republics are the unique case of nation-building process. Though, there might be difference of opinion on its prudence, they bear their current identity very much close to their hearts. It has been a striking example of transformation of a backward feudal economy into modern industrial economy. Much of the credit goes to CPSU and the GOSPLAN launched as an instrument of development. Third World could see from their experience that there are certain clear road signs that need to be taken into account while treading the path of development. Most important of them has been the national question addressed by CPSU so effectively. Second, the transformation of agriculture is the most urgent concern for an underdeveloped economy. Land reforms are the major step for fast changes in the state of agriculture. A new variable that can be added now is industrialization based on those resources that has comparative advantage for exchange.

Compared to them, the South Asian societies are a amalgam of plural nationalities. The process of democratization and development adopted by India had significant influence over nation-building process in South Asia. The neighboring relations among South Asian countries are conditioned by communal and ethnic factors. The Indo-centric identity of the region is a reality. Large tracts of Indo-Gangetic axis has been cradle to nation-state formations, since times anon. It would not be wrong to say that it still continues to diffuse impulse of that magnitude.

Afghanistan presents a geopolitical paradox between the two sub-continents. The long cherished role of communication link blistered in the severity of Cold War. The war ravaged country further added to its misery by lending itself into equally despotic rule by Taliban. It is to be seen whether the post-Cold War scenario offers some possibilities of positive transformation. Afghanistan is still the hotbed of fundamentalism and terrorist asylum. International operators such as Osama bin Laden withhold any possibility of further recuperation. The mix of ethno-culture with national polity is equally a dangerous counterpart to mixing of religion with politics under any democracy. The fundamentalist tendencies have potential to spill over both South and Central Asia.

India's concern arises from the unqualified probability of Central Asia getting entangled into Kashmir imbroglio. The left over of Cold War and Afghan crisis is portent enough to fit into neighboring catenas. Geopolitically, the region has served as hinterland to the powers counterbalancing the 'Indo-Gangetic Axis' of South Asian polity. Pakistan too borrows that definition while explaining her *locus standi* on Kashmir. This has direct bearing on Indian security interests and cascading implications for South Asian region as a whole. Kashmir has had history of being a transit emporium for trade with Central Asia.

Geographical proximity and cultural affinity in terms of religion, customs, dress and food and drinking habits provided

a strong base for the continuation of the socio-cultural links between the peoples of Central Asia and Kashmir even after the two regions remained separated by the rival interests of imperialist Britain and Tsarist Russia. One does not know if the present status of Afghanistan and manoeuverability of Pakistan in that region would ever bring a proactive approach from CARs regarding Kashmir. Though India has every reason to believe in their capability to adhere to Soviet line on this issue—a time tested long run approach. The presence of sizeable number of Tadzik, Uzbek, Uiguir and other Central Asian minor stocks in Afghanistan generate a host of concerns for these states. Today, practically the whole Afghanistan has become a sanctuary for the mercenaries, and they are willing to operate in either directions—Central Asia or Kashmir.

Taliban has been providing tutelage to these insurgents acting in neighboring China, Iran, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. They help Taliban militarily and Taliban allows them to set up their bases. According to the reports, a 200-strong force made of Wahabi militants are currently engaged in Dagestan under the command of Abu Abdulla Jafar, a Pakistani military instructor who runs a Guerilla camp in Chechnya. Thus, Pakistan obverse to her history is diffusing currents of instability all over Caucasia through Afghanistan. This renders her a lynchpin role between the insurgency in Kashmir and the consternation in north Caucasian communities.

Apart from this, another pernicious aspect is the attack on culture in Afghanistan revealing Taliban's detestation about pluralist notion of culture. The systematic attack on cultural symbols and religious practices that link them with neighboring Iran and Central Asia has been Taliban's priority. The large-scale massacre of Hazaras, the Shia minorities living in Mazar-e-Sharif, Bumiyan and other towns have attracted Iran's rage. All this has led to forging a common strategy between Russia, Iran, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan to contain Pakistan and Taliban.

Endnotes

1. Adapted from *Encyclopedia Britannica*, http://www.britannica.com.
2. Dickens, Mark (2003), Major Events Relevant to Central Asian History Part 1 up to 1600), http://www.oxuscom.com/cahist1. htm.
3. Kaushik, Devendra (1970), *Central Asia in Modern Times-A History from Early 19th Century*. The following head is based on his excellent treatise on Central Asia as much of its facts are owned by him.
4. *Ibid.*
5. *Ibid.*
6. Kaushik, Devendra (1970), *Socialism in Central Asia—A Study in the Transformation of Socio-ethnic Relations in Soviet Central Asia*. The following head is based on his excellent treatise on Central Asia as much of its facts are owned by him.
7. *Ibid.*
8. *Ibid.*
9. *Ibid.*
10. *Ibid.*
11. Arkhipov, A. and Kuznetsova, T. (1976), *Soviet Experience in Organizing Farmer's Cooperative*, Novosti Press, Moscow.
12. *Ibid.*
13. Banerjee, D., 'Emergene of Central Asia', *Asian Strategic Review*, 1991-92.
14. n3.
15. Patnaik, Ajay (1999), 'Socio-cultural Changes in Post Soviet Central Asia'; in *Culture, Society and Politics in Central Asia and India* by N.N. Vohra (ed.).
16. *Ibid.*
17. *Ibid.*
18. Sengupta, B.B. (1986), *Regional Cooperation and Development in South Asia*, Vol. 2.

19. *Ibid.*
20. *Ibid.*
21. *Ibid.*
22. Glatzer, Berntz (1998), is Afghanistan on the Brink of Ethnic and tribal Disintegration? in *Fundamentalism Reborn* by William Malley (ed.).
23. *Ibid.*
24. *Ibid.*
25. *Ibid.*
26. *Ibid.*
27. Other sources, primarily the translated versions are *Tarikh-e-Khan Jahani Wamakhazan-e-Afghani* by Khawaja Nimatullah B. Habibullah al-Harawi (Dacca, Asiatic Society of Pakistan, 1960) and *Hayat-e-Afghani* by Hayat Khan (Sang-e-Meel Publications, Lahore, 1981).
28. n23. According to Glatzer, the very tool which enables tribal leaders to establish powerful political entities, the charter of segmentary solidarity, is also instrumental for segmentary division.
29. Shahrani, M. Nazaf (1998), 'The Future of the State and the Structure of Community Governance in Afghanistan' in *Fundamentalism Reborn* by Malley (ed.).
30. *Ibid.*
31. The ethnic principle is neither a contributory factor for stability; on the other hand, the tribal structure of Afghanistan is a contributory factor to stability—Jirga or the Shuras are one example.
32. Rashid, A. (1998), Pakistan and Taliban; in *Fundamentalism Reborn* by Malley (ed.).
33. *Ibid.*
34. *Ibid.*
35. Emadi, Hafizullah (1997), 'New World Order or Disorder: Armed Struggle in Afghanistan and United States' Foreign policy', *Central Asian Survey*, 18(1), pp. 49-64.
36. *Ibid.*

37. *Ibid.*
38. In its annual opium survey, the Vienna based UN agency said, Afghanistan's total production of raw opium for 1999 was estimated to be record 5,000 tonnes—more than double of last year's harvest of 2,300 tonnes. According to the agency, Afghanistan now accounts for 75% of world's raw opium.
39. n23.
40. Anwar, Raja (1981), *The Tragedy of Afghanistan*, Verso.
41. In September 1996, the State Dept. Spokesman Glyn Davis revealed US stand on Taliban as 'nothing objectionable' with their version of Islamic Law. See Mackenzie—The US and the Taliban.
42. n36.
43. To describe Afghan society as feudal in classical sense on the strength of observed economic relations is a grave mistake—a mistake committed by PDPA.
44. Dawn Internet edition, 25 June 2000.
45. n33.
46. Maley, W. (1997), 'The Dynamics of Regime Transition in Afghanistan', *Central Asian Survey*, 16(2).
47. n36.
48. *Ibid.*

5

South Asia and Central Asia
Geopolitics and Geoeconomics

Post-Cold War South Asia has witnessed some important changes in its security environment. The collapse of Soviet Union dramatically energized peripheral states of India to redefine the strategic and military balance vis-à-vis India. The relationship between India and Soviet Union had created a kind of ideological-cultural defence system (colloquially, in contra-distinction to the US NMD) that practically preserved South Asian balance of power even during the Bangladesh War.

The new Central Asian Republics are now an important variable to this equation. Not only their economic setup is strong, they are significantly industrialized states. They offer new opportunities in the sphere of economic cooperation. Besides, their richness in gas and crude oil has become important bait in what has now been slanderously termed as the 'New Great Game'.

Oil and energy demands in South Asia shall be one of the most crucial factors influencing economic growth of countries in the region, like India. Can there be any imperative to link

the vital resources of Central Asia to the never-ending demands of South Asia?

Here, there is an important geopolitical connection that first needs to be sorted out. Afghanistan is the only economical route to these resources. So long as there is no stability (favourable to South Asian security equilibrium), this cannot be achieved. One need not go for strategic competition between nations. Nations can be better off with strategic cooperation rather than competition. Afghan situation must be pursued by the South and the Central Asian states to an agreeable form. Here again, the resolution of Kashmir issue emerges as an inevitable geopolitical logic.

There is genuine expectation that Central Asia shall remain sensitive to Indian perceptions as they continued to be in the past. But this time, there is a situation that demands an exchange of interest on this account.

The newly independent economies are longing to take faster growth with the help of expansion of their trade with neighbouring countries; no doubt, this shall bring them into granting of some favour. This has some uneasy moorings in India over the possible cooperation between them and Pakistan. The Afghanistan situation is one account where they find themselves closer to South Asian security perception and its long-term associated effects are a major caveat for any haste manoeuvres.

The post-Soviet world harbingers two important concerns for these regions, namely, the development of economic cooperation and containment of ethno-Islamic fundamentalism. The geopolitical trough between the two sub-continents is Afghan-Pakistan continuum.

The Geopolitical Status of Central Asia

There are several major influential nations around Central Asia. The major countries encompassing the region are Russia—the parent state, China- another big neighbour, Iran—a state with strong cultural and ethnic ties with the region,

Afghanistan—the defunct state and almost what has been known as the soft underbelly. The second order neighbourhood involves Pakistan—the historic contacts with the region and always the direction of movement for Central Asian tribes, India—the civilizational destination of Central Asia, since times anon, and Turkey—the land of forefathers and source of ancient migrant groups.

In contradistinction to this land connection, there is an overseas connection also: the connections of modernity and growth—the European connection, and of course, the desired one. So far, the most influential partner from the West has been the US, and most of the Europe especially Britain has joined hands with it to explore oil exploration possibilities in the region. Each of these nations made diplomatic efforts over the last few years to expand contacts with the region and during their course have revealed a variety of interest.

One can assess their strategic and diplomatic interest in order to draw a matrix for gauging Central Asia's Geopolitical Balance. One should also take into note the Indian position, as it is the most influenced state as far as South Asia is concerned. Locating the major forces shall need to be assessed country wise. We take each of these portend states one by one.

The Neighbourhood

One can attempt here to state a model that reveals the possibilities and trends of conflict and cooperation taken by these nations amidst globalization. Before going for a geopolitical matrix one can identify the potential powers and the countries of regional influence that are significant in determining the course of action of these newly independent states.

Russia

The independent CARs have invited a host of concerns for Russia. Afghan war legacy loomed large over its status vis-à-vis these republics. More so, the West had turned the course of

affairs in their favour that forced Russia to tackle simultaneously, the Islamic insurgency and NATO overtures. This not stood alone, the status of Russia not only in former USSR but within its own state territory was challenged by ethnic and sectarian insurgencies.

The Iranian, Turkish, and Chinese interest in the region showed signs of renewed efforts to pit Russian diplomacy primarily to its security concerns. The region has appeared susceptible to foreign infringement and also a potential source of instability on Russia's borders. Russia adopted its new National Security Concept on January 10, 2000, which updates its earlier form adopted by Boris Yeltsin on December 17, 1997.[1]

One can look some of the emerging perceptions within Russia, in a changed scenario. The doctrine defines the economic crisis and domestic social and political instability as the main threats to Russian national security. Some major features of the Draft Military Doctrine are as follows:

1. The most important task of the Russian Federation is to implement deterrence in the interests of preventing aggression on any scale, including with the use of nuclear weapons, against Russia and its allies.
2. The Russian Federation should possess nuclear weapons capable of guaranteed infliction of a predetermined damage to any aggressor state or coalition of states under any circumstances.
3. One of the principles concerning the use of force by Russia is the use of all forces and means at its disposal, including nuclear weapons, in case it needs to repel an armed aggression, if all other measures of resolving the crisis situation have been exhausted or proved ineffective.
4. Also from 1997 doctrine—Russia reserves the right to use all forces and means at its disposal, including nuclear weapons, in case an armed aggression creates a threat to the very existence of the Russian Federation as an independent sovereign state.

According to Dr. Nikolai Sokov, senior research associate at the Centre for Non-proliferation Studies, the hallmarks of the new defence policy are: (1) the perception that NATO uses force freely and will not hesitate to use it against Russia over political disagreements, and (2) a realistic appreciation of how Russia's weakened conventional forces are unable to resist a large-scale conventional attack by NATO. Nuclear weapons are seen as the only reliable means to dissuade NATO from using force against Russia, and the harsh language of the recent official documents is clearly intended to ward off this perceived threat. This amply demonstrates the kind of anguish that Russia faces after the dismemberment of Soviet Union.

From 1992, the Russian policy towards Central Asia changed. Moscow sought to maintain regional stability in order to prevent other powers from establishing hegemony, to protect and expand its economic interests, to protect ethnic Russians living in Central Asia (and prevent their migration to economically strapped Russia), and to stop the spread of Islamic fundamentalism. The new Russian security policy, often termed as the *Monrovski Doctrine*, in essence stated that "We are not going to get actively involved ourselves (in the former Soviet republics), but everyone else stays out".[2]

Russian policy towards the region was manifested in several ways. The new Russian military doctrine (1993) clearly aimed at Russian predominance in the former Soviet republics. Bilateral military agreements were established with all the Central Asian states. Russia has attempted to maintain the already close economic ties with these countries, and to reduce the influence of others; the oil and gas pipeline issue is a clear example. Russia has also supported the ruling governments in order to maintain stability in the region. In the short term, Russia's policy toward Central Asia has been relatively successful. The region appears relatively stable and Russian interests are well heeded.

It is questionable whether Russia in the long-term will be able to maintain its involvement in the area in the face of

internal strains and external competition. Opinion in Russia is split on the issue. The military involvement is both costly and controversial and the lack of economic development is a strain both on Russia and on the republics. There is also considerable suspicion and opposition in Central Asia concerning Russia's real, long-term motives and intentions.

Iran

Iran has high stakes in the region. It can look actively for a variety of trade agreements with these republics and has made quite a bit of progress in this regard. The ethnic and linguistic commonality between Iran and Tajikistan can also become a powerful basis for cooperation as the Tajiks are culturally Iranian rather than Turkic and speak an eastern dialect of Farsi (Persian). Its closeness to Muslim Central Asia is advantageous to the extent that Iran can continue to escalate the pace of its diplomatic and trade activities. Apart from the geographic proximity, the second advantage that Iran enjoys in Central Asia is its successful experiment with an Islamic government. Although, it's true that a number of heads of Central Asian states have expressed their antipathy to the Iranian model; one should not regard this reality to be permanent.[3] Most heads of these countries are former communists and as such they might feel more comfortable with secularism. What is significant is the popular response to the notion of Islamic government in the future. In the aftermath of the breakup of the former Soviet Union, the Muslim Central Asian peoples are in the process of acclimatizing the new realities: their independence, and their ability to practice Islam without any fear of repression from the state.

This notion of independence has also meant that a number of political parties, especially the Islamist parties would also like to gain bases of operation in similar kind of politics. This emerging political pluralism will enable them to look at Islam, along with other systems, as a political arrangement. At that time, the utility of the Iranian model is

also likely to be examined. This is where the Shiite nature of the Iranian model might turn out to be to its disadvantage, but such a disadvantage may not affect the very principle of incorporation of Islamic government.[4] At that point, the utility of the Saudi or the Pakistani model may also be examined.

The disadvantages faced by Iran in Central Asia are economic and religious. Iran's economic capabilities are quite limited as a country whose economy has experienced devastations stemming from the revolutionary turmoil since 1978 and from the war against Iraq between 1980 and 1988. Even though a substantial portion of its revenues (90 per cent or so) come from oil; Iran has been operating in an environment of depressed oil prices since the early 1980s. Its expenditures have skyrocketed while its oil income is down. Iran is spending enormous amounts of money rebuilding its economy.

In addition, Iran has also adopted an ambitious programme of military build-up. Given these major outlets for huge capital expenditures, Tehran can offer few monetary enticements for the Central Asian states, whose economies are badly in need of capital investments. What Iran can do, and it has been active along these lines, is to supply in-kind assistance, such as establishing air and railway linkages, signing joint exploration and production ventures, etc. It cannot, however, offer these countries generous cash subsidies to start a number of economic projects. The religious variable may also turn out to be a disadvantage for Iran in Central Asia. As a Shiite Muslim state, it cannot become an effective force in that area, where, save for Azerbaijan, the predominant portion of the Muslim population belongs to the Sunni sect. Lest one overstate this point, it is important to note that Iran has the potential to overcome this disadvantage by remaining a proponent of an Islamic government. The fact that Iran has implemented such a system in the aftermath of a revolutionary change may be viewed as a source of illustration and

inspiration for the Central Asian states, whose independence became a reality only as a result of another revolutionary change, the dismantlement of the Soviet Union.

Despite reports of Iranian involvement in the growing violent activism of the Islamist forces in North Africa, Tehran has maintained the scope of its activities in the Central Asian countries along the conventional lines of seeking economic and trade ventures. In this regard, the government of President Ali Hashemi Rafsanjani scored a major victory when Azerbaijan gave Iran a $7.4 billion share (or 20 per cent of the total) of its international oil consortium.[5] Iran also signed an agreement with Turkmenistan to lay pipelines to carry Turkmen gas to Europe through Iran. Kazakhstan and Iran signed an agreement for the transfer of 2 million tons of crude oil from Kazakhstan through the Caspian Sea to Iran.[6] Tehran worked out a variety of agreements with a number of Central Asian countries, including weekly flights to Iran, a number of border crossings, building bridges and repairing roads.

In the first period after their independence, many analysts believed that the Central Asian states would be highly susceptible to Iranian fundamentalist influence. However, nearly a century of Soviet rule with secular values also has made its mark on Central Asian societies, so there is little fertile ground for 'Khomeinyist' subversion. Iran's political isolation on the international scene also prohibits establishing direct military ties or security arrangements with its Central Asian neighbours. Most important of all, however, is Iran's link with Russia. Despite their differences, Russia is the key to Iran's long-term interests, and nothing must jeopardize that relationship.

Iran has vital interests in maintaining peace and stability in the Central Asian region. Its policy has been cautious, primarily strengthening its ties through bilateral accords on pipelines (with Turkmenistan) and the construction of communications infrastructure. Iran has also promoted

multilateral fora like the Muslim Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO).

Turkey

Turkey was widely expected to wield considerable influence in the Central Asian states after their independence in 1991. At its grandest, Turkish policy sought to enhance Turkey's international presence from the Adriatic Sea to the Great Wall of China, wherever Turkic peoples were involved. Backed by the Bush administration, Ankara attempted to present a model of a secular, democratic, westernized Muslim society that would counter Iran ideologically, and Russia and Iran politically.[7]

Turkey has invested several billion dollars in Central Asia, mainly in culture, education, telecommunications, and transportation. Nevertheless, Turkish Central Asian trade is still small, and Turkey's influence in the region is losing ground. The main reason for this is Turkey's internal problems and diminishing Western support due to the Kurdish and human rights issues. The unrest in the Kurdish areas also makes Turkey an unlikely option for pipeline routes, as the pipelines would have to cross these areas. Finally, there is some apprehension in Central Asia because of perceived Turkish 'Big Brother' behaviour in the region.[8]

China

Economically dynamic and militarily ascendant China must be considered a major player in the Central Asian region outranked in importance only by Russia. To China, Central Asia represents both a potential market for its growing economy, and a source of strategically important raw materials. China has actively established ties with the new republics. New railway links have been established, pipelines are on the drawing board and numerous joint ventures have appeared. In the short term, Russia and China share a common interest in deterring ethno-nationalism and resurgent Islam in

Central Asia.[9] The relationship between the two countries currently has seen a long period of détente that is now driven by common commercial and other interests.

China's western province, the Xinjiang-Uigher Autonomous Region (XUAR) has a predominantly Muslim population of Turkic origin (Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and Uighhurs). The province has had some ethnic unrest, and is tightly controlled by Beijing. The area is important to China, as it holds vast natural resources (petroleum, gas, iron, and coal), but also because it houses China's principal nuclear testing and missile launching sites and much of its 'gulag archipelago'. China's fear has been that unrest in Central Asia could spill over into the XUAR.

For the Central Asian Republics, China represents a counterbalance to the Russian dominance.[10] However, they have mixed feelings about the Chinese influence, and are wary of simply changing masters if Russia's decline continues unabated. They must balance the influence of Russia and China with that of other powers from Asia (such as Japan or South Korea), the United States, the Middle East and Europe.

However, China's interest in Central Asia also has a strong economic side. China believes it can temper the potential for Islamic or nationalist agitation by an economic policy that closely integrates Xinjiang and Central Asia with the Chinese economy.[11] China has many important advantages in this contest. A recent Russian analysis concluded:[12]

> "China, moving gradually toward a leading position in the struggle for influence in the post-Soviet era, has similar geographical advantages (of bordering directly on the area). It has far fewer limitations than its Middle Eastern rivals. A regulated economy, which is more compatible with the economies of the Central Asian republics, a secular state, and available financial means are also on the plus side. China offers the Central Asian states the use of its territory to gain direct access to the Pacific and on to the Far East and Southeast Asia."

South Asian Influence

With the appearance of five nominally Islamic neighbours in 1991, Pakistani policy-makers initially envisioned a Muslim security belt stretching from Turkey to Pakistan.[13]

The main Pakistani interest in the region has been to create for itself a geographical, economic and strategic depth in its struggle with India. At the same time, it made Pakistan concerned about spillover effects of regional conflicts through unstable Afghanistan. However, Pakistan's hopes have wilted under the tremendous left over by Afghanistan war legacy that the diplomacy appeared too light to resolve the inter-ethnic animosities. Besides geopolitical constraints and influence from pan-Islamic neighbours, especially Iran and Turkey have stymied Pakistan's efforts for significant influence in Central Asia. Also, the independent dealing by CARs with Taliban has further helped the latter to pursue an independent course.

Taliban envoy in Islamabad, Mullah Abdul Salam Zaeef said that Turkmenistan had agreed recently to provide electricity to Taliban controlled areas of Afghanistan.[14] He added, "Work on the 72-kilometer long power transmission line from Turkmenistan to Shibarghan, in northern Afghanistan, will be completed in the next six months".

The electricity supplied from Turkmenistan will also be extended to other parts of Afghanistan in later phases. All the expenditure for this project will be borne by the Government of Turkmenistan, the Taliban envoy said. The Turkmen President Saparmurat Niyazov has long since promoted this idea saying that should it be implemented the Taliban would begin doing business instead of making war.[15] According to *GazetaSNG.ru*[16], he also urged his Uzbek counterpart Islam Karimov to join the project.

There are stark differences of opinion among CARs while dealing with Taliban. Turkmenistan is the sole country in Central Asia to have officially recognized the Taliban. Recently Uzbekistan decided to develop contacts with the

Taliban despite the fact that Taliban has provided sanctuary to the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) believed to be aiming to overthrow Uzbek President Islam Karimov.[17] There are around 2,500-3,000 heavily armed fighters from the IMU, which this summer and last year launched guerrilla attacks inside Uzbekistan in a bid to set up bases in the volatile Ferghana valley and topple President Karimov. In parallel, it signed a CIS multilateral agreement to establish an anti-terrorist centre that is primarily intended to combat religious extremism and terrorism in Central Asia.

Tajikistan with its own affinities with Northern Alliance has sharp differences with Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. According to the then Afghan ambassador to Tajikistan, Said Ibrahim Hitmat, thousands of Afghan civilians forced by the war took refuge on islands in the Pyandzh River on the Afghan-Tajik border who were later evacuated to Tajikistan. He further added:

> "The number of people who have been forced by the fighting between the Taliban movement and the Northern Coalition to camp on the Pyandzh islands has reached 10,000, according to various sources. Most of them are old people, women and children who have no tents, food or medicines. However, it is difficult to provide humanitarian relief because the Taliban forces are shelling the islands. Although the commanders of a Russian force guarding Tajikistan's border with Afghanistan declined to confirm the Afghan ambassador's comments."

According to Radio Iran, the Afghan Northern Alliance prevented Taliban forces from advancing to areas in Balkh and Samangan Provinces in northern Afghanistan this morning. A Northern Alliance spokesman told a television and radio external correspondent that dozens of Taliban fighters had been killed in the attack and seven of them had been left on the battleground. He said a Taliban commander, Hakim Chirik had also been killed in the attack.[18] These are to

continue as long there is no regulation on feeding the war supply to Taliban.

There is also widely known fact that IMU is being bankrolled by Afghanistan's drugs trade, Osama bin Laden and Islamic groups in Pakistan along with the Arab Gulf states. Its strength has grown from some 600 fighters who first came to Afghanistan in the spring of 1999 to nearly 3,000 now. It is recruiting widely from all the Central Asian and Caucasian ethnic groups—especially Chechens—as well as Uyghur Muslims from the Chinese region of Xinjiang.[19]

India's most imminent security concerns stem from abatement of such forces by Pakistan. The efforts of Islamic encirclement and of spillover of conflicts to India's northwestern province, especially the Kashmir led India to think over strengthening its ties with the republics of Central Asia. As a non-aligned, non-Islamic state, India rejected military alliances as tools for promoting stability in the region, focusing instead on bilateral economic programmes. This has been relatively successful and India supports the region's secular regimes. However, due to self-maintained distances and lack of good communications to Central Asia, Indian interests in the region rely on cooperation with India's traditional ally, Russia. The wide-ranging efforts to formularize the security concerns are discussed in the following sections.

Defence and Security Issues in the Region

The all Central Asian Republics have relatively weak defence forces. Their numbers are shown in Table 5.1.[20]

Table 5.1.

Country	Defence Forces	Paramilitary
Kazakhstan	*35,100*	*34,500*
Kyrgyzstan	*12,200*	*5,000*
Tajikistan	*7,000**	*1200*
Turkmenistan	*19-21,000*	*?*
Uzbekistan	*49-54,000*	*16,000*

* In addition, about 31,000 Russian troops and small contingents from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan are stationed in Tajikistan for peacekeeping purposes. All data are for 1996.

Source: *The Military Balance*, 1997/98, London, Oxford University Press, 1997.

Central Asian security set up is primarily suited for internal security and territorial defence and have little to do with any sort of offensive capability. Kazakhstan was one of the four former Soviet republics to become a nuclear power in succession to the USSR in 1991. However, in accordance with the START-1 treaty and the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Kazakhstan had nearly all its nuclear warheads removed and transferred to Russia by 1995.[21]

The structure of the defence forces has its roots in the Soviet forces and only limited reorganization has taken place. The forces are based on conscription with terms of service from 18 to 31 months. Significantly, Russian citizens are allowed to serve with the armed forces in the region. Thus, whereas the conscripts mostly come from the titular nationalities, 90% of the officer corps has Slavs, mainly of Russian backgrounds.

The Central Asian states are all members of the CIS. One of the pillars of the CIS is the Treaty on Collective Security where the signatories declare that they will not join any alliance directed against other Commonwealth members. The new Military Draft adopted provides for mutual assistance in

case of outside attack on a member and some integration of military forces and air surveillance is also foreseen.

The main achievements of the CIS on the military side have been in the area of peacekeeping/peace enforcement, primarily in Tajikistan. Under the CIS umbrella, and with observers from the United Nations (UN) and the OSCE, a Russian force of some 30,000 troops has supported the Rakhmonov regime and quelled the civil war.[22] Significantly, the Russians have received some assistance from Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, whereas isolationist Turkmenistan has refused to take part. All the Central Asian countries have bilateral military agreements with Russia.

Russia also still has the right to maintain and operate military installations in the territories of all the five states. However, the actual number of Russian military personnel is small except in Tajikistan. All five states have been members of the UN and the OSCE since independence, thus taking part in the multilateral security arrangements of these organizations. They also all joined the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), later to become the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC).

However, Tajikistan and isolationist Turkmenistan have never had any active involvement in the organization. Again, Turkmenistan has later shown little interest whereas Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan have signed their Individual Partnership Programmes (IPPs) and show some interest in developing the relationship with NATO further.[23] The three countries have been also planning to form a combined Central Asian Peacekeeping Battalion for employment where required (e.g., by the UN or the OSCE).

With the exception of war-torn Tajikistan, Central Asia now appears relatively stable. The governments of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan have not faced any serious threats since their independence. The United States, Western Europe, China, Turkey and Iran either support the current state of affairs or do not oppose it. Yet,

there is considerable potential for instability and a conflict in the region could have dire consequences. However, analysts disagree by varying degree on solutions that would be best suited to ensure regional security and stability.

Most analysts agree that economic development is the key to regional stability. Without positive economic prospects, there will be few resources available to deal with fundamental problems. A sound economy is required to pay for environment protection, education, health care and social services, and it is closely linked to employment.

The economies of the Central Asian Republics hitherto had Soviet heritage of central planning that had altogether different system of priorities and greater degree of interdependence on Soviet economy. Some World Bank initiated privatization and other steps towards market economy have been implemented (at least in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan). Kyrgyzstan lifted a moratorium for private land ownership. President Askar Akayev had decreed the 5-year moratorium in 1998[24]. Kyrgyz parliament has discussed the issue several times before and rejected any private land ownership saying neither the state nor Kyrgyz nation is ready for it. Similarly in Kazakhstan, the Agricultural Post-Privatisation Assistance Project is implemented to support the development of newly privatized farms and agro-enterprises in key agricultural areas of Kazakhstan and improve rural productivity and incomes.[25] The programme will include three phases. The first phase will focus on the legal framework, the institutions and the procedures to support improved performance of rural enterprises, and stimulate the flow of commercial bank financing to enterprises. The second phase will build on the first phase by expanding the coverage of the advisory services. The third phase will expand the programme on a nation-wide basis.

The countries are receiving some outside investment and expectations are high, particularly in oil and gas rich Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. Democratic developments are

necessary to resolve disputes, ensure minority rights and to make government accountable. In turn, this would also help to enhance prospects for a peaceful development in the region and to reduce corruption. Democratic development would therefore help to attract foreign investment and to increase the chances for economic progress.

The post-Soviet situation of rising ethnic tensions along borders has left hitherto ethnically ambient societies with high potential for internal and inter-state strife. The current leaders appear to be quite anxious to avoid conflict and maintain the *status quo*. In the short-term, this aim is probably best met by supporting the current regimes, as no viable alternatives exist.

However, it is essential that economic reform and democratic development in the region be encouraged. It is also important that development is reasonably well balanced within the region. The regional power balance is subtle and cannot easily be altered without creating grounds for new conflict. It is also important to minimise the concerns of the outside powers with interests in the region. Direct economic aid, whether bilateral or through international organisations like the UN, the International Monetary Fund or the World Bank, has proved to have marginal effect. There is more promise in active investment projects, where both sides have direct gains from a positive development. It is also important that such investment comes with practical and technical assistance and with a set of rules to enhance progress, and that it is targeted to help balance growth in the region. The UN and the OSCE have considerable involvement in Central Asia and have had some success in promoting the rights of minorities. Both organizations are well suited to promote dialogue between the various players in the region. Their most important advantage is that they are perceived as impartial and do not favour any of the main players. However, both organizations are also seen as mere 'talk shops' and have had only limited influence on developments within the region.[26]

The argument differs to the NATO-related Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC). NATO's Partnership for Peace (PfP) has had considerable success in many of the CIS and former Warsaw Pact countries. With the exception of Tajikistan, all the Central Asian states have joined PfP. Notably, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan have been active PfP partners, and the three countries are working to establish a combined battalion for peacekeeping operations. The basic problem with PfP is that it is strictly related to military and security issues, and does little for the economy. It is quite an evident perception in Russia and elsewhere that the West is expanding its influence through NATO and PfP. For these reasons, PfP has limited potential as a framework for security in the region.

One option that has been proposed for security in Central Asia has been an alliance between the five republics. However, most experts have discarded this. One reason is that Uzbekistan is the local great power with the greatest population and the greatest military might. Most of the other republics have disputes with Uzbekistan, and resent the prospect of an alliance dominated by that country. The other main argument against a local alliance is the relationship with Russia, which currently does not allow such a venture. As an alternative to a regional alliance, Central Asian leaders could ally themselves with relatively powerful neighbouring states. Ukraine, Turkey, Iran or China could be a candidate. However, such an arrangement seems highly unlikely both because of the lack of interest from any of these countries, and because of the lack of interest from the Central Asian states themselves.

Concern about Russia's reaction looms as an overshadowing consideration. After the demise of the Soviet Union, Europe has seen a number of sub-regional organizations arise. Central Asia has established its own sub-regional organization in the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO).

The sub-regional organizations provide cooperation on a number of non-security related issues, for example, economic development, transnational planning for infrastructure and transport, environmental problems and natural resource management and human contacts, especially in the fields of tourism, culture and education. The development of joint programmes and the realisation of added value through cooperation create interdependence of a kind that bolsters stability. Sub-regional organizations can also help in matters more directly related to security. Notably, they can help develop new principles and mechanisms for cooperation on 'new threats' such as terrorism, organized crime, drugs and other smuggling, humanitarian aid, refugees, and uncontrolled migration.

In the complex security environment in Central Asia, the ECO is a promising initiative for continued stability and future cooperation. It brings the countries of the region together in cooperation on issues of common interest. Also importantly, most of the external players with interests in the region (Iran, Pakistan and Turkey) are represented. The ECO is not directed against any external threat and is fully accepted by Russia and China. It is essential that the support be non-intrusive to avoid distorting the regional balance and disturbing Russian and Chinese interests in the region. Offers of economic and technical advice in combination with channelled investment probably represent the best way ahead. The support should be combined with discreet offers of advice on defence and security matters through PfP.

The Geopolitical Matrix of Central Asia and South Asia

Here, a model is presented to gauge the influence of *Major Players* within and around Central Asia that are cross-checked in a *geopolitical matrix* by judging them against the Central Asian Republics and against individual nation's capability. However, Central Asian Republics too have been incorporated in a variable capacity as this allows to remove the bias from

their standpoint which is left here as a factor to be ascertained through the matrix inferences. After denoting the key variables between them their position is evaluated by the current and most probable factor involving the long-term policy effects.

Based on this position, the foreign policy/geopolitical expectations range is delimited and the flexibility index is created providing each country's strength. Based on this, the Central Asia's shift in balance is calculated and under this prediction the possible impact on South Asian Geopolitics is estimated. The coordinate forces are—CARs, India, Pakistan, China, Russia and the US. These forces have been identified on the basis of their interest and force play recorded after the independence of CARs.

The Matrix has been designed for 3-variables 1, –1, and ±1. Variable value (1) shows that the two coordinate forces show identical interests in certain areas. These areas for immediate grasping are identified within the box in parentheses. Value (–1) shows that the two coordinating forces find strenuous relations under certain factors and there is a point of geopolitical argument. They too have been shown in parentheses. Value (±1) is a set of interests where positive contacts are pursued within the region but outside the region, they have negative and strenuous relations that digresses their positive contact. Hence, it is the interpretation of alternating geopolitical strategies.

Table 5.2

	CARs	*India*	*Pakistan*	*China*	*Russia*	*US*	*Scores*
CARs	1	1	-1	1	1	1	4
India	+1 [Moscow-Delhi Ties]	1	-1	±1	1	±1	2 ±1
Pakistan	-1 [Taliban]	-1 [Kashmir]	1	1	-1	±1	-1 ±1
China	+1 [Oil & Trade]	±1 [Border & Trade]	+1 [Defence + India]	1	±1	±1	3 ±2
Russia	+1 [Defence]	+1 [Defence]	-1 [Taliban]	±1 [Peace & Coopera-tion + Sphere of Influence]	1	-1	1±1
US	+1 [World Bank]	±1 [Kashmir & Trade]	±1 [Kashmir & Taliban]	±1 [Strategic partnership & Domestic Concerns]	-1 [NAT O]	1	1 ±2

There are certain important assumptions for viewing GSF index. The value indicated in terms of 1 are the near logical denomination of the direction and nature of interest, of course an important component, but it has not been quantified here. This is because to identify the number of counts on which the region can get influenced by one or more forces is not specified. That is why if the GSF values are smaller, they have *dual meaning*: one, there is little choice reflecting that the causality is highly linear; second, the strong ordering of preferences with respect to the region. Thus, GSF index actually is the 'flexibility' index, demarking the slope of the CARs global political landscape and gradients, for example, they may be monotonous on the Russian side, but that is only one half of the story.

Table 5.3

Scores	*Lowest*	*Countries*	*Highest*	*GSF-Index*
4	4	CARs	4	-
2 ± 1	1	India	3	2
-1 ± 1	-2	Pakistan	0	-2
3 ± 2	1	China	5	4
1 ± 1	0	Russia	2	2
1 ± 2	-1	US	3	4

Looking at Table 5.3 one can draw the following inferences. There is a Geostrategy-Flexibility Index calculated for each state. The value for each country reveals the comparative advantages in diplomatic manoeuvres.

Above index reveals China as the most beneficiary state with respect to Central Asian region, it has GSF 4. Its all policy options can remain in positive mode, this is well supported by recent efforts by Russia and China in their long-standing border dispute. We also see the US GSF index 4, but its policy options are influenced by at least one negative mode, the role of NATO in the region that is strongly contested by Russia. Russia has GSF value only of 2, which shows that owing to its binding position with the Central Asian states, it has a very limited flexibility in the region. Here, one needs to be careful in interpreting the GSF index, the direct causal relationship between Central Asia and Russia offer very limited policy options, hence low variability is revealed by GSF value.

At the same time, we can draw comparative value statements for India and Pakistan. Pakistan also has GSF value of 2, which is negative. This means that whatever manoeuverability Pakistan has it is in stark contradiction to Central Asian geopolitical status and more so linear. This puts Pakistan into juxtaposition vis-à-vis other states. India also has GSF value of 2 and its limitations are revealed in lack of an array of active interest and divergence of policy options vis-à-vis Central Asian states.

However, diplomatic behaviour is not pursued by nations in isolation. A combination of policy options and convergence of interest can bring states together. At the same time, an inevitable coalescing can downsize the diplomatic strength. Take, for example, the Cold War situation: Russia and India as allies and with Central Asian states as part of Soviet Union constituted geopolitical strength of the order of 8 (2+2+4), in GSF terms. On the other hand, the utilitarian alliance between Pakistan, US and China put them at 6, in GSF terms. Thus, Afghan imbroglio was found in a deep struggle over parity in GSF terms. The Indian indifference to Afghan situation turned the crucial balance against Soviets by downsizing their strength to 6, which was equivalent to Pakistan-US-China axis. This 6-6 battle was later to be proved gangrenous for Afghanistan.

Some of the important concerns after their independence have been mainly on two accounts: (1) the vast economic wealth these states command, (2) the political control over them. Economic resources in Central Asia, which are of immediate interest, are oil, gas, and pipelines. World oil cartels are engaged in exploring possibilities of exploiting them. On the stability account, Afghanistan is the biggest hurdle in reaching them. Conversely, the biggest market potential, India is not a party to this interest. This has complicated situation and geopolitical framework is needed to assess various regional forces and linkages that can help to model out a set of relationship between Central and South Asia. Another dimension added to this is the question of leadership in Central Asia. Uzbekistan is a formidable state with its maximum population number and location with respect to neighbouring states. However, Kazakhstan with its proximity to Russia and China and ample resources at command also has important stakes in regional power structure. These factors are to be judged in the coming section.

Above matrix shows some important forces operating within or in the vicinity of the region. They are significant in terms of tracking the Central Asian dynamics. The balance of

power in South Asia has gained renewed thrust with independent stature of CARs. No doubt, over the last two years there have been quite promising trends from the region. The major concern remains for South Asia, especially India is that it had the most influential relations with these states during the Soviet times. Indian security concern is an important component in South Asian stability and its peaceful growth.

The concrete aspect of the whole gamut of affairs is the composite relationship between India and Central Asia; Pakistan and Central Asia; and India-Pakistan. Much depends on the last set of relationship that can improve or offset any former two. A positive paradigm can begin with assuming that Kashmir issue is not indecisive.

Oil and Natural Gas Geoeconomics of Central Asia

Central Asia and the Caucasus are considered to be the next oil and gas frontier. The region's sizable energy reserves combined with its unique political status have catapulted Western firms to tap the riches amid insecure political situation.

Proven oil reserves in Central Asia and Caucasus are pegged at between 15-30 billion barrels or 2.7% of world oil reserves.[27] Proven natural gas reserves are higher at 230-360 trillion cubic feet or 7% of the world's total reserves.[28] Geologists differ in their estimates ranging oil from 50 billion barrels at the lower end to 160 billion barrels at the higher end.

There are five major basins that store most of these reserves. They are South Caspian, North Caspian, North Usturt, Mangyshlak and Amu-Darya Basin. South Caspian is mature exploration basin with over 150 years of development. Large known oil and gas fields are found in the offshore. Among them, notably Guneshli, Chiraq and Kyapaz in Azerbaijan are undergoing development.[29] Most of the Turkmenistan Caspian shelf remains relatively undrilled with more than 40 untested structures. Turkmenistan claims

undiscovered oil reserves on its Caspian shelf of 22 billion barrels. North Caspian and northwestern Kazakhstan are also areas of with large proven reserves as well as a high potential for new discoveries. Almost three quarters of all Kazakhstan reserves are in two giant fields of Tengiz (oil) and Karachaganak (gas). The recoverable reserves of Tengiz have been recently updated to 12 billion dollars of oil with estimated 25 billion barrels of oil in place.

Some oil company officials hold that the shallow offshore concession of Caspian shelf has several times the reserves of Tengiz. North Usturt and Amu-Darya basins have some potential in oil and gas exploration. Amu-Darya basin contains mainly gas reserves with minor amount of oil. Seismic surveys and extensive exploration programmes are expected to reveal potential drilling targets. Taking logistical and political constraints into consideration, analysts project that the amalgamation of major deals signed by international companies shall be able to export 800-900,000 barrels per day of oil from the region. The Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) of Washington, DC expects Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan to reach a peak oil production level of about 3.5 million barrels per day sometime around 2010.[30]

Potential Transport Lines and Geopolitical Concerns

The *landlocked* situation of Central Asian and Caucasus hydrocarbon reserves requires considerable confidence to bring them to market. Unlike the Gulf countries or South America, they have to take their oil and gas through pipeline to shore. The development of pipeline corridors from the Caspian basin to international markets has been painstakingly slow process. Many possible routes through Russia, Georgia, China, Afghanistan, Iran and Turkey via Georgia or Armenia have been discussed. Since 1990s, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan combined with international oil companies are exploring possibilities for export.

The landscape for Caspian pipeline negotiations has changed over the past seven years, mainly due to shifting political factors. At present, several international oil-producing consortia are pursuing short-term transport solutions. Starting in late 1997, the AIOC consortium comprising British Petroleum, Amoco, Exxon, Pennzoil, Unocal, Armoco, Statoil, TPAO of Turkey, Azerbaijan state Socar, Lukoil, Tiochu and Delta-Nimir, began shipping a limited volume of oil from its Chiraq field in Azerbaijan through the so-called Northern Route that extends from Baku to the Russian cities of Grozny and Tikhorestsk (Russia) to Russian Black Sea port of Novorossiysk.[31] Their initial capacity is 120,000 barrels per day that would be expanded to 300,000 barrels per day. AIOC is also in the process of refurbishing a western route from Baku to Tbilisi that will end at the Georgian port of Supsa. The US and the Turkish Government are pushing for the development of a major route from Baku to the Turkish Mediterranean port of Ceyhan.[32] Exact routing is under debate as part of it goes through the Kurdish rebellion areas. Moscow has declared its opposition to the sub-Caspian sea routes because of environmental risks and high seismicity in the area.

The Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) comprising Russia, Kazakhstan, Oman, Chevron, Lukoil, Rosneft-Shell, Mobil, Agip, British Gas, Kazak Munaigas and Oryx have been trying to finalize plans for a private 1.34 million barrels per day pipeline from Tengiz field in the Western Kazakhstan to Tikhorestsk to the Russian Black Sea port of Novorossiysk, utilizing an existing Russian line from Tengiz to Grozny.[33]

Iran has proposed that Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan export their oil to Iran's northern refining centres at Tabriz, Tehran and Arak and then take it for exports along with Iranian oil from its main Persian Gulf terminal at Kharg Island. The plan has the advantage of utilizing existing reversible pipeline capacity inside Iran but has run into several snags, including the US Government objections. Iranian officials report that Malaysia's Petronas or China's CNPC

might be willing to invest in the Iranian route.[34] Turkmenistan has signed a deal to deliver natural gas to Turkey via Iran. One proposal is for constructing a new line from Daulatabad in such a way that Turkmenistan's gas is used by Northern Iranian industries, and Iran delivers gas to Turkey from its Southern gas fields through pipeline connections already underway along the Turkish border.

China's CNPC has also proposed to build a $3.5 billion pipeline from Kazakhstan to China's Tarim Basin.[35] This project along with Unocal's proposed oil and gas pipeline slated to connect an existing line at Charjou (Turkmenistan) through Afghanistan to Pakistan (COAPP), is considered a long-range programmes that won't be implemented until next decade. Unocal has served as the development manager for the seven-member Central Asia Gas (Cent Gas) pipeline consortium, which was formed in October 1997 to evaluate the future construction of a gas pipeline from Turkmenistan through Afghanistan to natural gas markets in Pakistan and later to India.

However, Unocal has withdrawn from Cent Gas project for some business reasons.[36] Exxon, Mitsubishi and CNPC are also studying a natural line from Turkmenistan to China. Questions have arisen mainly on the security of various routes given the political uncertainties and ongoing ethnic disturbances.

Energy Scenario in South Asia[37]

Although the reserves were there during the Soviet times and perhaps there were better opportunities to draw them for South Asian markets, the present scenario does not gloss over this fact, but only relocate the possibilities under newer manoeuvres conducted by CARs along with neighbouring states with no more hitherto Soviet economic cover.

This has been possible with huge demand that lays with South Asian region and the inevitable involvement of oil cartels for their commercial exploitation. The big hurdle is to

resolve the Afghan tangle. Whosoever succeeds, wins the game.

Steady economic and population growth in South Asia have resulted in rapid increases in energy consumption in recent years. According to the US Energy Information Administration (EIA), the South Asia's primary energy consumption (commercial) increased by around 50% between 1990 and 1998.[38] In 1998, South Asia accounted for approximately 4% of the world commercial energy consumption, up from 2.5% in 1987. India's commercial consumption makes the largest share of the overall demand, and is projected to increase by 3.8% per year up to 2020. Despite the rapid growth of energy demand, South Asia continues to be among the lowest levels of per capita energy consumption in the world, but among the highest in terms of energy consumption per unit of GDP.

South Asia's commercial energy mix was 47% coal, 33% petroleum, 12% natural gas, 7% hydroelectricity, 1% nuclear and 0.2% other in 1998. There are significant variations in the region. Bangladesh's energy mix is dominated by natural gas (69% in 1998), while India relies heavily (55%) on coal. Sri Lanka is tremendously dependent on petroleum (76% in 1998), while Pakistan relies on oil (43% in 1998), natural gas (38%) and hydroelectricity (13%) and the Maldives is 100% dependent on petroleum.[39] The Himalayan countries of Nepal and Bhutan have high shares of hydroelectric power in their energy consumption mix. In recent years, natural gas has been growing in importance as a source of energy in South Asia, especially for power generation, fertilizer manufacturing and petrochemical production.

The major energy issues facing South Asian nations today are keeping up with the rapidly rising energy demand and promote cross-border trade. Throughout early two decades of 21st century, South Asian energy demand is expected to grow by 3.8-4.3% annually. Among the various fuels consumed,

consumption of natural gas is expected to grow at the fastest rate through 2020.

South Asia contains around 55 trillion cubic feet (Tcf) of proven natural gas reserves, about 1% of the world's total. The region produces and consumes around 1.8 Tcf of gas annually. Around 44% of this is accounted for by India, 39% by Pakistan, and remaining 17% by Bangladesh. If long-term projections are correct then South Asia shall have to import significant quantities of gas. Gas imports to the region requires construction of infrastructure for handling liquefied natural gas (LNG).

Natural gas usage has increased rapidly in South Asia during 1990-98; it rose by 68%.[40] It is playing an important role in power generation. Natural gas in Bangladesh is a significant source for commercial energy. Currently its reserves are estimated around 11 trillion cubic feet. MNCs such as Shell, Unocal and Halliburton are engaged in seismic mapping and drilling these reserves. Currently its main gas producing fields are Bakhrabad, Feni, Habiganj, Kailashtilla, Narsinghdi, Rashidpur, Sylhet and Titas (the largest).[41] Production from Sangu, Bangladesh's first offshore field began in 1998. The huge industrial area of Kolkata is its nearest market.

Natural gas supplies nearly about 8% of India's energy demand. Gas consumption is expected to increase rapidly in coming years reaching 1.9 Tcf by 2005. Much of the demand is expected from power sector. Domestic gas production was expected to increase only modestly from 800 billion cubic feet (Bcf) to 875 Bcf by 2000.[42] Most of the increased demands therefore has to be met through imports mainly, the LNG. Two gasification plants have been proposed, one at Ennore near Chennai and second, at Mangalore on western coast. In September, the government also approved LNG gasification plant at Kakinada. Qatar's Ras Laffan LNG Company has agreed to supply 7.5 million metric tons of LNG for the planned projects in 2002. The 5 million metric tons are

expected to go to Dahej in the Gujarat and 2.5 million metric tons to Cochin in Kerala. The Enron Corporation plans to import 7 million tons of LNG for its Dabhol power plant. In May 1998, British Gas International and the Yemen LNG Company signed a memorandum of understanding to begin the Pipavav LNG project in Gujarat.

Pakistan currently produces around 0.7 Tcf of natural gas per year, all of which is consumed domestically. With gas demand growing rapidly (at the rate of 30%), there may be need to raise imports from Middle east or Central Asia. In July 1997, officials from Turkmenistan and Pakistan and representatives from a consortium led by Unocal (54.11%) and Saudi Arabia's Delta Oil (15%) signed an agreement to build gas pipeline from Turkmenistan via Afghanistan to Pakistan.

The nearly 800 miles, 48-inch diameter pipeline is estimated to cost between $2 billion and $2.7 billion. If built, it would carry up to 700 Bcf of gas from Turkmenistan's largest gas field at Daulatabad to central Pakistan. However, in January 1999, Unocal withdrew from the consortium citing the difficulties involved in building a pipeline through war-torn Afghanistan. Despite Unocal's withdrawal Turkmenistan and Pakistan have continued discussions on the project. Pakistan may eventually be linked to the gas infrastructure of the Arabian Peninsula through the Dolphin Project, a gas scheme sponsored by the UAE Offsets Group, which would link the UAE and Oman to Qatar's North Field gas reserves. Pakistan signed a MoU with the sponsors of the project in 1998.

South Asia contains only 5.1 billion barrels of oil, around 0.5% of the world's total. In 1999, the region consumed around 2.4 million barrels per day (b/d) of oil, and produced 0.81 million b/d, making South Asia a net oil importer of around 1.6 million b/d. The vast majority (around 750,000 b/d) of South Asia's oil production comes from India, including its offshore Bombay High field (which accounts for about one-third of total Indian oil output).[43] The remainder

(around 60,000 b/d) of South Asia's oil production comes mainly from Pakistan (and to a very small extent, Bangladesh). Most South Asian crude oil imports come from the Middle East, and this is likely to remain the case for years to come. South Asia's oil imports are expected to grow sharply as production remains about flat while demand soars. By 2020, the region could be importing as much as 5.2 million b/d of oil, more than triple today's import volume. The vast majority of this oil is expected to come from the Middle East (located close to South Asia, and also where more than two-thirds of world oil reserves are concentrated), with only small volumes coming from other areas.

Growing demand for transportation fuels and increased industrial power demand have been major factors behind the growth in South Asian oil consumption in recent years. Between 1990 and 1999, South Asian oil consumption led by India, grew by about 64%. EIA's International Energy Outlook 2000 projects that India's oil consumption will grow another 40% by 2005, reaching 2.7 million b/d (up from 1.9 million b/d in 1999).

India's last Five Year Plan (1997-2002) forecastsed that the country would exhaust its crude oil reserves by 2011-2012, even if only 30% of demand is met through domestic production. The plan also envisions that India would need to increase its crude oil imports up to 70% by 2001-2002. The Plan emphasizes and encourages domestic oil companies' pursuit of oil exploration opportunities in other countries, particularly in Asia and Central Asia.

Like India, Pakistan's net oil imports are expected to increase rapidly as domestic oil demand growth, much of it associated with the start-up of new oil-fired power plants, outstrips increases in oil production. Sri Lanka imports all of its crude oil, which is used largely for electricity generation and transportation, and has refining capacity of 50,000 b/d. In recent years, Sri Lanka has increased its oil imports in an effort to diversify away from reliance on hydroelectricity, which

varies depending upon rainfall amounts. Between 1990 and 1999, Sri Lankan oil consumption increased around 80%.

The construction of adequate refining capacity to keep up with growing oil demand is of great economic importance to South Asia. India has more than 1 million b/d of new refining capacity in various stages of development. The largest project, the Reliance Industries refinery at Jamnagar, came partially on stream in late summer 1999, and will have a final capacity of 540,000 b/d. Most of this capacity is scheduled for completion by 2002. The 100,000 b/d 'Pak-Arab' refinery in Pakistan came online in late 2000, helping alleviate the country's refined products dependence.

Petronet India, a company created in early 1998 as part of an agreement among India's three government-owned refineries (IOC, Hindustan Petroleum, and Bharat Petroleum) is building product pipelines that will add about 500,000 b/d to current pipeline capacity of about 325,000 b/d (all operated by IOC).[44] Completion of these projects will shift the main transportation mode for petroleum products from rail to pipeline.

Amid such scenario, it is not off placed that Central Asia could be one of the potential suppliers of natural gas and oil (Table 5.4,5; Fig. 5.1,2,3,4). The vast supplies are the most proximate to South Asia, and provide a natural destination. The long-term prospects for demand of fuels in South Asia shall certainly need more than Middle East to meet them.

Table 5.4

Central Asia, Dry Natural Gas Production, 1992-2002; billion cubict feet (bcf)

Region/ Country	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002
Kazakhstan	290	240	160	170	150	220	190	160	314	356	464
Kyrgyzstan	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
Tajikistan	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	2	1
Turkmenistan	2,020	2,290	1,260	1,140	1,310	900	470	790	1,642	1,702	1,889
Uzbekistan	1,510	1,590	1,670	1,700	1,700	1,740	1,940	1,960	1,992	2,228	2,038
Total	3,820	4,120	3,090	3,010	3,160	2,860	2,600	2,910	3,950	4,289	4,392

Table 5.5

Central Asia, Crude Oil Production, 1992-1999, 2002 b/d

Region/ Country	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002
Kazakhstan	444	408	352	362	403	466	476	530	610	721	818
Kyrgyzstan	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
Tajikistan	1	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
Turkmenistan	98	79	77	70	76	89	110	139	142	155	180
Uzbekistan	36	47	75	115	115	112	116	102	91	85	79
Total	581	537	506	550	596	670	704	773	845	963	1,080



Fig.5.3. India: Crude Oil Production, Consumption (1992-2002)



Fig.5.1.Central Asia: Petroleum Production, Consumption (1992-2002)



Fig. 5.4. India: Natural Gas Production, Consumption(1992-2002)



Fig. 5.2. Central Asia: Natural Gas Production, Consumption (1992-2002)

India and Central Asia: Imperatives for Regional Cooperation

Central Asia has unique relationship with Indian sub-continent in numerous sphere of social and political life. All this stands transformed under new conditions. Before discussing the possibilities of cooperation in the post-Soviet era, one must examine the influencing factors. The pre-Cold War status of Central Asian Republics had functional relationship with the South Asian states.

The nodal facility served by Moscow-Delhi ties provided all channels of contact between the two regions. Majority of these served between India and these states. Even the formal influences, revealing the neighbourly contacts with Afghanistan were a part of Soviet Policy structure. The region never found itself under the leading position for directing the formal relationship ever before. The major cause had been the constant concern to prevent any spillage of the contagion to these regions. At the same time, there has been need felt for

reciprocal help from the South Asian states. Pakistan has clinched this aspect of their insecurity but it's a position that put them (Pakistan) in contradiction to their Kashmir policy.

The Indian focus has been on identification of core Soviet privileges that these states would like to maintain and the concomitant road to further their interest areas in India. These observations can help trace the logistics for deterring Pakistan's overtures to influence them with Kashmir syndrome, common to Arab and other Muslim states.

One must not forget that both, South Asia and Central Asia have one security aspect in common. The presence of Soviet defence cover provided growth and stability in both the regions. Though in South Asia, India was a major beneficiary, it nevertheless maintained the positive approach towards its neighbour without compromising its leadership in the region. Central Asia too got a renewed socio-economic structuring, but what one sees them of a nation is much of the Soviet construction with all its affects. This geopolitical linkage between South and Central Asia cannot be ignored. The crisis-based cooperation is still pertinent in the region. The need felt to forge a joint strategy towards Afghanistan by India and Russia reflects the continuing convergence of geopolitical interests between the two regions even after the Cold War.

Legacy of Moscow-Delhi Ties

One important factor that has been the strategic convergence of Indo-Russian ties amidst growing worldwide concern had been the Taliban's effort to gain total control over whole Afghanistan. The advance of the Taliban, as feared, could give a big boost to the forces of religious extremism and destabilize the entire region. India and Russia found it necessary to formalize interaction between their national security establishments to counter international terrorism spreading across the strategic arc extending from Afghanistan to Chechnya.

The first ever visit to India by the head of the Russian National Security Council, Mr. Sergei Ivanov materialized into signing a protocol regularizing exchanges between their national security councils. In a press statement, Mr. Ivanov pointed out that the security councils of the two countries would now regularly analyse the 'military-political' situation in South and Central Asia, including ways to combat the scourge of terrorism, which has infected this zone.[45] On Central Asia, both the parties discussed ways to tackle the possibility of a combined terrorist onslaught involving Uzbek dissident groups and elements of the Pakistan-backed Taliban on the Central Asian Republic of Uzbekistan from Kandhar in Afghanistan.

According to sources, Uzbekistan is the key to the spread of terrorism across Central Asia because of its geographic location. Uzbekistan's 'pivotal' location is evident as it shares common borders with all its other Central Asian neighbours—Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan. Russia feels that containment of terrorism in Central Asia is vital for its security. Moscow is keen that insurgency in the Caucasus revolving around Chechnya is kept separated from the insurgent rumblings in Central Asia. India, on its part, is keen to keep Central Asia sanitized, as extremism in this region will affect its security interests in Kashmir.[46]

Aware of the threat from terrorism and the need for combating it collectively, Russia has established a counter-terrorism centre that includes former Soviet Republics as members. Besides, it holds joint exercises with its Central Asian neighbours on counter-terrorism. According to Mr. Ivanov, both India and Russia shall now compare their 'strategic doctrines', hold regular consultations and expand interaction between their security specialists. Mr. Putin during his visit to India said the proposed *Joint* Working Group on Afghanistan should cover "the activities of all the agencies involved, including the special services of both countries".[47]

South Asian security environment hitherto enjoyed the limitation of regional tension to Kashmir issue. Pakistan and India have been in constant tussle to set the regional balance in their favour. Russia has been great supporter of India on Kashmir issue; can Central Asian states continue this trend? The independent CARs, for the first time have provided opportunity to both the ends, that of aggravating and ameliorating tensions on this agenda. The collective will of Moscow and Delhi to combat the menace of the *terrorist international* with its dangerous global spread had been one important aspect of South Asian regional security. India is as much a victim of it in Kashmir as Russia in Chechnya. Speaking in some detail on the Kashmir issue, Mr. Vladimir Putin spelt out the Russian view. The points he made were:

> "Kashmir has been the cause of tensions between India and Pakistan", "foreign interference should be stopped", the issue should be resolved "on a bilateral basis through compromise", and there must be "unconditional respect for the Line of Control".[48]

These are sensitive issues for infantile Central Asian states. Keeping an eye over the last year's tensions between India and Pakistan, Kargil imbroglio was just a tracer bullet indicating future course of affairs. There are some important areas where South-Central dynamics is involved under this head. Rightly, then Prime Minister, Mr. Atal Behari Vajpayee, has said that the security of one billion Indians is central to Asia's security and stability, he added:

> "India's experience had taught that in the absence of a non-discriminatory world order, peace lay in strength."[49]

Strategic Cooperation with CARs

Recently, India and Uzbekistan signed several key agreements on May 2nd, 2000 to fine-tune coordination between the two countries against cross-border terrorism mushrooming from

the Afghanistan-Pakistan extremist club. The Uzbek President Islam Karimov urged that both New Delhi and Tashkent should forge a joint front to counter the threat of destabilization to Central and South Asia from Taliban-dominated Afghanistan.[50] Uzbekistan shares a common border with the other four Central Asian Republics — Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan—and is the fulcrum around which the security of resource-rich Central Asia revolves. From a military angle, armed inroads can be made into Uzbekistan across the legendary Amu Darya, which separates the country from Afghanistan. The possibility of such a thrust has increased, with the Taliban now sitting at the northern city of Mazar-e-Sharif, which is around three hours driving distance from the Amu Darya. Reports from Uzbekistan also say Kandhar in Afghanistan has become the base for the formation of the United Uzbek Opposition. This opposition is likely to be joined by the Pakistan-backed Taliban.

The choice of Kandhar as the springboard for an onslaught into Uzbekistan is significant as it is not far from Quetta in Pakistan, from where the area can be kept well supplied. India, on its part, fully shares Uzbekistan's security concerns. Consolidation of radicalism in Central Asia can only have negative security repercussions on Kashmir.

India and Uzbekistan discussed the regional security situation in the backdrop of Russian efforts to keep the insurgency in the Caucasus insulated from radical forces in Central Asia, and is also engaging the Central Asians in a major military and diplomatic exercise to this end. A coalition of four Central Asian Republics, minus Turkmenistan has also been formed to counter extremist threats. China, also sensing the rise of extremism in its oil-rich Sinkiang province, has also launched a major cooperative initiative along with Russia to engage the Central Asians under the framework of the Shanghai-five. The Uzbek President declared his rejection of extremism from Afghanistan as:

> "Afghanistan has become a hotbed and training ground of international terrorism. Such activities are absolutely unacceptable to us. We cannot accept the policies of certain countries supporting Taliban."[51]

Mr. Karimov described India as Uzbekistan's *natural ally* in the fight against terrorism, which he said, had acquired 'explosive' dimensions. Both sides today signed an extradition treaty and a legal assistance pact on criminal matters. A 'mutual assistance' agreement between the two customs authorities was also finalized. India has also finalized an agreement to extend another 10 million dollars of credit to Uzbekistan. Besides, the two countries signed pacts in the fields of agriculture research, culture, information and mass media.

Turkmenistan with its historic and ethnic distinctiveness has appeared independent with other Central Asian states. It has special position of privilege with Turkey and ethnic groups identified communally in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Pushtun are affinate to Turkish brotherhood. This has implications for Central Asia's Afghan policy. However, India's then Defence Minister Jaswant Singh found Turkmenistan President Mr. Saparmurat Niyazov as "very positive, very warm, constructive and forward looking" on Indian concerns. A decision has been taken to set up a Joint Working Group (JWG) of experts to discuss ways of exploiting this sector. An option has also been kept open for third country participation.[52]

Turkmenistan holds one of the largest reserves of natural gas in the world. Two-thirds of Central Asia's around eight trillion cubic meters of proven reserves are located here. India's demand for natural gas has been steadily rising and the country is estimated to consume 2.3 trillion cubic feet of gas by the year 2005. While the formation of a JWG shows India's political intent to bring Turkmenistan in its energy security calculus, larger geopolitical and commercial developments at

the moment stand in the way. The essence of the problem lies in establishing a transport corridor from the Central Asian republic to South Asia.

The Problem of Transporting Central Asian Gas and Oil to Indian Market: A Geoeconomic Study

According to a Turkmen Official, "the battle really lies in taking the gas to energy hungry destinations in India". According to experts, future pipelines from Turkmenistan towards India will either have to traverse the Afghan-Pakistan corridor or via Iran and then through the Pakistani mainland to reach industry in India. But there are problems in the exercise of either of the two options. For instance, the ongoing civil war in Afghanistan is likely to discourage international investors from sinking in their money there. In fact, the Unocal Corporation of the US, which so far was the driving force for an oil and gas exit route from Turkmenistan via Afghanistan, has pulled out of the venture. An Indian foreign policy spokesperson said:

> "It is becoming increasingly clear that the best possible option of bringing Central Asian gas to India lies along the Pakistan land corridor and not beneath the sea. But can we as things stand afford to give Pakistan that leverage."[53]

Given the security and economic considerations involved, accessing Central Asian gas through Pakistan may have to await a durable rapprochement between New Delhi and Islamabad. Nevertheless, despite the difficulties involved, the formation of a JWG on hydrocarbons with Turkmenistan may be the beginning of long-drawn process, which dovetails into India's overall game plan to achieve national energy security.

Turkmenistan has acknowledged that India's say in the international diplomacy on Afghanistan is vital. The Turkmen President himself referred to the shortcomings in the UN sponsored initiative on resolving the Afghan crisis. The United States, Russia, China, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Iran and Pakistan are part of this UN sponsored group. After nearly two years of detailed discussions, India, Iran and Turkmenistan signed a key transit agreement in 1997 propelling trade with resource-rich Central Asia. The then visiting External Affairs Minister, Mr. I.K. Gujral and his Iranian counterpart, Mr. Ali Akbar Velayati initialled the accord.[54]

Turkmenistan's Foreign Minister and Deputy Premier, Mr. Boris Sheikh Muradov, who specially flew in from the Turkmenistan capital Ashgabat was the third signatory. Officials here saw the arrangement as an assertion of an 'independent' foreign policy being pursued by the three countries. "It is significant that the agreement is being signed in Teheran which powerful countries want to see isolated", an Iranian official said. "India has an independent foreign policy towards Iran and we do not get pressurized by what third countries might say", Mr. Gujral said in response to a question soon after the signing ceremony.

The agreement envisages the utilization of a land-cum-sea route leading up to Turkmenistan. For instance, goods from Mumbai can be shipped to the Iranian port of Bandar Abbas. The consignment can then be sent by rail to Sarakhs on the Iran-Turkmenistan border along what has been described as the *New Silk Road.* The goods could reach interior Turkmenistan through Tadjen and Mary.

The use of this corridor, which extends beyond Turkmenistan can spin off trade benefits, not only with the five Central Asian Republics, but along the 'length and breadth' of the entire former Soviet Union and beyond. "In last May, we unified the railway systems of the former Soviet Union and Iran", an Iranian analyst said.[55]

Sources point out that Tabriz is the key junction of the western flank of this railway. Goods from Tabriz can be sent towards Turkey, which in turn is connected to Rotterdam. The eastern offshoot of this network leads to the Central

Asian Republics. Besides, a link line between the Central Asian Republic of Kazakhstan and Urumqu in China draws Beijing into an expanding net. "The passage to China is a major development as the Chinese reach can now be extended into the Persian Gulf along a land corridor", a source said.

Two years later, India and Turkmenistan again reviewed their tripartite agreement on cargo transfers along the Iran-Central Asia rail corridor although its implementation has not been smooth. For instance, the shortfall in generating 'adequate volumes' for Central Asian trade has been a key bottleneck.[56] The absence of a fuller load has delayed the scheduled running of the cargo trains. Besides, the costly insurance package for cargo consignments on this route is yet another impediment. Technical difficulties are also emerging as a roadblock. The differences in railway track gauges of Iran and Central Asia are causing delays at the trans-shipment points along the Iran-Turkmen border. Though the tripartite agreement caters to these contingencies, the arrangement is likely to be fine-tuned during discussions between the two sides.

Kazakhstan has unique status among the CARs. It was a nuclear weapon state with giant resource infrastructure and a geopolitical fulcrum between Russia and China. Relationship with Kazakhstan is important for reigning regional balance of power. Highly placed sources here say the oil-rich Central Asian Republics, especially Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan are showing signs of widening the canvas for tie-ups, going beyond their earlier western fixation.

Kazakhstan has already flagged off a new interest in India. The Ispat group, which has a prominent presence in Kazakhstan, and the Confederation of Indian Industry (CII), had held a major business conference in March 1992. "It is the first time that India has been chosen as one of the important destinations for industrial cooperation", the sources said.[57] Though Kazakhstan has been looking for broadening economic links with India across the board, sources here feel that the future of its long-term tie-ups with New Delhi would

essentially revolve around oil and gas. There is a need to take steps, which can pave the way for widening the Indian window in Kazakhstan's oil and gas sector. India, however, would not prefer to move into Kazakhstan alone. This is already visible as cash strapped India and Russia jointly see Kazakhstan as a potential investment ground for forays and have signed an agreement envisaging third country joint ventures. The Oil and Natural Gas Commission (ONGC) and the Lukoil of Russia signed the arrangement during the visit to India by the Russian Prime Minister, Mr. Yevgeny Primakov, in December 1998.[58]

"India obviously doesn't have the money to invest and will therefore essentially try and find a small niche with third country partners. Another option is to find an equity stake in large international consortia", the sources added.[59] India is also negotiating an access to a proven hydrocarbon field in Kazakhstan. Simultaneously, it has tied up with Beijing for the transfer of the mineral tapped in this field along a future pipeline, which goes into Mainland China.[60] China plans to build a huge pipeline along the eastern corridor from Kazakhstan into its own territory. It plans, at a later stage, to extend this line into the Asia-Pacific.

Other Prospects for Regional Cooperation

The geopolitical interests can provide an immediate impulse to drive efforts for a broad based cooperation with CARs, but there is a need for sustained basis of cooperation, reciprocal in terms of their respective economies. In fact, this has been the major agenda of South-South Cooperation to counter the imperial tendencies and relative deprivation. Among the major steps required is to discourage the game-like mindset so much proliferated by Western media and intellectuals around these states. Second, the clear approach against ethno-Islamic fundamentalism taken by these states should be consolidated at different forums along with Russian help.

This can be supported by exploring key economic sectors in which a comparative advantage based trade can be pursued.

Mr. S.T. Devare, Secretary (ER) in the Ministry of External Affairs in Govt. of India, stressed that Indian industry must step up its efforts for competing with other corporate players in the region.[61] He further recommended that counter-trade agreements be worked out as a temporary measure to facilitate trade, as the state of currency markets made it difficult for several countries to make hard currency payments for imports. Economic relationship with Central Asia was unacceptably small, as Mr. Devare added that this region was rich in natural resources hence Indian industry would have to be far more dynamic.

Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan have shown keen interest in Indian expertise and technology for the development of small and medium enterprises in their countries. Speaking at a seminar on 'Business and Investment Opportunities in the Central Asian Republics'[62], organized by the Confederation of Indian Industries (CII), the Uzbek Ambassador, Mr. Ibrahim Mavlanov said that his country would like to popularize this form of enterprise, and as India was a renowned success in small and medium enterprises, its inputs were much sought after. Mr. Mavlanov also identified processing of cotton, of which Uzbekistan was the world's largest producer, as a particularly promising area of cooperation.

The Kazakhstan Ambassador, Mr. Askar Shakirov, stated that forming a good bilateral relation with India was an important priority of his country's foreign policy, and in this respect a lot had been achieved. Kazakhstan provided the crossing point for combined markets amounting to 2.6 billion people, and transport infrastructure and road development both for connecting these markets, and for the new Kazak capital (in the process of being built) would interest foreign investors. Further, Kazakhstan had the potential to export $25-30 billion worth of agricultural produce annually.

Prospects in Agriculture

India and Central Asia can take up several tertiary sectors for cooperation, as there are more possibilities in high value-added

goods. But if one looks at the structure of these economies, there is a high contribution of agriculture and allied activities in GDP. This brings into focus the importance of traditional strengths of their economies that they would like to trade into.

South Asia and Central Asia are comparable territories in terms of area with 5,100,000 and 3,977,100 square kilometers, respectively. If one looks at the relative share of all the countries from both the regions, India and Kazakhstan stand apart with almost 2/3rd of the total land area spread over the two regions. The other comparative states are Pakistan-Uzbekistan-Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan-Nepal-Bangladesh-Tajikistan and Sri Lanka-Bhutan-Maldives. The land use in both the regions can be further divided into (1) arable land, (2) permanent crops, (3) permanent pastures (Table 5.6,7; Fig. 5.5,6). The statistics show quite different patterns of land use for Central and South Asia.

Table 5.6

Agricultural Landuse—South Asia (2002)

	Bangladesh	*Bhutan*	*India*	*Pakistan*	*Nepal*	*Sri Lanka*	*Maldives*
Permanent Crops ('000 ha)	144	410	20	8400	94	672	1000
Permanent Pastures ('000 ha)	30000	600	415	11062	1737	5000	440
Non-Arable & Non Permanent ('000 ha)	57155	4588	4535	127204	11006	54968	4547
Arable Land ('000 ha)	7910	8019	145	161718	3200	21448	916

Table 5.7

Agricultural Landuse—Central Asia (2002)

	Tajikistan	*Kyrgyzstan*	*Turkmenistan*	*Kazakhstan*	*Uzbekistan*
Permanent Crops ('000 ha)	127	66	65	136	343
Permanent Pastures ('000 ha)	3198	9365	30700	185098	22219
Non-Arable & Non Permanent ('000 ha)	13003	17769	45078	248299	36597
Arable Land ('000 ha)	930	1345	1850	21535	4484



Fig. 5.5. Agricultural Landuse (%) in South Asia, 2002



Fig. 5.6. Agricultural Landuse (%) in Central Asia, 2002

The agricultural land of the two biggest states from both the regions is quite contrasting; India has 52.36% (161.5 mln ha) of its agricultural area as arable land, Kazakhstan has almost 86% of agricultural area as permanent pastures. Similar is the case with all the other South-Central comparables.

Keeping in mind the Soviet background of Central Asian agriculture one can notice that plantation crops (permanent crops) are a very small category of landuse. This is however quite substantial in South Asia where it owes much to colonial legacy that played important role in converting forests into cultivation of tropical crops especially tea, rubber, coffee, sugarcane, cotton etc. Nepal, Sri Lanka, Pakistan, and Bhutan have higher share of permanent pastures, which reveals quality of their terrain in difference to India and Bangladesh. If one looks at the percentage share of agricultural landuse across both the regions, there is clear contrast of higher share of permanent pastures in Central Asia and higher share of arable land in South Asia. Bhutan has exceptionally high non-arable and non-permanent agricultural land being hill country. Tajikistan also shows similar trends. Sri Lanka and Maldives have a high share because of forest and woodland.

The size of irrigated area is an important factor in determining the quality of agriculture. India has the largest share of irrigated land among all the states. Pakistan, Uzbekistan and Bangladesh practice intense irrigation, as their share is higher among the total share of irrigated land spread over Central-South Asia. Uzbek agriculture is quite closer to South Asian agriculture patterns as it is also the most densely populated CAR.

All the five CARs are producers of diverse variety of crops. Alcoholic beverages, cereals, fruits, cotton, oil crops, onions, potatoes, sugar crops, tobacco and vegetables are produced in large quantities in Kazakhstan. Turkmenistan leads in cereals, cotton, oilcrops, onions, potatoes, tomatoes, vegetables and tubers. Kyrgyzstan produces cereals, especially barley and maize, potatoes-tubers, sugarbeat and vegetables.

Uzbekistan leads in fruits especially grapes and apples, cereals especially bran, cotton, starchy roots especially potatoes, oilcrops, tobacco and vegetables.

All states are leading exporters and importers of agricultural commodities (Table 5.8,9). Kazakhstan exported the largest number of commodities ranging from cereals (mainly wheat, rice and barley), vegetables, onions, cotton lint, oilcrops, fruits and tobacco. It also imports some major products such as sugar (raw equivalent), molasses, sunflower seed oil, fruits, alcoholic beverages, tea, tobacco, spices, potatoes, tomatoes, bananas, etc. Tajikistan principally exports cotton lint, fruits especially apples and grapes, vegetables, onions, tobacco and alcoholic beverages. Its principal imports are cereals (mainly wheat), sugar, vegetable oils and wine. Its imports are spices and alcoholic beverages largely. Kyrgyzstan largely exports vegetables, onions, fruits especially apples, sugar, tobacco, wheat, cotton, and alcoholic beverages. It primarily imports alcoholic beverages, wheat, molasses and vegetable oils. Uzbekistan is a big exporter of cotton lint, followed by vegetables and fruits especially grapes and apples. It also exports substantial quantity of stimulants. Its principal imports are wheat, sugar, oilcrops, vegetable oils especially soyabean and sunflower oil.

Table 5.8

Principal Agricultural Exports of CARs, 2002

Kazakhstan	*Kyrgyzstan*	*Uzbekistan*	*Tajikistan*	*Turkmenistan*
Wheat	Apples	Cotton Lint	Cotton Lint	Cotton Lint
Barley	Sugar	Cottonseed Cake	Apples	Wine
Onions	Tobacco	Onions	Onions	Tomatoes
Cotton Lint	Wheat	Grapes	Tobacco	Sugar
Rice	Tomatoes	Apples	Grapes	Tea
Cereals, Other	Cotton Lint	Tomatoes	Brans	
Sugar	Grapes	Tobacco	Wine	
Tobacco	Potatoes	Brans	Tomatoes	
Apples	Maize	Wine	Tree nuts	
Tomatoes	Tea	Soyabean Oil		

Table 5.9

Principal Agricultural Imports of CARs, 2002

Kazakhstan	*Kyrgyzstan*	*Uzbekistan*	*Tajikistan*	*Turkmenistan*
Alcoholic Beverages	Wheat	Wheat	Cereals	Cereals
Cereals	Molasses	Sugar	Sugar	Alcoholic Beverages
Vegetable Oils	Alcoholic Beverages	Soyabean Oil	Vegetable Oils	Vegetable Oils
Bananas	Vegetable Oils	Sunflower Oil	Alcoholic Beverages	Spices
Pineapples	Maize	Tea	Tea	Tea
Coffee	Tea	Rye	Tobacco	Tobacco
Cocoa Beans	Rice	Infant Food		Fruits
Tea	Apples	Rapeseed & Mustard Oil		
Tobacco	Cocoa Beans	Tobacco		
Sugar	Tobacco			
Vegetables				

India can extend agriculture trade with states in certain commodities. India's international trade in most of these commodities is large in large volumes. These possibilities can be gauged through component-wise export-import possibilities. India primarily imports large quantities of vegetable oil (namely, palm, soyabean, sunflower seed oils), sugar, pulses, fruits and dates, alcoholic beverages, cotton lint, starchy roots and lot others. Cotton lint from Uzbekistan; principal cereals and cotton from Kazakhstan; cotton lint and fruits especially grapes from Tajikistan, can be principal export items to India. On the other hand, coffee, tea, tobacco, spices, onions, fruits esp. bananas and pineapples, rapeseed and mustard oil, soyabean cake can be the chief exports to Kazakhstan; tea, tobacco and mustard oil can become chief exports to Uzbekistan; rice, coffee, tea, tobacco and vegetable oils to Turkmenistan; and the same plus rice to Tajikistan can become principal exports from India. There is more scope for

the processed food in the same commodities that can be listed in the potential exports.

Animal Husbandry Products

One can see the large pasturelands as one of the major agricultural landuse in Central Asian Republics. They have livestock as important part of their economic assets. They have produced several processed commodities in large quantities and also indulge in substantial trade (Table 5.7,8). Kazakhstan is a major producer of milk, meat especially bovine meat, skimmed milk, mutton, eggs, pork, offals and hides and skins. Kyrgyzstan has animal husbandry as important sector of its economy. It produces milk, meat—bovine, mutton, pork, offals and wool, hides and skins, and animal fats. Tajikistan too produces large quantities of milk and meat. Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan also produce substantial quantities of marine products besides these. Silk is largely produced by Turkmenistan and Kyrgyzstan. The major exports of these republics range from wool, hides and skins, silk, freshwater fish. Kyrgyzstan also exports animal fats, butter and ghee, honey, cheese and milk in substantial quantities. Kazakhstan exports the largest number of agricultural commodities. In fact, it exports more than what it produces. Hides and skins, milk, fish, meat, wool, animal fats, butter and ghee, eggs and whey are its important exports.

Table 5.10

Principal Livestock Products Exports of Central Asia, 2002

Kazakhstan	*Kyrgyzstan*	*Uzbekistan*	*Tajikistan*	*Turkmenistan*
Hides & Skins	Hides & Skins	Hides & Skins	Hides & Skins	Wool
Milk	Bovine Meat	Wool	Wool	Silk
Fish, Seafood	Wool	Silk	Silk	Hides & skins
Meat	Milk	Meat Meal	Freshwater Fish	Fish, Seafood
Wool	Silk	Fish, Seafood	Fish, Seafood	Freshwater Fish
Freshwater Fish	Animal Fats	Freshwater Fish		Honey
Butter, Ghee	Butter, Ghee	Honey		
Eggs	Honey			
Whey	Cheese			
Cheese				

Table 5.11

Principal Livestock Products Imports of Central Asia, 2002

Kazakhstan	*Kyrgyzstan*	*Uzbekistan*	*Tajikistan*	*Turkmenistan*
Milk	Milk	Bovine Meat	Bovine Meat	Milk
Poultry Meat	Eggs	Milk	Milk	Butter, ghee
Fish, Seafood	Fish, Seafood	Poultry Meat	Fish, Seafood	Bovine Meat
Pig meat	Silk	Butter, Ghee	Hides & Skins	Mutton
Bovine Meat	Wool	Fish, Seafood	Cephalopods	Fish, Seafood
Butter, Ghee	Poultry Meat	Pig meat		Poultry Meat
Eggs	Butter, Ghee	Cheese		Pig meat
Wool	Bovine Meat	Crustaceans		Cheese
Pelagic Fish	Freshwater, Fish	Honey		
Cheese				

Agricultural trade in animal products with India can serve as an effective complementary to trade in crops. India imports animal products in large quantities. Wool, hides and skins, silk, butter and ghee, skimmed milk, whey and honey are lucrative trading products for CARs. India primarily exports fish, crustacean, cephalopods, meat, skimmed milk, eggs, animal fats, silk, honey, butter and ghee and meat meal. The CARs import some of them in good amount. Tajikistan imported 22,091 metric tones of bovine meat in 1998. It also imports skimmed milk, milk and seafood. Seafood, bovine meat, pork, butter and ghee are the principal imports of Kazakhstan. Turkmenistan primarily imports milk, butter and ghee, bovine meat, fish, seafood and eggs. Uzbekistan also primarily imports bovine meat, butter and ghee and seafood, especially mollusks, crustaceans and cephalopods have good scope for exports to Central Asian Republics.

The breakdown of Soviet economic system has brought severe pressure to reduce production. The most affected of them has been agriculture, the mainstay of these republics. The new relations between South Asia and Central Asia can once again bring into expansion possibilities for these economies. Also, nowhere so near is the question of food security can be so well addressed.

Notes

1. http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/reports/sokov2.htm
2. http://www.cfcsc.dnd.ca/irc/nh/nh9798/0009.html
3. http://www.ndu.Edu/inss/macnair/mcnair47/m047ch03.html
4. *Ibid.*
5. *Ibid.*
6. *Ibid.*
7. n 2.
8. *Ibid.*
9. http://www.scifig.com/milnet/pentagon/centasia/cenasap5.htm
10. n 2.
11. *Ibid.*
12. *Ibid.*
13. *Ibid.*
14. http://www.afghan-web.com
15. http://www.rferl.org/bd/tu/reports/2000/08/050800.html
16. http://www.gazetasng.ru
17. http://www.cacianalyst.org/Nov_22_2000/Islamic_Militants_inCentral_Asia.htm
18. http://www.rawa2.stellarhouse.com/reports3.html
19. n 18.
20. n 2.
21. http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/reports/tnw_nat.htm
22. n 2.

23. *Ibid.*
24. http://groups.yahoo.com/group/KYRGYZNEWS/message /322
25. http://www-esd.worldbank.org/ecssd/projects/pid8503.shtm
26. n 2.
27. http://www.csis.org/intern/forum991h.html
28. http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1074/mr1074.chap6.pdf
29. http://bakerinstitute.org/Pubs/studies/gppca/gppca.html
30. 1.http://bakerinstitute.org/Pubs/workingpapers/efac/efcac8.html
31. http://bakerinstitute.org/Pubs/workingpapers/efac/pipelines.html
32. http://ourworld.compuserve.com/homepages/usazerb/413.htm
33. n 32.
34. n 31.
35. http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/kazaproj.html
36. http://www.unocal.com/uclnews/98news/centgas.htm.
37. Based on assessment provided by Energy Information Administration—official energy statistics from the US Government.
38. http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/sasia.html
39. *Ibid.*
40. *Ibid.*
41. http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/international/bngladsh.html.
42. http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/international/india.html.
43. *Ibid.*
44. *Ibid.*
45. The Hindu on indiaserver.com: India, Russia to Chalk up Plan to Bust Terrorism, April 28, 2000.
46. The Hindu on indiaserver.com: Common threat draws Delhi, Moscow closer, February 01, 2000.

47. The Hindu on indiaserver.com: Afghan shadow over Putin visit, Monday, October 02, 2000.
48. The Hindu on indiaserver.com: Putin against foreign interference in Kashmir, October 05, 2000.
49. The Hindu on indiaserver.com: Safety of Indians key to Asia's security: PM, September 23, 2000.
50. The Hindu on indiaserver.com: Indo-Uzbek road map to fight terrorism, May 02, 2000.
51. The Hindu on indiaserver.com: Delhi, Tashkent to discuss counter-terrorism measures, Thursday, April 27, 2000.
52. The Hindu on indiaserver.com: India, Turkmenistan JWG on energy soon, May 22, 1999.
53. *Ibid.*
54. http://www.indiaserver.com/thehindu/1997/02/23/THF02.html.
55. *Ibid.*
56. *Ibid.*
57. The Hindu on indiaserver.com: Indo-Kazakhstan meet to focus on oil, gas, March 30, 1999.
58. *Ibid.*
59. *Ibid.*
60. The Hindu on indiaserver.com: China plans to develop impoverished west, September 23, 2000.
61. The Hindu on indiaserver.com: Petro co.s asked to tap potential in Central Asia, February 25, 2000.
62. *Ibid.*

6

Conclusion

South Asia and Central Asia contain a range of snapped links to be restored but in an entirely new framework. The need is to relocate the development of nations in universal variables that have come affront as a result of global economic opportunities. Territorial integrity, national sovereignty, economic independence and freer exchange of ideas are possible only if particularistic variables, such as ethno-religious outlook, tribal polity and self-styled inter-state relations are put aside.

This chapter sums up the *prima facie* investigation of the geographical objective that serves as basis for cultural political study. The role of region as the basis for objective spatial study has already been discussed at length at theoretical level. This chapter adds further note to the geopolitical factors in array that emanated from the study and present a source material to the problem of geopolitical delimitation of a region.

Regional Cooperation and Geopolitical Realities

South Asia is one of the complex socio-political systems of nations that have considerably accommodated ethnic conflict. Though ethnic, multi-linguistic and regional differentiations have prevailed in society, they seldom became guiding principles of national polity. The growing interpolation of

these forces into national constitution has brought pressures on governments in the region to organize their political space on the lines of majoritarian rule. Thus, there are disowned communities with a sense of deprivation, and political freedom seems to them their only solution. This is one of the tension perpetuating situations in South Asian region. The extent of government expenditure on military by many states is quite high. The quest for peace has involved too many variables to be ascertained. India being the focal state in South Asia shall continue to grow in strength and prosperity in all spheres. And the peripheral states can only benefit by cooperating rather than pursuing conflict.

The post-Soviet world harbingers two important concerns for these regions, namely, the development of economic cooperation and containment of ethno-Islamic fundamentalism. The geopolitical trough between the two sub-continents is Afghan-Pakistan continuum. India's relationship with Pakistan is a key factor for balance of power equation in South Asia. Pakistan's control over Taliban factor is a key to stability in Afghanistan. And Afghanistan's stability is the key to security of Central Asia. The advent of Taliban and Al-Quarda is an important factor for the security of these Central Asian Republics. Both Tajikistan and Uzbekistan are fighting these groups under the aegis of Soviet Union.

The task of harbouring geoeconomic linkages and geopolitical imperatives relies much with in these precincts. It shall incorporate the ethno-political scales and resource potential drawn in pervious chapters as well as the political morphometry of South Asia. The ethno-political influence running between Indo-Centric South Asia and conglomerate Central Asia is an undefined frontier space. The major quest for geopolitical interest begins with the demarcation of geopolitical frontier between Central Asia and South Asia. Central Asia generates a host of identity assertions for South Asia.

The landlocked status of Central Asia presents a necessary quest for diverse outlets with a possible development of complementariness. This is augmented with the fact that their effort has been to strike a balance with the broken strings of Islamic heritage with the beam of socialist political economy upon the pathway of national reconstruction. Only South Asia provides them pluralistic, versatile and interactive outlet where they can put up influencing channels of communication.

Russia, China and Islamic World encircling these states present a monotonous landscape. Though they are a host of economic opportunities but economic interaction is not the sole regional pursuit. The socio-cultural recognition and politico-economic exchange of responsibility are important coordinates of inter-regional behaviour.

The wide range of possibilities of economic cooperation discussed in chapter five are only a scan view of the larger scenario of cooperation that awaits. One could even think of Delhi-Tashkent Railway in the present century. The extent of trade and commerce is not estimable at present due to the other side of this geopolitical 'economic' reality, but history speaks volumes upon it. The 'Great Game' rivalry between the British and the Russians sharpened due to enormous resource potential (for trade and commerce) at the fringe of these regions.

The other aspect of this reality needs to be addressed. And as an aftermath, it shall be one of the important areas emanating out of this thesis to see how these two regions can become interactive units.

Afghanistan is a geopolitical reality extending between the two regions. It has several nuances, such as a frontier post, a friction zone, a trough, a quagmire or a barrier. The fact is that its basic nature has been integrated in past while conducting regional affairs across Central Asia. The complex ethno-political situation is a source to the host of identities generated by Afghanistan. An important assumption of this thesis is that

the basic nature of these regions is seen as a coordinate of action.

Central Asia and South Asia as Geoeconomic Regions

This is quite a comfortable identity and it can sustain its viability as working of SAARC with ECO or EEC, as they are major economic cooperation organizations. Regional cooperation under these conditions is a very fruitful venture as the universal interest governs international relations. There is already some exchange of ideas between countries from both the regions. The perfect complementary situation of resource-rich Central Asia and demand stricken South Asia provide the near proximate linkages.

The economic interdependence has never been facilitated as such of now. The key environment is provided by globalization of certain sectors such as consumer goods, finance capital and media. These are of course dominated by TNCs, but there is always a residuary opportunity for regional cooperation. There can be no challenging between the two environments that are operating at different scales. But there is always a need to assert the identity of focus into play.

Economic cooperation between developing countries evolved as a political economic strategy of safeguarding their independence against the two powering blocks. The rise of global awareness in 1960s paved way for institutions such as G-77, NAM and UNCTAD. The primary effort was to bring cursor to the key issues of underdevelopment and poverty, and the fast rising gap between the developed and the developing countries. But the disillusions were soon given away when the capitalist motive prevailed upon the development goals in the minds of developed countries. The only important initiative left was South-South cooperation. In fact, the leading nations in developing world acted as conduit of North-South and South-South cooperation with the help of socialist countries.

South Asia and Central Asia can be good reciprocal economies. There is ample manpower and skill in South Asia,

whereas there are ample natural resources in Central Asia, especially oil and natural gas. Besides, these nascent economies are potential enough advanced to engage in economic trade especially in engaging goods and metallurgy. Central Asian Republics have good prospects for economic cooperation with South Asia in the field of agricultural products also. There is always a great question of food security lingering over South Asia that can even be more effectively addressed under regional cooperation.

However, the geographical proximity is a mirage to this identity. This demands in clearer terms from South Asian countries to align their interest and homogenize their agenda vis-à-vis Central Asian states. This demands South Asia acceding Pakistan's suzerainty over Afghanistan. Unless this authorized or put consent to, there can be no meaningful economic-regional cooperation between both the regions.

This approach brings forth the linkup of Kashmir issue with Afghanistan. The relations between India and Pakistan emerge as an important coordinate in regional extension of South Asian linkages with Central Asia. Another important issue is the question of integration of people of Afghanistan in South Asia. This demands a lot of trust building, something that is a rare commodity in tribal society. The existent form of integration is neither stable nor viable for conducting any international relations.

Here, India owes special role in putting trust building measures both with respect to Afghanistan and Pakistan. But this approach has always been shied upon. The new road link via Iran are only self-consolatory in vision and provide no solution to the deep gap between South Asia and Central Asia that demands filling.

This brings us to the point of asking: What should be the South Asian outlook to this situation so as to extend the line of communication with Central Asia.

South Asia and Central Asia as Geopolitical Regions

The deep ethno-political undercurrents have been stronger variables influencing the inter-state relations in South Asia. The Central Asian response to the situation is important, as it shall demarcate the geopolitical frontiers between the two regions. The quest for a secular democratic outlook by CARs is in tandem to South Asian approach for inter-state relations but it only consolidates the Afghan barrier between South Asia and Central Asia. This in geopolitical terms stretches the frontier from Afghanistan to Pakistan. This is important from Indian security perspective on two issues.

One, the potential instability of Afghanistan, visualizing from the days of Cold War needs to be curtailed at this frontier only. Thus, containing ethno-Islamic terrorism and instable Kashmir situation with one chord. The second interest is to degrade any point of inflexion in the Indo-centric monocline gradient of South Asia.

The Kashmir issue is a major fault line running across the South Asian region. It is the region with an uncalculated risk of war. The CIA report in its analyses of South Asia has to add that

> "The widening strategic and economic gaps between the two principal powers, India and Pakistan—and the dynamic interplay between their mutual hostility and the instability in Central Asia—will define the South Asia region in 2015."

The ethnic posture is one of the concurrent streams of concerns between South Asia and Central Asia. Afghanistan is both locational and historical linkage to this aspect. Its failure in perpetuity has posed grave concerns for political stability in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan and for India in South Asia.

The Indian Factor

India was benefited enormously with the Cold War geo-strategic balance. The massive challenge of poverty and famine

were taken up through prodigious five-year planning and infrastructure development model envisioned along socialist path of reconstruction. Central Asia provided a noble example to world planners of social and economic transformation at a single go, a perfect inspiration for post-colonial India. The story of Indian development has preserved relevance of regional cooperation in decentralized manner throughout the shifting global balance of power, and the factors of socialist path of nation building that are relevant even at present.

Natural resources are important in raising economic production and expanding employment opportunities for the masses. They are also important in augmenting poverty reduction programmes, if they ensure enough food security and external trade. The size of economy and share of exports and imports in GDP (% terms) is important indicator revealing the access to natural resources both domestic and external. India is the largest economy in the region. The only other significant economies are of Pakistan and Bangladesh. In the absence of complementariness in the structure of merchandise export, we find there is little potential for South Asia to be an economically viable unit when trading with ASEAN, EU and others is far more promising. Global finance is an important variable in terms of accessibility to resources. India draws more than twice of the foreign direct investment than the rest of South Asia. In fact, global assets in South Asia are more or less concentrated in India.

Growth of science and technology has been phenomenal in India. The country has stunned the world by a stark contrast of massive poverty and illiteracy on the one hand and rapid strides taken in space technology, nuclear science and presently in computer sciences. These are unparallel strengths of India that surpass far the progress of any other South Asian state, and in fact the true guarantor for Indian security concerns.

The Possible Response

Central Asia may altogether give a new turn to these situations. They may take up dual approach with the evident duality of South Asian identity. They may talk of economic cooperation with both Pakistan and India on separate forums. Already, they have joined ECO, where along with Islamic countries they have tried to forge a community. Turkmenistan has already shown extra cordial interests with Pakistan. There can be no objection to that but it only reveals the reigning discord that can underplay the efforts for regional cooperation.

It is more impetuous that India and Central Asia initiate their interaction based on their economic strengths. The fact is that political and geo-strategic concerns offer much more complex and hazy formulations. The more reliable basis for cooperation is to keep in track with the Cold War legacy that has not left altogether and pursue the broad ranging dialogue wherein an effort towards the geopolitical solutions can be made. There is a unique responsibility for India and Uzbekistan to explore the deeper contacts that have been carried throughout Soviet days. India-Uzbekistan-Russia linkage serves as a natural harbourage to the legacy of Moscow-Delhi ties.

The later stage can rely upon basic effort to form regional forum with a possibly of *SAARC-EEC Regional Cooperation Forum*. The major initiatives should be taken on trilateral basis by India, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. This should be one of the toeing principles of Indian diplomacy in order to carry the Cold War commonality of interests further. Also this should demarcate clear cut sectoral priorities so as to impress other potential powers around Central Asia that there is no intermingling of interest. The perceived cooperation in primary and secondary sectors can be beneficial, however, one also look for India specific sectors such as information technology, agro-based food products and travel and tourism.

India owes much to efforts of containing of the ethno-fundamentalist overtures by these states. This shall provide the delimitation of geopolitical interests between the two regions in its interest and Central Asia.

Regional Cooperation as Delimiting Tool between South Asia and Central Asia

The New World Order may render geopolitical world into anachronism in a post-Cold War era, but security concerns are more acute than ever before. There is a debate on whether Cold War was a boon or a bane for developing world. One can be certain about the developed world that they are much better placed now. The developing countries might feel the loss of security cover provided by Soviet Union. At the same time, they also have the opportunity to objectively judge their needs on security of economy and political freedom. There are no more obligations to be party of a greater alliance, but all the more is the need to identify the common interest between nations.

The New World Order incorporates the Old World conflicts in a more refined manner. There are no bully postures although, but there are conflict patterns of national interests among nations. If the international relations discern this rising tide, then geopolitics acts as a continental shelf providing it an extra momentum every time with its increasing swell.

Although Huntington overrode the term civilization, he largely succeeded in demonstrating most of these conflict patterns in the post-Cold War World. Cohen's shatter-belts, gateway states/regions are precursor to this approach.

The dichotomy of challenge is that at one level the national interests align around cultural variables inviting conflict with their own framework, especially in plural societies, and at the second level the economic interests regarding growth and development opportunities provide the focus for class based antagonisms at all scales, from domestic to

global. The effort to safeguard the developmental and cultural interests is a dual effort of nations in international arena.

The new approach to geopolitical theory incorporating world economic influences has only been visible under a liberalized world; so shall be its contradictions. The major task of a geographer is to locate the potentialities of these mega-processes and predict the possible directions. Although, he always finds himself, taking sides at different points of time. To emerge out of these contradictions successfully is also one of the major challenges for a geographer.

Globalization has been a nodal network in one sense between regions. India provides this nodal facility to South Asian region given the size of the economy it commands and the volume of its trade and commerce with rest of the world. The Gujral doctrine was a concrete formulation to this effect. However, the inertia of Indian domestic politics renders the regional dynamics of South Asia lopsided. The frictions between India and Pakistan are the major source of regional de-stability. The extension of this conflict along ethno-religious lines has also seriously constricted the state's capacity to negotiate any meaningful approach to present deadlock. Both the states have allowed proliferation of such tendencies during the last decade to unmanageable proportions.

Since times anon, both the sub-continents experienced crossing of peoples and ideas. The making of present South Asia owes much to Central Asia, as the gains from Soviet model have been already mentioned. Afghanistan served as the passage prior to advent of Western imperialists. The strong Indo-Sasanian, Mughal traditions substantially modified the cultural fabric of South Asia.

Epilogue

Regional cooperation and geopolitical understanding seem to be strange bed fellows. Yet, the whole Cold War period ran through a course of such tactics with strategic and economic cooperation hand in hand. This served as a security cover for

the sovereignty and economic growth of Third World countries. The major change in the post-polar has been the absence of generous help by socialist nations under the leadership of Soviet Union. The rapid strides in economic development and industrial self-reliance was possible only due to all out approach to help construct the post-colonial economy of Third World nations.

Development of geopolitical strategies was abandoned at no point of time since World War-II. They were needed more than ever before under newer military doctrines. The race to an unmatched superiority as the only assurance of anti-aggression paved to serious arms race way back in 80s.

The trilogy of neo-colonization of the capitalist West, revolutionary socialism of Soviet Bloc and development cry of Third World countries became enmeshed into a series of conflict most notably beginning with the Korean Peninsula, Vietnam War, Arab-Israel conflict, Indian Ocean dominance and at its highest with the Cuban Missile crisis. The fate of Third World loomed large between development and destruction. The 'retreat' of socialism and unmatched superiority of war-capitalism has put at least this threat to some distant future. But the element of uncertainty has grown more than ever before with increasing manoeuverability of developing and erstwhile socialist nations to point focus upon their strengths vis-à-vis the capitalist West. Thus, in one sense there has been ever more the need felt by the West to have an effective strategy of dominance. The US initiative for a national missile defence system is the clear assertion of idea of unmatched superiority that has won over the concept of competitive and assured security of Cold War days. The absence of a reliable deterrence is one of the post-Cold War phenomena that may spurt arms at regional scale.

A major challenge to the 'post-polar' (term acceptably used by CIA in its report) world would involve maintaining regional geo-strategic balance and fighting the independent

operators of terrorism and drug trafficking. According to CIA estimates:

> "Current annual revenues from illicit criminal activities include: $100-300 billion from narcotics trafficking; $10-12 billion from toxic and other hazardous waste dumping; $9 billion from automobile theft in the United States and Europe; $7 billion from alien smuggling; and as much as $1 billion from theft of intellectual property through pirating of videos, software, and other commodities."

Another major threat to community of nations is the intra-state quest for identity through efforts for secession or de-recognizing the federal elements of state structure by means of acts of terrorism or violation of state machinery. These are major concern for Third World countries with plural society but weak economies. The attempt to replace the state system by alter-state systems based on either religion or ethno-political lines pose serious threat to democracy and regional cooperation. Among the most conspicuous has been the ethno-Islamic sectarianism.

Given the situation, modern geopolitical theory can bank upon certain assumptions. The world military order remains far from clear than what it used to be during Cold War days, i.e., American superiority in terms of weapons shall certainly remain, but their political and diplomatic finesse may loose out on the account of lack of concerns akin to Cold War days. The coming century shall witness tremendous spurt in growth of theatre warfare technologies, similar to Star Wars Programme. The so-called rouge states may develop credible missile strike capability. But the threat to global peace and development lies somewhere else.

Bibliography

Adhikari, Sudeepta (1992), *Fundamentals of Geographical Thought*, Chaitanya Publishing House, Allahabad.

Agarwal, Sushila (1985), *Third World and New International Order*, Aalekh Publishers, Jaipur.

Ahady A-u-L (1998), Saudi Arabia, Iran and the Conflict in Afghanistan in *Fundamentalism Reborn? Afghanistan and the Taliban* (ed.) W. Malley.

Anwar, Raja (1988), *The Tragedy of Afghanistan*, Verso, London.

Arkhipov, Anatoli and Kuznetsova, Tamara, (1976), *Soviet Experience in Organizing Farmer's Cooperative*, Novosti Press, Moscow.

Banerjee, D., 'Emergence of Central Asia', *Asian Strategic Review*, 1991-92.

Bello, Walden, 'UNCTAD: Time to Lead, Time to Challenge the WTO'. http://www.zmag.org/CrisesCurEvts/Globalism/unctadbello.htm.

Dhani, A.H. (1999), "Buddhism to Islam: Cultural Links between Central Asia & South Asia" in *Culture, Society and Politics in Central Asia and India*, ed. NN Vohra.

Dikshit, R.D. (1994), *The Art and Science of Geography—Integrated Readings*, Prentice-Hall India, New Delhi.

Dikshit, R.D. (1995), *Political Geography—The Discipline and Its Dimensions*, Tata McGraw-Hill, New Delhi.

Dikshit, R.D. (1997), *Geographical Thought—A Contextual History of Ideas*, Prentice-Hall India, New Delhi.

Dwivedi, R.L. (1990), *The Fundamentals of Political Geography*, Chaitanya Publishing House, Allahabad.

Ershov, V.V., Novikov, A.A. and Popova, G.B. (1988), *Fundamentals of Geology*, Mir Publishers, Moscow.

Glatzer, B. (1998), "Is Afghanistan on the Brink of Ethnic & Tribal Disintegration?" in *Fundamentalism Reborn? Afghanistan and the Taliban*, ed. William Malley.

Gudozhnik, G.S. (1990), *Civilization and Global Problems*, Progress Publishers, Moscow.

Harrison, S.S. (1991), "Fanning Flames in South Asia" in *Pakistan and South Asian Environment* ed. Qureshi, E.A.

Hartshorn, Truman A. and Alexander, John W., (1992), *Economic Geography*, Prentice-Hall India, New Delhi.

Hartshorne, Richard, (2000), *The Nature of Geography*, Rawat Publications, Jaipur.

Hopkirk, Peter, (1990), *The Great Game: On Secret Service in High Asia*, OUP, UK.

Huntington, S.P. (1996), *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, Penguin.

Hurst, M.E. (1972), *A Geography of Economic Behavior*, Duxburry Press.

Hussain, Majid (1999), *Evolution of Geographical Thought*, Rawat Publications, Jaipur.

Jiali Ma, "Central Asia: Geo-strategic Situation and Big Powers' Policies" in *Contemporary Central Asia*, Vol. III, No. 1, 1999.

Kasperson, Roger E. and Minghi, Julian V. (1970), *The Structure of Political Geography*, University of London Press, London.

Kaushik, Devendra (1970), Central Asia in Modern Times—A History from the Early 19th Century, Progress Publishers, Moscow.

Kaushik, Devendra (1976), *Socialism in Central Asia—A Study in the Transformation of Socio-ethnic Relations in Soviet Central Asia*, Allied Publishers Ltd., New Delhi.

Khidirbekughli, Doulatbek, "Geopolitics and Democracy". http://www.freenet.kz/~alumni/doulatbek/book2/the_geopolitics_and_democracy.htm.

Lavrov, S. and Sdasyuk, G. (1988), *Concepts of Regional Development*, Progress Publishers, Moscow.

Lenin, V.I. (1977), Selected Works, Vol. I, II, III, Progress Publishers, Moscow.

Lenin, V.I. (1980), *The State*, Progress Publishers, Moscow.

Lenin, V.I. (1983), *On State Capitalism during the Transformation to Socialism*, Progress Publishers, Moscow.

Loughlin, John O. (1984), "Geographic Models of International Conflict" in *Political Geography: Recent Advances and Future Direction*, ed. Peter Taylor and John House.

Mackenzie, R. (1998), "The US & the Taliban" in *Fundamentalism Reborn? Afghanistan and the Taliban* ed. W. Malley.

Marx, Karl and Engels, Frederick (1988), *The First Indian War of Independence 1857-1859*, Progress Publishers, Moscow.

Marx, Karl and Engels, Frederick (1989), Selected Works Vol. I, II, III, Progress Publishers, Moscow.

Mazari, Shireen M., "Continuing Centrality of Geopolitics in the Post-bipolar World". http://www.defencejournal.com.

Meier, Gerald M. (1995), *Leading Issues in Economic Development*, OUP, New Delhi.

Muir, R. (1997), *Political Geography—A New Introduction*, Macmillan Press, London.

Owens, Mackubin Thomas, "In Defense of Classical Geopolitics". http://www.nwc.navy.mil/press/Review/1999/autumn/art3-a99.htm.

Patnaik, A. (1999), "Socio-cultural Changes in Post Soviet Central Asia" in *Culture, Society and Politics in Central Asia and India*, ed. N.N. Vohra.

Rahul, Ram (1973), *Politics of Central Asia*, Vikas Publishing House, New Delhi.

Rashid, A. (1998), "Pakistan & Taliban" in *Fundamentalism Reborn? Afghanistan and the Taliban* ed. W. Malley.

Rubin, Barnett R. (1995), *The Fragmentation of Afghanistan: State Formation and Collapse in the International System*, Yale University Press, Chicago.

Rubin, Barnett R. (1995), *The Search for Peace in Afghanistan: From Buffer State to Failed State*, Yale University Press, London.

Sengupta, B.B. (1986), *Regional Cooperation and Development in South Asia*, Vol. 2.

Shahrani, M.N. (1998), "The Future of the State and the Structure of Community Governance in Afghanistan" in *Fundamentalism Reborn? Afghanistan and the Taliban* ed. W. Malley.

Stobdan, P. (2000), "India and Central Asia: Imperative for Regional Cooperation in Peace and Security in Central Asia" in *Occasional Paper Series*, IDSA, New Delhi.

Tuthail, Gearoid O., At the End of Geopolitics? http://www.majbill.vt.edu/Geog/faculty/toal/papers/End.htm.

Uberoi, J.P.S. (1970), "Between Oxus and Indus—A Local History of the Frontier" in *Central Asia—Movements of Peoples and Ideas from Times Prehistoric to Modern*, ed. Guha Amalendu, Vikas Publications, New Delhi.

Uzbek Society for Friendship and Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, (1977), *Agriculture in Uzbekistan*, Tashkent.

Uzbek Society for Friendship and Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, (1977), *Culture and Art of Uzbek People*, Tashkent.

Uzbek Society for Friendship and Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries (1977), *Public Education in Uzbekistan*, Tashkent.

Uzbek Society for Friendship and Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, (1977), *Welfare of Uzbek People*, Tashkent.

Warikoo, K. (1989), *Central Asia and Kashmir*, Gyan Publishing House, New Delhi.

Weinbaum, M.G. (1994), Pakistan and Afghanistan—Resistance and Reconstruction, Westview Press, Oxford.

Yaffe, David, "Globalization: A Redivision of the World by Imperialism". http://www.rcgfrfi.easynet.co.uk/marxism/articles/glob131.htm.

Other Internet Sources

1. Almaty Herald Online, http://www.herald.asdc.kz
2. Central Asia Caucasus Analyst, http://www.cacianalyst.org
3. Central Asia Monitor, http://www.chalidze.com
4. Central Asia News Analysis, http://www.ferghana.ru/news/english.html
5. Central Asia Regional Information: Internet Resources, http://www.indiana.edu
6. Central Asian Studies World Wide, http://www.fas.harvard.edu/~casww

7. CIA World Fact book, http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook.
8. Energy Information Administration, http://www.eia.doe.gov
9. Fact Sheet: Sanctions Against the Taliban in Afghanistan, http://wwwhusis.html
10. Geology and Petroleum Potential of Central Asia, http://riceinfo.rice.edu/projects/baker/index.html
11. Group of 77, http://www.g77.org
12. Harvard Forum for Central Asian Studies, http://www.fas.harvard.edu/~centasia
13. History of Central Asia, http://www.Britannica.com
14. Human Rights in the New World Order—Noam Chomsky, http://www2.prestel.co.uk/cgi
15. ICARP—Interactive Central Asia Resource Project, www.icarp.org
16. International Monetary Fund, http://www.imf.org
17. Islam and Energy Security in Central Asia, http://riceinfo.rice.edu/projects/baker/index.html
18. Journal Of International Affairs, http://www.columbia.edu.
19. Pannier, Bruce, Kyrgyzstan: Ancient Silk Road City, Osh, Celebrates 3,000 Years, http://www.rferl.org
20. Rashid, Ahmed, Juma Namangani Returns to Tajikistan for Fresh Offensive, CACA, http://www.cacianalyst.org
21. Renewable Energy World, http://www.oma.ws
22. South Centre, http://www.southcentre.org
23. The Caspian Times, http://www.caspiantimes.com
24. The Center For Political and Strategic Studies, http://www.cpss.org
25. The Dawn, http://dawn.com
26. The Geopolitics of Oil in Central Asia, http://www.hri.org/MFA/thesis/winter98/geopolitics.html
27. The Hindu, http://www.indiaserver.com
28. The Moscow Times, http://www.themoscowtimes.com
29. The Times of Central Asia, http://www.times.kg
30. The USGS World Energy Home Page, http://certnetra.cr.usgs.gov/energy/index.html
31. UNCTAD, http://www.unctad.org

32. UN Group of Experts Recommendations Report: Globalisation & State—An Overview. http://unpan/un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents.
33. Uzbekistan Daily Digest, http://www.eurasianet.org
34. Washington Post Service, http://www.iht.com
35. World Bank, http://www.worldbank.org
36. World Trade Organization, http://www.wto.org

Index

Ackermann, E.A., 75
Afghan ethnicity, 121–36
AIOC, 167
Air isolationism, 41
Alexander, 34
American geopolitics, 41–42
Animal husbandry products, 192–94
Anwar, 130
Aristotle, 26, 34
ASEAN, 203
Ashin, G., 92
Asian Relations Conference, 86

Backwash effect, 81
Balche, Vidal de la, 27, 34, 35, 64
Bandung Conference, 5
Boudeville, Jacques, 80
Bretton Woods Conference, 63
British geopolitics, 42–46
Brook, 66
Buddhism, 23, 24, 25
Byzan, Barry, 55

Capitalism, 28, 70, 80, 83
CARs (Central Asian Republics), 3, 7, 8, 13, 20, 22, 95, 112, 129, 138, 142, 152, 160, 161, 165, 169, 179, 184, 189, 193, 198, 202
Central and South Asia,
  as geoeconomic regions, 200–01
  as geopolitical regions, 202–05
  basic delineations, 3–4
  co-operation as delimiting tool, 205–06
  geostrategic outlook, 5–7
  geostrategic regional co-operation, 7–12
  regional geography, 13–20
  socio-economic indicators, 20–23
  historical cultural ties, 23–24
  Kashmir as entrepot, 24–25
  review, 126–29
  geopolitical matrix, 160–65

Central Asia: geo-economics of oil and natural gas, 165–76
Central Asia: geographic status, 143–60
  China, 150–51
  Defence and security, 154–60
  Iran, 147–50
  Russia, 144–47
  South Asian influence, 152–54
  Turkey, 150

Central Asian Economic Community, 110
CIA, 207, 208
CIEC, 85
CII, 184, 185
Clash of civilizations, 2, 34, 54
CNPC, 167, 168
Cohen, Saul B., 27, 48–50, 58, 205
Cold War, 1, 27, 28, 31, 32, 42, 54, 56, 63, 85, 86, 90, 95, 130, 137, 164, 177, 202, 204,206, 208
Concerns for Central Asia, 110–11
Contradictions of capitalism: special manifestations, 78–83
CPSU, 136
Crush Zone Concept, 46

Dani, Ahmed H., 24
Darwinism, 35
Davis, Glyn, 130
Devare, S.T., 186
Development of geoeconomic thought, 63–93
  concept of region, 65–67
  economic activity, 67–70
  geopolitics and geoeconomics, 90–93
  geopolitics of globalization, 78–83
  globalization and regionalization, 83–90
  world view, 70–78

Diffusion framework, 52–53
dlebensraum, 31
Duverger, Maurice, 92

EAPC, 159
ECO, 159, 160, 200, 204
Economic activity, 67–70
Economic space, 78
Egalitarian internationalism, 42
EIA, 169, 172
Eratosthenes, 34
Ethnicity, 102–05, 121–36
Ethno-political formations, 114–20
Fairgrieve, James, 46
FDI (Foreign Direct Investment), 76, 77, 82
First World War, 39, 40
Founding fathers of geo-political thought, 36–39
  Alfred Thayer Mahan, 37-38
  Friedrich Ratzel, 36–37
  Rudolf Kjellen, 38–39

French Revolution, 5
Fukuyama, Francis, 54
G-77, 29, 77
Gandhi, Mahatma, 86
Gateway states and regions, 50
GDP, 22, 82, 169, 187, 203
genres de vie, 64
Geocultural entrépot, 24–25
Geoeconomic poles, 71–73
Geoeconomic thought, 63–93
Geoeconomics, 55, 57, 92
Geoeconomics of capital, 73-78
Geographic instinct, 39
Geographical space, 78
Geographical thought, 34
Geopolinomics, 57
Geopolitical dynamics, 3–4
Geopolitical matrix, 160–65
Geopolitical theory, 31–60
  can and pro, 56–58
  development of thought, 32–36
  founding fathers, 36–39
  limits and opportunities, 59–60
  major schools, 39–51
  modelling conflict, 51–53
  post-cold war, 53–56
Geopolitical thought, 32–39
Geopolitics, 26, 27, 32, 33, 35, 41, 53, 56–58, 59, 63, 78, 93
Geopolitics and geoeconomics, 90–93
Geopolitics of containment, 46–47
Geopolitics of globalization, 78
Geostrategic regional co-operation, 7–12
German Geopolitik, 40–41
Glatzer, Berntz, 121
Globalization, 3, 4, 6, 9, 29, 63, 73, 86, 206
GNP, 72
Gray, Colin, 33, 58, 59
Great Game, 9, 17, 199
Growth poles, 79, 80
GSF, 162, 163, 164
GSTP, 89
Gujral, I.K., 134, 183
Gyorgy, Andrew, 42

Hartstone, Richard, 27, 65, 66
Haushofer, Banse and Grimm, 40
Herodotus, 26, 34
Historical cultural ties, 23–24
Hitler, 40
Hitmat, Said Ibrahim, 153
Huntington, Samuel, 54

ICBMs, 60
Imperialism, 70
IMU, 153, 154
Indian and Central Asia, 176–94
  cooperation with CARs, 179–82
  legacy of Moscow-Delhi ties, 177-79
  gas and oil transportation, 182–85

prospects in agriculture, 186–92
Prospects in animal husbandry products, 192-94
Indian factor, 202–03
Indus Valley Civilization, 9
Inner Crescent, 32, 43
International Conflicts Models, 51–53
International Monetary Fund, 74, 85, 158
International politics, 59
International Standards Association, 74
International Telecommunication Union, 74
IPPs, 156
ITCZ, 19
Ivanov, 178

JWC (Joint Working Group), 181, 182

Kalhana, 24
Kanishka, 25
Kaplan, Robert, 54
Kaushik, Devendra, 102
Kennan, George, 47
Khan, Dost Mohammad, 124
Khan, Genghis, 99, 100
Kissinger, Henry, 27, 53
Kjellen, Rudolf, 26, 35, 38–39

Laden, Osama Bin, 127
landschafteil, 65
Landuse, 27
lebensraum, 26, 36, 37
Lenin, 55, 81, 82
Lewis, Arthur, 72, 73
Liberalization, 4, 86
LNG, 170, 171
Locational analysis of conflict, 48–51
locus standi, 137
Logic of conflict, 56
Lösch, August, 79
Loughlin, John O., 27, 51
Luttwark, Edward, 55

M&As, 82, 83
Mackinder, 26, 28, 32, 41–46, 55, 58, 72, 83
Mahan, 26, 37–38
Major schools of geopolitics, 40–53
American geopolitics, 41–42
British school, 42–46
containment, 46–47
German geopolitik, 40–41
locational analysis of conflict, 48–53
Marx, 17, 55, 70
Maull, Otto, 40
Midland Basin, 71
Military doctrine, 145, 146
MNCs, 76, 77, 170
Mohammed, Mahathir, 6
Monrovski doctrine, 146
Morganthou, 51
Muslim Economic Cooperation Organization, 150
Myrdal, Gunnar, 81

NACC, 156
NAM, 29, 77, 88, 89, 90, 200
Napoleon, 59
Narco-terrorism, 11
National security concept, 145
NATO, 1, 11, 145, 146, 156, 158
Nazarbayev, 112
Neo-colonialism, 71
New International Economic Order, 83
New World Order, 73, 90, 205
NIEO, 1
Non-Alignment Movement, 84
Nyerere, 88

Oil geopolitics, 8–9
Old World, 205
ONGC, 185
Organic state theory, 36
Organization of economic activity, 68–70
OSCE, 156, 158
Outer Crescent, 28, 43, 83
Owens, 41, 48

Paelink, J., 80
Pathological concepts, 79
Perroux, Francis, 78, 79, 80
Phillips and Love, 5
Physiography, 16–17
Piao, Lin, 55
Post-cold war geopolitics, 53-56
prima facie, 121, 197
Putin, Vladimir, 128, 179
QIR univariate test, 52

Rafsanjani, 149
Ratzel, 26, 36, 37
Raw material appendage, 5
Regional Cooperation and Third World, 5–7
Regional geography, 13–20
climate, 18–20
drainage, 17–18
physiography, 16–17

Regional semblance, 95–138
brief history, 97–102
comparative, 114–20
culture, society and politics, 109–13
ethnicity and nation state, 121–36
geographic setting, 96–97
modern central Asia, 102–09
reflexion, 136–38
Rimland theory, 46
Rosecrance and Mathews, 54
Royal Geographical Society, 43, 45
Rumble's social field theory, 51

SAARC, 200, 204
Safarov, Saifullah, 135
Sauvy, Alfred, 5
Schulz-Gaevernitz, 82
Seversky, Alexander de, 32, 41, 42
Shahrani, 124

Singh, Bhisma Narain, 10
SITTDEC, 90
Social and economic indicators, 20–22
Social Darwinism, 37
Sokov, Nikolai, 146
South and Central Asia: historical relevance, 9–12
South Asia: energy scenario, 168–75
South-South cooperation, 28, 87–90
Spread effect, 81
Sprout, 51
Spykman, Nicholas J., 31, 42, 46, 47
STARIMA Methods, 52
status quo, 158
Stoddart, 35
Strabo, 34
Strausz-Hupe, Robert, 42
Structural realism, 55
suo moto, 11

Theory of shatter-belts, 51
Third World, 1, 5, 6, 27, 28, 64, 76, 83, 84, 88, 201
Third World initiative, 83–85
Timur, 100
TNCs, 22, 28-29, 71, 74, 82-83, 207
Transformation of agriculture, 108–09

Ultra-nationalism, 2
UNC, 7
UNCTAD, 29, 76, 84, 200
United Nations, 84, 156

Vajpai, A.B., 3, 179
vice versa, 73

Wallerstein, 55
Weber, Alfred, 79
Whittlesey, Derwent, 42
World Bank, 85, 157, 158
World capitalism, 27
World Development Report, 188
World economy, 63
World financial capitalism, 73
World Investment Report, 76
World War II, 40, 41, 45, 60, 207
WTO, 11, 73, 74, 88

XUAR, 151

Yatte, David, 76
Yellow Peril, 44

Zaeef, Abdul Salam, 152